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ABSTRACT 
JENNIFER M. MILLER: Postdoctoral Appointments: Motivations, Markets, and 
Experiences 
(Under the direction of Maryann Feldman) 
 
This dissertation considers three research questions. Why do scientists become 
postdoctoral scholars (postdocs)? What role do postdocs play relative to other categories of 
labor in research production? What factors are associated with a postdoc being dissatisfied?  
The literature review in Chapter 2 summarizes findings about which scientists are 
most likely to become postdocs, considering characteristics of individual scientists and 
doctoral institutions. The role of individual motivations in determining which students plan 
to become postdocs is incorporated into a conceptual model based on the social 
psychological theory of planned behavior. The theory frames scientists’ motivations for 
postdoc appointments in terms of behavioral attitudes, social norms, and perceived 
behavioral control, moderated by understanding that a postdoc is expected for a desired 
career. 
Chapter 4 models universities’ production of life sciences research as a function of 
capital and labor (doctoral research assistants, postdocs, and faculty). This analysis uses data 
about 145 research universities from the NSF Survey of Graduates and Postdoctorates, the 
2006 NRC Assessment of Research Doctorate Programs, and other sources to estimate a 
translog production function using seemingly unrelated regression to calculate coefficients of 
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complementarity. Universities appear to utilize postdocs as complements to doctoral research 
assistants and faculty in research production. 
In Chapter 5, survey data from 764 postdocs in physical and mathematical, biological, 
and health sciences are used in an ordered probit regression to estimate effects of individual 
and organizational factors on the probability that a postdoc will be dissatisfied with an 
appointment. Postdocs are less likely to be dissatisfied when they find their current research 
interesting, when the appointment is consistent with interest in a faculty research career, and 
when the research has an applied element. Surprisingly, being at an institution with a high-
quality doctoral program does not seem to prevent dissatisfaction. Mediation analyses 
indicate that while postdocs in high-quality programs report greater freedom to shape 
research projects, they interact less frequently with advisors, possibly due to advisors’ 
involvement in research commercialization.  
Chapter 6 integrates findings with the literature and current topics in science and 
workforce policy; discusses implications for policymakers, institutions, and scientists; and 
suggests future research directions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Postdoctoral appointments (postdocs) are an important concern for science and 
technology policy because of their large numbers and the significant contributions they make 
to research and innovation. The National Postdoctoral Association (NPA, 2009) provides the 
following definition of a postdoc: “ … postdocs typically perform research under the 
supervision and mentorship of a more senior researcher, often called the postdoctoral advisor. 
The key characteristic of a postdoc position is that it is a temporary career-building step on 
the path to a more permanent position.” Three aspects of this definition—the time-limited 
nature, mentored research, and career preparation—are consistently used to define postdoc 
appointments in the US (e.g., COSEPUP 2000). 
A recent estimate places the number of postdocs in the US as high as 90,000 
(National Science Board, 2010). According to the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) 2006 
Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR), there are a total of 488,860 science, engineering, and 
health doctorate holders employed in the US, with 226,400 employed in four-year institutions 
of higher education. 34,921 research doctoral degrees in science, engineering, and health 
were awarded in the US in 2008. In 2009, 67.32% of doctorate recipients in the life sciences, 
55.48% in the physical sciences, and 36.72% in engineering took postdoc appointments—in 
each case an increase over prior years (Fiegener 2010; Stephan and Ma 2005). The number of 
foreign postdocs coming to the US with PhD in hand and the proportion of US doctorate 
recipients taking postdoc appointments have both contributed to the growth of the postdoc 
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population (Stephan 2012). These postdocs include some of the most talented and productive 
early career scientists from doctoral programs in the US and around the world (Vogel 1999; 
Zumeta 1985).  
There are concerns, however, that postdocs’ scientific talent, developed at substantial 
public and private cost, may be underutilized in these time-limited appointments that lack the 
stability and autonomy that would allow scientists to tackle high-risk, high-reward research 
during the creative early stage of their careers when their research production should be high 
(Stephan and Ma 2005). From their historical origins as the privilege of a respite from the 
demands of teaching and administrative duties before embarking on a faculty research career, 
some critics assert that postdocs have become a holding pattern and a source of cheap labor 
(Mishagina 2009; Puljak and Sharif 2009).  
In the life sciences, the US annually produces over 8,000 new doctorate recipients 
most of whom will have at least one postdoc appointment (NSF, 2009). When the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) doubled its research funding between the years of 1998 and 2003, 
more students were attracted to life sciences doctoral programs. This effect lagged the 
funding increase by a few years, with the NSF Survey of Graduate Students and 
Postdoctorates reporting a 29% increase in life sciences graduate students between 2001 and 
2006, compared to a 9% increase in other science and engineering fields over the same time 
period. However, as funding levels flattened, career appointments have not always been 
available for newly-trained scientists (Freeman and Van Reenen 2008). The approximately 
$10 billion of funding for life sciences research in the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) of 2009 represents another such sudden but temporary increase in funding. By 
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subsidizing graduate education in response to sharp increases in demand, uneven funding 
levels are thought to be one contributor to the prevalence of postdoc appointments.  
To better inform public policy related to the funding and management of postdocs, 
this dissertation takes a multidisciplinary and multilevel approach to investigate the roles of 
individuals and organizations in the prevalence of and problems with postdoc appointments. 
The six-chapter dissertation has the following structure. Chapter 2 contains a review 
of the literature addressing individual and organizational factors affecting whether scientists 
take postdoc appointments. Chapter 3 elaborates a conceptual model of social psychological 
motivations behind individual decisions to pursue postdoc appointments. Chapter 4 draws on 
microeconomic theory to present a model of the role of postdocs in the production of 
university research. Chapter 5 presents an analysis of survey data revealing factors associated 
with dissatisfaction in postdoc appointments. Chapter 6 concludes with implications for 
policymakers, administrators, and early-career scientists and directions for further research 
on postdocs. Each chapter is summarized below. 
The literature review in chapter two reviews and synthesizes the highly fragmented 
literature on postdoctoral appointments. It draws on the academic literature, government and 
professional association reports, and publicly available data to summarize what is known 
about who becomes a postdoc. One way to approach the question of who becomes a postdoc 
is by examining individual characteristics like personal motivation, human capital, and 
demographics. Another approach considers the role of characteristics of the doctoral 
institution. This review considers both approaches, as well as cross-level effects, to integrate 
knowledge of individual and institutional determinants of postdoctoral study. The review 
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summarizes existing research on postdocs in a series of potentially testable propositions that 
suggest directions for future research. 
Chapter 3 contributes to understanding of the influence of individual-level 
motivations on PhD students’ intentions to pursue a postdoctoral appointment by placing the 
decision to become a postdoc in a theoretical framework based on Ajzen’s (1988) theory of 
planned behavior. This chapter suggests an answer to the question of why students pursue 
graduate degrees that may not lead directly to related career positions by describing a model 
of the influence of behavioral attitudes, social norms, and perceived behavioral control on 
intention to pursue a faculty research position in the long term and a postdoc appointment in 
the near term. A theoretical rationale is considered for the effect of each component of the 
theory of planned behavior on intentions to pursue a faculty research position. The model 
also includes the effect of intentions to pursue a faculty research career on plans to seek a 
postdoc appointment after graduation, moderated by the belief that such an appointment is a 
career prerequisite. Policy implications suggest specific targets for improving access to 
information to improve scientists’ career decisions. 
The contributions of postdocs to the academic research enterprise are well established 
by prior research. However, the mechanism of this contribution is not well understood from 
an economic perspective. Chapter 4 presents an economic model of university research that 
treats doctoral research assistants, postdocs, faculty, and laboratory space (representing 
capital) as inputs in a production function. To answer the question of whether postdocs are 
substitutes for or complements to other inputs in the production of research, this analysis 
combines the extensive data gathered by the National Research Council (NRC) to assess 
research doctorate programs in 2006 with several publicly available data sources. Seemingly 
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unrelated regression is used to estimate the effect of each input on postdocs’ factor share in 
production. The results of these estimates are used to calculate coefficients of 
complementarity.  
 Chapter 5 analyzes survey data to examine which factors are associated with a 
postdoc’s dissatisfaction with an appointment. Dissatisfaction with postdoc appointments is a 
public concern because these appointments often represent a significant investment of public 
funds and dissatisfaction with postdoc appointments may deter the most talented scientists 
from continuing research careers. Dissatisfied postdocs are also a concern for universities 
and other organizations because they rely on postdocs’ research productivity and have 
realized the need to incorporate postdocs more fully into the community of scholars. 
Individual scientists also have a particular interest in avoiding poor choices at the critical 
juncture in their early careers where they select a postdoc appointment. This chapter draws 
on survey data from 764 postdocs at major US universities to examine the factors associated 
with dissatisfaction. Results of an ordered probit regression indicate that the type of research 
conducted, its connection to career goals, supervision, and demographic characteristics affect 
the probability that a postdoc will be dissatisfied. The study also analyzes the mediating roles 
of autonomy, advisor interaction, and advisor involvement in commercialization activities on 
the relationship between program quality and dissatisfaction. The chapter concludes with 
implications for public and institutional policy and for early career scientists considering 
postdoc appointments. 
The concluding chapter integrates these empirical findings with the literature and 
current topics in science and workforce policy to discuss implications for policymakers, the 
institutions that partner closely with government to implement these policies, and individual 
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scientists. The conclusion summarizes the empirical findings to address the following 
questions. How do individual scientists make the decision to take a postdoc appointment? 
What determines whether a postdoc will be dissatisfied with the appointment? What is the 
economic function of postdocs in universities’ production of research? The conclusion also 
presents policy implications and directions for future research.
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Individual and Institutional Antecedents of Postdoc Appointments 
 
As postdoctoral appointments have become more common and prolonged (Stephan 
and Ma 2005), policymakers seek to better understand who becomes a postdoc and why. This 
chapter reviews the literature and advances a series of propositions to guide future research 
on postdoc appointments. The review summarizes the academic literature, government and 
professional association publications, and publicly available data. The emphasis of the 
review is on US postdoc appointments. However, studies set in other countries are also 
included when relevant. 
This review is organized in three sections. The first section reviews evidence about 
how individual-level factors such as motivation, ability, and demographics predict who 
becomes a postdoc. The second section discusses how university-level factors such as 
prestige of the university and features of the doctoral program predict who becomes a 
postdoc. The third section describes potential interactions between individual-level and 
university-level influences.  
A great deal of descriptive information has been compiled about postdocs. Table 1 
provides a chronology of key surveys and descriptive work on postdocs. Table 2 describes 
ongoing NSF surveys that include data about postdocs. The Survey of Earned Doctorates 
(SED) asks new graduates about their post-graduation career plans, which often involve 
taking a postdoc appointment. The SDR asks scientists about their post-graduation 
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employment and training. In some years, the SDR includes more detailed questions about 
postdoc appointments. 
Appendix A summarizes the empirical studies that are the main focus of this review, 
including methodology, key findings, and limitations. Note that many of the studies are 
cross-sectional or retrospective, based on secondary or archival data, reflect samples from 
earlier time periods, and/or are largely descriptive in nature. Several study postdocs outside 
the US.  
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 Prior research suggests that there are a number of individual-level factors that 
influence whether someone will become a postdoc. These factors, suggested by 
psychological, economic, and sociological theory, can be categorized as motivational, human 
capital, and demographic. The following section reviews the existing literature on these 
factors and motivates a series of potentially testable propositions. 
Motivational Factors 
 Perhaps the most straightforward motivation for taking a postdoc appointment is the 
desire for an academic career. However, it might be useful to examine this motivation more 
carefully and distinguish it from other motivations such as interest in a research career that is 
not necessarily academic, belief that a postdoc appointment is a prerequisite for a desired 
career, or a motivation to change direction after completing the doctorate.  
 The SDR asks scientists who have taken postdoc appointments their reasons for 
becoming a postdoc. Trends in these survey responses from 1997-2003 are shown in figure 1. 
The most commonly reported reason for becoming a postdoc is that it is expected for one’s 
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career. A lack of other employment opportunities is less frequently reported and has become 
less frequent over time.  
Postdoc appointments have long been associated with the intention to pursue an 
academic career in the form of a tenure-track academic appointment (Curtis and National 
Research Council 1969). More recent studies have also found this association (Fox and 
Stephan 2001). Taking a post hoc view, those who become tenured faculty are more likely to 
have held a postdoc appointment than scientists who follow other career paths (Zumeta 
1985).  
Some new PhDs become postdocs because they feel that a postdoc appointment is 
required or expected in their field (Curtis and National Research Council 1969). In some 
fields, this belief accurately reflects the reality of scientists’ career paths. Prior research 
suggests that doctoral students’ beliefs about career prospects are influential even when they 
are only partially aligned with actual career paths typical in their field (Fox and Stephan 
2001). As shown in figure 1, the expectation that a postdoc appointment is required or 
expected is the most commonly reported reason for becoming a postdoc among SDR 
respondents. The percentage of respondents citing this reason showed an upward trend 
between 1997 and 1999 and has decreased only slightly in the subsequent two surveys.  
Taking a postdoc appointment may also be associated with the desire or perceived 
need to change fields (Curtis and National Research Council 1969; Libarkin and Finkelstein 
2001). The desire to obtain training in another field was cited in one study as a motivating 
factor by over 40% of biochemists who had taken postdoc appointments (Nerad and Cerny 
1999). Changing research interests could motivate a scientist to change fields. Speculatively, 
those scientists who found themselves in a less engaging area of study during the doctoral 
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program may use the postdoc appointment as a way to transfer their skills to a more 
interesting type of research, assuming that they are still interested in a research career.  
Taste for science. Postdoc appointments may also attract those who aspire to a 
research career, rather than the traditional faculty career including teaching and research. 
Akerlind (2005, 2009) found that Australian postgraduate researchers often described their 
career aspirations in terms of research rather than faculty appointments. Recent work has 
found that an intrinsic motivation or taste for science can have a strong influence on 
scientists’ career choices (Roach and Sauermann 2010; Stern 2004). Such intrinsic 
motivations were found to be stronger in fields where postdoc appointments are common, 
such as the life sciences (Zumeta 1985).  
Career theory suggests that value motivation, such as taste for science, along with 
self-direction, may differentiate between those who persist in careers in science and research 
from those who are more likely to pursue careers in education and health fields (Briscoe and 
Hall 2006; Segers et al. 2008). The role of taste for science may also be interpreted from the 
perspective of needs-supplies fit, in that scientific careers fulfill a perceived need for a work 
environment consistent with scientific values (Edwards 1991). While work on values 
congruence has usually focused on person-organization fit (Edwards and Cable 2009), the 
concept could potentially be applied to occupational choice (Blau et al. 1956). Scientists may 
be willing to make financial and other sacrifices to be scientists because the scientific 
occupation, rather than the employing organization, is congruent with their values. While 
prior studies have not addressed this question specifically, these considerations suggest that 
those with an intrinsic motivation or taste for scientific research are more likely to become 
postdocs. 
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Proposition 1: Taste for science will be positively associated with becoming a 
postdoc. 
 
Human Capital 
 Human capital may play a role in the motivation to become a postdoc in three ways. 
First, scientists’ levels of human capital upon completion of the doctorate may influence 
employers’ selection decisions. These selection decisions may in turn influence who becomes 
a postdoc. Second, scientists may perceive the postdoc appointment as an opportunity to 
further develop their human capital. Third, scientists may see the postdoc appointment as an 
opportunity to signal the human capital they have already developed. 
Human capital theory initially focused on the additional knowledge and skills gained 
through education (Becker 1975). In the extension of this theory to the concept of science 
and technology (S&T) human capital, knowledge and skills are supplemented with tacit 
knowledge, social capital, and connections to scientific networks to better explain the role of 
research experiences in developing scientific capacity (Bozeman, Dietz, and Gaughan 2001). 
Human capital is thought to be more successfully developed when the person is well-
matched to the position or occupation (Jovanovic 1979; McCall 1990) and this results in 
increased productivity and other positive labor market outcomes (Allen and van der Velden 
2001; Bender and Heywood 2009).  
Level of human capital. One implication of human capital theory is that the scientists 
with the most human capital upon completion of the doctorate will be able to secure the most 
desirable positions. Relatively low pay and low job security imply that postdoc appointments 
would be less desirable positions. Some scientists, generally considered to be of lesser 
ability, may find themselves in postdoc appointments for an extended period of time and 
unable to secure a career position (Puljak and Sharif 2009).  
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However, the further implication that the most capable scientists are more likely to 
find career positions and avoid postdoc appointments is generally not supported and may be 
overly simplistic. It is not at all uncommon for scientists of high ability to take postdoc 
appointments (Hornbostel et al. 2009; Zumeta 1985; Bohmer and Von Ins 2009). The role of 
mobility and networks in development of S&T human capital may make postdoc 
appointments desirable, especially to those high-ability scientists who expect high 
productivity in an appointment that is a close fit to their research interests.  
Several previous studies using measures that would seem to be good proxies for 
ability, such as pre-doctoral publications, have failed to find an effect on the probability of 
becoming a postdoc (McGinnis, Allison, and Long 1981; Reskin 1976; Su 2011). There are 
four possible interpretations. First, prior studies may not have had adequate ability measures. 
Second, ability may play no significant role in determining who becomes a postdoc. A third, 
related interpretation is that the effect of ability depends on time period, discipline, or other 
factors; prior studies examined widely varied contexts. Finally, it is possible that this 
relationship is nonlinear, with high ability doctorate recipients becoming postdocs by choice 
for the opportunity to develop S&T human capital and lower ability doctorate recipients 
becoming postdocs by necessity (Zumeta 1985). Despite the failure of prior empirical work 
to demonstrate a consistent relationship between ability and becoming a postdoc, the 
literature suggests the following speculative proposition. 
Proposition 2: Relative to doctorate recipients of average ability, both high and low 
ability recipients will be more likely to become postdocs. 
 
 Development of human capital. The literature has discussed development of 
generalist skills more than the types of specific scientific capabilities or technical skills that 
would be signaled through academic publications. This is somewhat surprising, since 
 
 
13 
 
scientists themselves report subject matter knowledge as the greatest benefit from their 
postdoc appointments (See figure 2). Concerns have been expressed about knowledge and 
skill development. Postgraduate researchers in Australia reported that the skills they were 
developing were targeted toward faculty positions that combined research and teaching, but 
that these positions were scarce and the postdocs were often more interested in pure research 
positions (Akerlind 2009). Some of these Australian postdocs did not consider themselves to 
be in training at all. It is also not clear whether postdoc appointments serve the purpose of 
further developing scientists’ abilities. If postdoc appointments are holding patterns or 
signals (Mishagina 2009; Recotillet 2007), graduates have no rational reason to become 
postdocs for skill development. 
In practice there has been a significant effort to improve skill development 
opportunities for postdocs, especially in the areas of generalist skills such as project 
management, communication, and proposal writing (Davis 2009). Studies have also found 
that those who complete a PhD quickly may be more likely to become postdocs (Recotillet 
2007; National Research Council 1981; Laudel and Gläser 2008). If postdoc appointments 
have value for skill development, they may have greater appeal to students with less 
developed skill levels. Here skill does not refer to research achievement measures, such as 
publications, or inherent scientific ability, but to skills such as teamwork, project 
management, and communication usually acquired through professional experience. 
Although there are other possible explanations, the finding that increasing age reduces the 
chance of becoming a postdoc is consistent with this line of reasoning (Zumeta 1985; 
Recotillet 2007; McGinnis, Allison, and Long 1981). Alternatively, students without these 
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skills may not be competitive for career positions, and so may find themselves in postdoc 
appointments by default. 
The postdoc appointment may also be an important stage in the transition from 
student to independent researcher (Laudel and Gläser 2008). Two aspects of becoming an 
independent researcher are selecting research topics and obtaining grant funding. Although 
the sample was small, one study found that PhD students whose advisors had assigned their 
dissertation topics were more likely to become postdocs (Curtis and National Research 
Council 1969). Surveys of postdocs reveal that proposal-writing is a key skill they hope to 
develop during their appointments (Davis 2009; Chang et al. 2005; Helbing, Verhoef, and 
Wellington 1998). These findings suggest that doctoral students who have had experiences 
with selecting research topics and obtaining funding may be less likely to become postdocs, 
as they will perceive fewer new skills to be gained from the experience.  
Stephan and Ma (2005) express concern that human capital is not put to its highest 
use during the extended postdoctoral periods that have become typical. In combination with 
the emphasis on generalist skills, this concern suggests that the first postdoc appointment 
may be the most valuable to augmenting human capital. Mishagina (2009) found that 
scientists who had multiple postdoc appointments were more likely to leave science and 
engineering, indicating that these subsequent positions served as waiting lists rather than 
skill-developing opportunities. It may make sense to differentiate between postdocs in their 
first appointment, when they are likely to be developing new generalist skills, from those in 
subsequent appointments. Generalist skills receive a lot of attention in qualitative and 
practitioner-oriented work, but there appears to be little known about their specific place in 
scientific training and careers.  
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The following proposition could be tested to increase understanding of the role of 
generalist skills.1 
Proposition 3: Opportunities to develop generalist skills during or prior to the 
doctoral program will be negatively associated with becoming a postdoc. 
 
Signalling human capital. New doctorate recipients may see postdoc appointments as 
not only a way to acquire human capital, but also a valuable way to signal their ability 
through the norms of open science (Dasgupta and David 1994). This explanation is consistent 
with the high level of academic publishing achieved by many postdocs (Cheung 2008; 
Corley and Sabharwal 2007; Kyvik and Olsen 2008). Dasgupta and David suggest that even 
scientists who eventually want to work in industrial settings where proprietary research is the 
norm may seek postdoc appointments that allow them to establish a track record of 
publications. The potential to use the postdoc appointment to signal human capital already 
developed suggests the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: New doctorate recipients with a high proportion of research in the 
pre-publication stage relative to their number of publications will be more likely to 
take postdoc appointments. 
 
Demographic Characteristics 
 Postdoc appointments have been used to examine the extent to which universal and 
meritocratic norms prevail in science, as opposed to particularistic norms that judge scientists 
and their work based on personal characteristics (Reskin 1976; Long and Fox 1995). 
Demographic factors that have been studied with regard to their relationship to postdoc 
appointments include gender, race, nationality, age, and discipline. Nationality may also 
                                                            
1 This proposition could also be explored at the university level from the perspective of 
Laudel and Gläser’s (2008) hypothesis that some universities act as free riders in the training 
of doctoral students and utilization of postdocs. 
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moderate the effects of gender and discipline. While the relationship between a demographic 
characteristic and an outcome is not usually interpreted causally, it can be seen as an 
indication that particularist norms or social roles influence outcomes. 
 Gender. Of these demographic characteristics, the most extensively studied has been 
gender, consistent with the expectation of social role theory that men and women will behave 
differently base on their distribution into different social roles, especially in the contexts of 
work and family life (Eagly, Wood, and Diekman 2000). Many studies fail to find significant 
differences between women and men in the probability of becoming a postdoc (Zumeta 
1985; Recotillet 2007; National Research Council 1981; Helbing, Verhoef, and Wellington 
1998). Nolan, Buckner, Marzabadi, and Kuck (2008) found that women chemists were less 
likely to become postdocs. However, many studies do indicate that gender has an effect 
through interaction with marriage (Zumeta 1985; Curtis and National Research Council 
1969; National Research Council 1981), children (Martinez et al. 2007), and spousal 
employment (Helbing, Verhoef, and Wellington 1998). These interaction effects may be 
stronger for foreign-born scientists, since social roles vary across cultures (Martinez et al. 
2007; Mukhopadhyay and Higgins 1988). Even the interaction effects are sometimes 
ambiguous in direction. One possible explanation is that in some cases women who have 
family constraints take postdoc appointments instead of career jobs. In other cases, they may 
forego postdoc appointments due to family constraints. Women of higher scientific ability 
might be more likely to find themselves in the first situation and women of lesser ability in 
the second. It seems prudent for future studies to control for gender and its interactions with 
marriage and children. Studies that aim to explain the role of gender in postdoctoral 
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appointments should include other variables that are likely to be relevant, such as marital 
status and parenthood. 
US native male scientists may be particularly unlikely to become postdocs due to 
motivation or opportunity to pursue more highly paid opportunities within and outside of 
academic science (Black and Stephan 2010; Stephan 2012). Martinez et al. (2007) also found 
an interaction between nationality, gender, and marriage, with married men from the US 
being less likely to make accommodations for a spouse’s career. This somewhat surprising 
finding may relate to cultural differences, the fact that non-US respondents had already made 
the decision to study in a foreign country, or possibly non-US respondents not being sure 
how to answer the question if the spouse did not have a career. It seems likely that the 
findings by Martinez et al. would generalize beyond the NIH sample they studied and to the 
postdoctoral career stage. 
Proposition 5: Gender per se will not have a direct effect on the probability of 
becoming a postdoc; nationality, gender, and marital status will interact such that 
married men from the US are least likely to become postdocs, other factors being 
equal. 
 
Nationality. For the many graduate students from outside the US, there are also 
motivations related to the opportunities, incentives, and institutions surrounding scientific 
career paths in their home countries. Existing research in this area has focused on broad 
classifications, such as visa status and developing country origins. Students from developing 
countries have been found to be more motivated to stay in the US because their earnings 
potential, even as a postdoc, is much higher in the US than in the home country (Lan 2009). 
Developing countries may also have other undesirable characteristics, such as lack of 
facilities, isolation, and undesirable political and social conditions (Commitee on Policy 
 
 
18 
 
Implications of International Graduate Students and Postdoctoral Scholars in the United 
States and Board on Higher Education and Workforce 2005).  
 Doctoral students from some regions and countries are more likely to stay in the US 
after completing their degree (Thurgood, Golladay, and Hill 2006; Finn 2010). The NSF data 
analyzed by Thurgood and his colleagues show that doctoral scientists from Europe and Asia 
are more likely to stay than those from other regions. Within those regions, graduate students 
from China, India, and Russia are most likely to stay in the US. Since postdoc appointments 
take place primarily in the US, it seems likely that those who are more likely to stay are also 
more likely to become postdocs.  
On the other hand, some scientists who have opportunities for attractive scientific 
careers at home may be less likely to become postdocs in the US. This may be especially true 
if, as described by Holzinger (2007), the opportunities in their home country are tied to 
native-language publications and national professional associations, as is common in 
continental Europe. Graduate study in the US may fulfill a home country expectation for 
international study and preclude the need for or benefit from being a postdoc in the US.  
Figures 3-6 present stay rates for doctorate recipients by country grouped to illustrate 
regional patterns, which may correspond to career incentives. Figure 3 illustrates the 
considerably higher stay rates for new PhDs from the large, rapidly developing Asian nations 
of China and India compared to the lower stay rates for those from smaller Asian nations.  
Figure 4 shows the stay rates for new PhDs from Anglo-Saxon and other European 
nations. The stay rates appear noticeably higher for Eastern Europe, but the pattern for 
Anglo-Saxon and continental nations is not clear. Figure 5 shows only the UK, Australia, 
Canada, and the continental European nations. Consistent with Holzinger’s (2007) distinction 
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between Anglo-Saxon and continental European models, France, Germany, and Spain do 
have lower stay rates. Greece, which might be expected to follow the same pattern, starts out 
with a higher stay rate but has decreased to a low rate within four years. Italy’s higher stay 
rates may reflect barriers to reintegration into the Italian science community (Gill 2005). The 
UK, Canada, and Australia all have high initial stay rates, but Canadian and Australian stay 
rates drop sharply after the second or third year. This pattern is consistent with a postdoctoral 
appointment in the US followed by return to the home country or relocation to a third 
country. Disaggregated data for The Netherlands and Scandinavian nations, hypothesized to 
follow the Anglo-Saxon model, would help confirm the pattern. Qualitative and policy 
research would be useful to understand apparent outliers like Italy and Greece. 
Figure 6 shows stay rates for Latin American countries. New PhDs from Argentina 
and Peru have higher stay rates than those from other parts of Latin America. Disaggregated 
data on more Latin American and developing nations as well as qualitative research could 
lead to a better understanding of the career incentives and institutions shaping the decisions 
of Latin American scientists.  
The relationship between staying in the US and becoming a postdoc is likely to be 
endogenous, with those who stay more likely to become postdocs and those who become 
postdocs more likely to stay. The more interesting question is about how the underlying 
structure of national innovation systems and scientific and academic careers in the home 
country influences the decision of foreign scientists to pursue a career in the US. Quantitative 
data document national patterns of immigration and economic motivations have been 
demonstrated empirically. However, little is known about qualitative and institutional aspects 
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of international postdocs and the approach to such questions is largely speculative at this 
time. 
Foreign students from different disciplines vary in their likelihood of remaining in the 
US after completing the PhD (Commitee on Policy Implications of International Graduate 
Students and Postdoctoral Scholars in the United States and Board on Higher Education and 
Workforce 2005). This finding can be attributed to the demand for specific expertise and the 
quality of science in those disciplines in the US. Conversely, demand for specific skills in 
foreign students’ home countries will also play a role. Since the US is the primary location of 
postdoctoral appointments, it seems likely that foreign students in disciplines that are in 
greater demand in the US will be more likely to become postdocs.  
 Empirical evidence supports the role of temporary visa status as an indicator 
associated with postdoctoral study, independent of the effect of nationality (Lan 2009). 
Permanent visa status confers a number of advantages to a job seeker that increase the 
probability of receiving a career position rather than a time-limited postdoc appointment.  
Proposition 6: Regional patterns of institutions and incentives associated with 
scientific careers and other home-country political, cultural, and economic 
characteristics will be systematically associated with the probability of becoming a 
postdoc, with students from small Asian, continental European, and most Latin 
American nations being less likely to become postdocs. 
 
 Other demographic characteristics. Although one study found that US 
underrepresented minorities (African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans) were 
less likely to become postdocs, possibly due to the greater availability of alternative 
employment at higher pay (Zumeta 1985), more studies conducted over 30 years have failed 
to find an effect by race (National Research Council 1981; Fiegener 2009; Thurgood, 
Golladay, and Hill 2006). The most common finding, especially in more recent studies, has 
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been that race does not influence the probability of becoming a postdoc for underrepresented 
minorities earning a doctoral degree. However, analysis of racial effects is limited by the 
small number of minority postdocs identified in even large surveys.  
Older doctorate recipients have been found to be less likely to become postdocs 
(Zumeta 1985; Recotillet 2007), usually interpreted to indicate that older PhDs are more 
likely to have financial obligations that motivate them to take higher-paying positions. 
However, one study found this relationship to apply only to fellowships and not to research 
associate postdocs hired with grant funding (McGinnis, Allison, and Long 1981). 
As discussed earlier, opportunities to develop generalizable skills may be negatively 
related to becoming a postdoc. New PhDs who had work experience before entering their 
doctoral program or who spent more time as doctoral students may have had more 
opportunities to develop these skills. Since work experience and additional years of study 
both take time, they are likely to be correlated with age and may mediate the effect of age, at 
least partially. Although age has been found to be negatively associated with becoming a 
postdoc, the mechanism of its effect is not yet clear. 
Discipline. The most straightforward way discipline has been related to the 
probability of becoming a postdoc is through labor market conditions. Postdoc appointments 
are frequently interpreted as a response to a lack of career opportunities, especially in 
academia (Stephan and Ma 2005). Graduate students who perceive a lack of career 
opportunities might be more likely to plan to become postdocs, and graduates who actually 
encounter a lack of career opportunities might be more likely to in fact become postdocs. The 
relationship between perceived and actual career opportunities was explored by Fox and 
Stephan (2001). While the most obvious way to study labor market effects would be to 
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observe longitudinal trends, it might also be possible to observe this effect by discipline, if 
there is variation in the labor markets for different disciplines. Such differences in job 
opportunities may be observable at the level of specific fields within broad disciplinary 
groupings like life sciences.  
Proposition 7: A large number of new doctorate recipients relative to the number of 
academic positions available will be positively associated with becoming a postdoc. 
 
 Postdoc appointments are more likely in some fields than in others. In addition to 
labor market factors, this may also be due to the type of knowledge involved in that specific 
field. At the most basic level, this has been attributed to some fields having more material to 
master (Curtis and National Research Council 1969). More specifically, postdoc 
appointments may be more likely in more highly specialized fields or those closely tied to 
biological systems (National Research Council 1981). Biochemistry has long had a 
particularly high prevalence of postdoc appointments (Nerad and Cerny 1999), possibly due 
to its inherent connection to two disciplines. Postdocs may also be more common in pure 
sciences like chemistry or physics than in transfer fields where basic and applied work are 
integrated, such as computer science and mechanical engineering (Zubieta 2009).  
There have been numerous attempts to create conceptual maps of science. It might be 
possible to use such a map to predict the effect of scientific discipline on the paths of 
scientific careers, including the prevalence of a postdoctoral career stage. Klavans and 
Boyack (2009) have synthesized prior approaches to create a consensus map of science. They 
place biochemistry at one end and mathematics and computer science at the other. This 
configuration is consistent with the relative prevalence of postdoc appointments in those 
fields—with high prevalence in biochemistry and low prevalence in math and computer 
science.  
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It is also possible that the timing of specific scientific discoveries could make postdoc 
appointments particularly desirable (Kuhn 1962; Stephan and Levin 1992). Breakthroughs or 
paradigm shifts within a field could make a postdoc appointment an opportunity for a 
scientist to become one of the first in a new regime rather than one of the last trained under 
an old regime. This is a speculative area of inquiry, but could potentially lead to rich models 
of how knowledge structures relate to the structures of careers and professions. 
Proposition 8: The knowledge content of scientific disciplines will be related to the 
prevalence of postdoc appointments in that discipline in a predictable way, such as 
through complexity, specialization, or change. 
 
 Alternatively and more concretely, postdoc appointments could address a mismatch 
between doctoral training and existing job opportunities. For example, a biochemist might 
seek a postdoc appointment that develops skills in biomedical engineering. This situation 
could be more likely to result when training takes place in disciplinary departments but job 
opportunities are in interdisciplinary settings (Chang et al. 2005). Motivation to change fields 
may therefore be rationally motivated by labor market conditions. Data about career patterns 
of recent graduates would allow for a test of the following proposition. 
Proposition 9: Being in a field where recent doctoral graduates have frequently 
changed fields will be positively associated with becoming a postdoc.  
UNIVERSITY LEVEL 
Studies of university-level factors influencing postdoc appointments have most 
frequently emphasized the role of prestige. However, other features of the doctoral 
institution, such as location, may also influence the likelihood of becoming a postdoc. 
Prestige. Perhaps because the scientific enterprise is highly stratified, prestige is the 
most widely studied university-level characteristic associated with postdoc appointments. In 
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this context, stratification means the structure of the scientific enterprise and the relative 
prestige and influence of its parts. One of the most fundamental ideas in the study of 
stratification of science is the theory of cumulative advantage, often referred to as the 
“Matthew effect” (Merton 1968). Cumulative advantage refers to the tendency for scientists 
who have already achieved recognition to have an advantage over unknown scientists in 
achieving future recognition. This leads to a concentration of prestige in a small number of 
scientists and institutions. 
Psychological, cultural, and structural mechanisms of cumulative advantage were 
proposed by Cole and Cole (1973). Rosen (1981) proposed an alternative model of 
stratification based on high returns to small increments in ability at the top of the ability 
range. While different mechanisms have been proposed, all of these models address the 
observation that science is highly stratified with prestige and influence concentrated among a 
few top individual and institutional contributors.  
Several studies have found that new PhDs from more prestigious universities were 
more likely to become postdocs (Zumeta 1985; Curtis and National Research Council 1969; 
Zumeta 1984). However, Curtis found that the relationship with prestige was weaker in 
biological sciences and Zumeta found that the relationship grew weaker over time. It is 
possible that this relationship will not hold for a life sciences sample today, but the 
relationship has been common enough in other studies that the hypothesis should be tested. 
Further, while prestige may be found not to be a strong predictor of which life sciences 
doctorates become postdocs, prestige of the doctoral institution is known to have strong 
effects on other career outcomes for scientists (Su 2011; Zubieta 2009; Bedeian et al. 2010; 
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Burris 2004). Burris suggests that a more prestigious postdoctoral institution may take the 
place of the doctoral institution in explaining future career outcomes. 
A strong role for prestige is also supported by the finding that predoctoral publication 
productivity typically does not predict whether a graduate takes a postdoc appointment 
(Hornbostel et al. 2009; McGinnis, Allison, and Long 1981; Su 2011), although Reskin 
(1976) found it predicted prestigious postdoctoral fellowships for men only. Productivity is 
one of the most plausible alternative explanations to prestige, but evidence for its effect is 
weak. A direct effect of prestige on funding decisions does not seem to be the mechanism 
through which prestige influences later outcomes. Like many other studies of peer review 
cited by Bornmann and Daniel (2006), Viner, Powell, and Green (2004) do not find that 
prestige of the doctoral or proposed postdoctoral institution had an effect on funding 
decisions. While the mechanism is uncertain, prior research has generally supported the idea 
that graduates from prestigious universities will be more likely to become postdocs.  
Features of the doctoral institution. There has been considerably less attention paid to 
the role of features of the doctoral institution other than prestige. For example, the current 
literature does not seem to address the effect that interaction with postdocs as a graduate 
student might have on the probability of becoming a postdoc. It is common for doctoral 
students and postdocs to work together in labs and for postdocs to play a role in training and 
supervising graduate students (Akerlind 2005; Vogel 1999). The nature of doctoral student-
postdoc interactions as well as their frequency may influence attitudes toward postdoc 
appointments. Conditions for postdocs vary a great deal from campus to campus (COSEPUP 
2000). It seems likely that doctoral students at universities where postdocs are generally 
satisfied with their appointments would be more likely to become postdocs themselves. This 
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is a potentially interesting question in particular because universities are putting structures in 
place to improve conditions for postdocs and to incorporate them into the university 
community, sometimes as a result of postdocs’ organizing activity (Gerwin 2010). Such 
structures might further institutionalize the postdoctoral career stage by increasing interest in 
postdoc appointments among these institutions’ own graduates. Postdoctoral organizing 
activity and administrative oversight are relatively new phenomena, so there is not yet 
empirical support for specific hypotheses about their effects. Institutions that make extensive 
use of postdocs themselves might produce graduates who are more aware of opportunities for 
postdoc appointments or to consider such appointments an expected part of the research 
career.  
However, Stephan (2012) interprets the high frequency with which graduates of small 
liberal arts colleges pursue graduate training in science as perhaps resulting from their lack of 
familiarity with the sometimes unpleasant realities of scientific careers. This phenomenon 
might also carry over to doctoral students’ familiarity with the realities of postdoc 
appointments, with the following implication. 
Proposition 10: Graduate students at universities where there are many postdocs may 
be more likely to become postdocs themselves, moderated by the level of satisfaction 
of the postdocs. 
 
  Location. Postdocs are highly concentrated in prestigious universities that receive 
large amounts of research funding (NSF, 2007, 2010). These universities are in turn 
geographically concentrated, especially in Boston and the Bay Area.  
Postdoc appointments can play different roles in scientific careers. For some, they 
may expand networks beyond the doctoral program. For others, they may provide an 
opportunity to work in one’s field of study that is compatible with personal obligations, such 
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as a spouse’s career (Martinez et al. 2007). New PhDs from universities in metro areas with 
many postdocs at multiple institutions may be able to accomplish both of these goals at the 
same time. On the other hand, graduates of universities that are not located in college clusters 
would need to relocate, perhaps half-way across the country, for a time-limited position. 
These geographic considerations imply that postdoc appointments may be more common for 
students when there are many such opportunities available at other institutions in the local 
area. 
Proposition 11: The likelihood of becoming a postdoc will be positively related to the 
number of postdoctoral appointments available in the local area. 
   
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS 
Individual-level factors may interact with university-level factors to make a postdoc 
position more or less likely. While research on such interactions has been limited, the 
literature does suggest some likely possibilities. This section briefly considers three such 
potential interactions. 
Ability and Prestige 
 Scientific careers are characterized by cumulative advantage (Merton, 1968). This 
implies that outcomes will be better for those who combine multiple advantages, such as 
ability and affiliation with prestigious institutions. In discussing the hypothesized 
relationship between ability and the likelihood of becoming a postdoc, a nonlinear 
relationship seemed likely, with those of highest and lowest ability most likely to become 
postdocs. Prior research has identified non-linear institutional patterns in the careers of life 
scientists (Smith-Doerr 2006). Perhaps those students who combine high ability with high 
prestige doctoral institutions will be especially likely to become postdocs, as will those of 
low ability at low prestige universities. In studying a sample of mid-to-high prestige 
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institutions, high ability students at high prestige schools might be expected to be the most 
likely to become postdocs, as they may be well positioned to persist to the eventual goal of a 
faculty position. Cumulative advantage, well-established in the sociology of science, implies 
that those who have already benefitted from high ability and the many advantages of a 
prestigious doctoral program will continue to accrue advantages throughout their careers, 
lending support to the following proposition (Merton 1968). 
Proposition 12: Individual ability and institutional prestige will interact such that 
high ability individuals at high prestige institutions are most likely to become 
postdocs.  
 
Citizenship and Location 
 Foreign graduate students are at a disadvantage in their ability to tap into informal 
labor markets in the US (Wei, Levin, and Sabik 2009). In discussing the relationship between 
location of the doctoral institution and the likelihood of becoming a postdoc, it seemed 
plausible that proximity to postdoctoral opportunities would increase the probability of 
becoming a postdoc. This effect may be stronger for non-US students. The concentration of 
postdocs on the coasts, where immigrant populations are also concentrated, may also 
contribute to this effect. While postdocs are clearly concentrated on the coasts, there is 
empirical evidence of their disadvantage in the labor market, so at this point propositions 
about the interactions of those factors are speculative. 
Proposition 13: Location of doctoral institution and citizenship will interact in such a 
way that non-US students in doctoral programs far from other postdoc opportunities 
will be least likely to become postdocs. 
 
Gender and Location 
 Postdoc appointments may be especially desirable when they combine the ability to 
affiliate with a new institution with the ability to stay in the same geographic location. This 
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effect may be stronger for women, since they are more likely to seek an appointment that is 
compatible with a spouse’s career (Nerad and Cerny 1999). Prior research has identified the 
greater propensity for women scientists to concentrate in college clusters, in comparison to 
their male colleagues (Kulis and Sicotte 2002). It may be possible to generalize from these 
factors known about women’s careers to the context of postdoc appointments, anticipating 
that doctoral university location will have different effects on male and female scientists. 
Proposition 14: Location of doctoral institution and gender will interact such that 
women in locations where there are many postdoc appointments will be most likely to 
become postdocs. 
 
SUMMARY 
 Research about why new doctorate recipients become postdocs identifies influences 
at the individual and university levels. A better understanding of which graduate students 
become postdocs would be of value to those who employ, fund, and organize postdocs.  
While there is information about trends in certain key motivations for postdoc 
appointments (see figure 1), the information about motivations is still fairly superficial. 
Because the demographic variables that have been the focus of most prior research about 
why people become postdocs serve as indicators but do not explain mechanisms, it would be 
beneficial for future research to explore some potential mechanisms behind this career 
choice. For example, future research could examine the relative importance of knowledge 
acquisition and network development in the choice of a postdoctoral appointment. Further, it 
would be useful to advance understanding of the role that home country career incentives and 
institutions play in the decisions of international graduate students about whether to become 
postdocs in the US. While higher earning potential in the US explains many developing-
country nationals’ decisions to stay, less is known about why some choose to return and the 
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decisions made by scientists from developed countries. A third individual perspective to 
consider for future studies is the influence of personal characteristics such as taste for 
science, disposition, and knowledge of career options. 
Another potentially interesting direction for individual-level research would be to 
examine which scientists benefit from becoming postdocs. Scientists report many benefits 
from postdoc appointments (see figure 2), but these self-reported benefits, primarily in 
specialized knowledge, are not clearly tied to outcomes. It would be useful to test outcomes 
explicitly. The concept of taste for science could potentially be employed to assess the 
benefits of becoming a postdoc. By providing a way to approximate the value of the non-
monetary rewards of scientific careers in monetary terms, both monetary and non-monetary 
benefits could be considered in evaluating career outcomes from postdoc appointments.  
University-level influences beyond prestige are also a fruitful area for future study. 
Little is known about how characteristics of doctoral programs influence who becomes a 
postdoc. Factors such as location, teaching and mentoring of doctoral students, interaction 
with current postdocs, and career placement services may influence who becomes a postdoc.  
The choice of research questions at both the individual level and the university level 
should be guided by a consideration of how policy instruments could influence the nature of 
postdoc appointments. Policy interventions could be designed to encourage those most likely 
to benefit from postdoc appointments to pursue them and to do so with accurate information 
about how to seek an appropriate appointment and maximize the opportunity it provides. 
Targeted interventions to provide the right information to doctoral students at the right time 
could improve decision making and utilization of resources during the doctoral and 
postdoctoral years.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Conceptual Model of Individual Motivations for Postdoc Appointments 
  
Both individual and institutional factors are believed to influence which scientists 
take postdoc appointments. This chapter presents a conceptual model of individual decision 
making with regards to the choice to take a postdoc appointment, an area that is not yet well 
understood. Prior empirical work provides limited information about why individual 
doctorate recipients become postdocs based primarily on demographics (Helbing, Verhoef, 
and Wellington 1998; McGinnis, Allison, and Long 1981; Nolan et al. 2004; Nerad and 
Cerny 1999) and ability measures (Reskin 1976; Su 2011; Zumeta 1985, 1984).  
This chapter frames the question of why people take postdoc appointments as one of 
individual motivation. Motivational factors associated with the decision to take a postdoc 
appointment in prior research include interest in an academic career, typically understood to 
mean a tenure-track faculty position with an emphasis on research, and perception that a 
postdoc appointment is a career prerequisite (Fox and Stephan 2001). Long term career goals 
appear to motivate the decision to pursue a postdoc appointment after graduation. The most 
frequently cited motivation for taking a postdoc appointment has long been pursuit of a 
career for which a postdoc appointment is understood to be a prerequisite (Foley 2008). The 
postdoc appointment may be a prerequisite to further develop S&T human capital (Davis 
2009; Bozeman, Dietz, and Gaughan 2001) or to signal human capital that has already been 
developed through scholarly publications (Dasgupta and David 1994).  
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Taking a postdoc appointment because of interest in a faculty research career can be 
problematic, however, because few faculty positions are available. Tenure may be achieved 
by fewer than 30% of even a select group of postdocs in the life sciences (Levitt 2010).  
By placing the decision to pursue a postdoc appointment in a framework based on the 
social psychological theory of planned behavior, the current chapter contributes to 
understanding how this decision is influenced by individual-level motivations (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010; Ajzen 1991). In the theory of planned behavior, demographic and ability factors 
previously associated with postdoc appointments are expected to exert their effect through 
these attitudes, norms, and perceptions. 
 This chapter is organized in two sections. The first section describes Ajzen’s (1991) 
theory of planned behavior and evaluates its consistency with economic rationality. The 
second section applies the theory of planned behavior to the context of scientists’ postdoc 
appointments and advances four specific propositions about applying the model in this 
context. The third section concludes with discussion and directions for future research.  
THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR 
Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior integrates behavioral attitudes, social 
norms, and perceived behavioral control to explain intentional behavior. The behavioral 
attitudes variable incorporates beliefs about the consequences of engaging in a behavior. The 
social norms variable includes the individual’s perceptions of influential others’ beliefs about 
the behavior. The perceived behavioral control variable represents the extent to which an 
individual feels confident in the ability to engage in the behavior.  
The theory of planned behavior rests on considerable support for the finding that 
intention is a reliable antecedent to behavior (Ajzen 1988; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; 
 
 
33 
 
Sheppard, Jon, and Warshaw 1988). While past behavior is often the best predictor of 
behaviors that are repeated and frequent, behaviors that take place infrequently are often 
predicted by intention. Intention is useful to predict preparatory activities as well as the 
outcome of interest when the behavior is not completely under the individual’s control. The 
incorporation of perceived behavioral control into the earlier theory of reasoned action better 
accounts for behaviors that are not completely under the individual’s control, such as labor 
market activity (Ajzen 1991). 
The theory of planned behavior has been applied to a wide range of intentional 
behaviors, including many studies of career-related intentions. In contexts similar to 
scientific careers and postdoc appointments, the theory has been found to explain intentions 
to work for the National Health Service as an allied health professional (Arnold et al. 2006), 
to seek temporary employment (Van Hooft and De Jong 2009), to enlist in the military 
(Schreurs et al. 2009), and to remain in the US after graduation (Baruch, Budhwar, and 
Khatri 2007). Occupational intentions have also been studied using the theory of planned 
behavior by Giles and Larmour (2000), Giles and Rea (1999), Norman and Bonnett (1995), 
and Song et al. (2006). Other relevant planned behavior studies include those focused on 
education (Davis et al. 2002; Meyer 2002; Archer et al. 2008), entrepreneurship (von 
Graevenitz, Harhoff, and Weber 2010; Engle et al. 2010; Krueger and Carsrud 1993; 
Krueger, Reilly, and Carsrud 2000; Carr and Sequeira 2007), and investment (East 1993).  
Relationship to Economic Rationality 
Science policymakers have often approached research about the scientific labor force 
from the perspective of economic rationality (e.g., Freeman and Goroff 2009). Excessive 
rationality has been one criticism of the theory of planned behavior (Reyna and Farley 2006; 
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Gibbons et al. 1998), leading to considerable debate (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). In response 
to these criticisms, Fishbein and Ajzen qualify their model as rational only in the sense that 
attitudes, norms, and perceived behavioral control follow logically from a person’s beliefs. 
They also acknowledge, however, that these beliefs can be intuitive, biased, or erroneous. 
Even the theory’s critics acknowledge its appropriateness for deliberative decisionmaking. 
Fishbein & Ajzen defend the application of their theory to both rational behavior and a wide 
variety of spontaneous behaviors, while acknowledging limitations for behaviors like 
reflexes and addiction. 
 Intentions formed according to the theory of planned behavior have been compared to 
an individual conducting a personal cost-benefit analysis and formulating an appropriate 
intention based on the result (Conner and Armitage 1998). Similarities between the theory of 
planned behavior and economic rationality can be seen by examining the decision to pursue a 
doctoral degree from both perspectives. An economically rational explanation of the decision 
to pursue a doctoral degree has been provided by Breneman, Jamison, and Radner (1976), 
who assumed that the student made the decision like an investor interested in both monetary 
and non-monetary returns from acquiring a necessary occupational credential. Breneman and 
colleagues also acknowledged, however, that the student based the assessment of costs and 
benefits on limited information (cf. Mangematin 2000). 
 This economic model of the decision to pursue a doctoral degree shares several 
characteristics with a model based on the attitude, norm, and perception components of the 
theory of planned behavior. Individuals’ attitudes toward a behavior can include both 
monetary and non-monetary preferences. These attitudes also include beliefs, potentially 
based on imperfect information, about the consequences of pursuing the degree. Perceived 
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behavioral control further incorporates the prospective student’s limited available information 
about resources and opportunities to complete the degree. In economic terms, the individual 
is making a decision with some degree of risk based on incomplete and possibly inaccurate 
information. For example, students are often unaware of the labor market they will encounter 
upon completion of the degree. Fox and Stephan (2001) have observed a complex 
relationship among reality, perceptions, and preferences in scientific labor markets, 
concluding that new doctorate recipients’ perceptions were only partially accurate. The 
theory of planned behavior further implies that some information comes from the social 
norms observed in influential others. With its emphasis on beliefs and perceptions, the theory 
of planned behavior integrates the individual’s lived experience with economic rationality. 
Application to Postdoctoral Appointments 
An explanation of the decision to pursue faculty research careers and postdoc 
appointments based on the theory of planned behavior’s attitudes, norms, and perceptions 
draws support from the theory’s applicability in employment, education, and other related 
contexts. The theory suggests a model in which the intention to pursue a faculty research 
career leads to the intention to pursue a postdoc appointment (see figure 7). The intention to 
pursue a faculty research career is expected to depend on behavioral attitudes, social norms, 
and perceptions of control over obtaining a university research position. Intention to pursue a 
faculty research position is the model’s key determinant of intention to pursue a postdoc 
appointment. 
A near-term intention to pursue a postdoc appointment upon graduation arises from 
the intention to seek a faculty research position. Of course, the student’s ultimate success in 
attaining a faculty position will depend not only on intentions but on the conditions of the 
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labor market. During the doctoral program, these long- and short-term intentions may 
influence preparatory behavior such as completion of the doctorate, publication of findings, 
and exploration of alternate careers. This preparatory behavior is one reason to study 
intentions regardless of whether the student eventually obtains a faculty research position. 
 The remainder of this section examines the decision to pursue a faculty research 
career and a postdoc appointment in relation to each of the three components of the theory of 
planned behavior: behavioral attitudes, social norms, and perceived behavioral control.  
Behavioral attitudes. Behavioral attitudes arise from beliefs through an expectancy-
value model with two components: belief strength and outcome evaluation (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010). An attitude reflects a person’s expectation that a behavior will lead to an 
outcome and the value a person places on that outcome. More formally, an attitude is “a 
latent disposition or tendency to respond with some degree of favorableness or 
unfavorableness to a psychological object [such as a behavior],” (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, 
76). A behavioral attitude arises from a belief, “the subjective probability that an object has a 
certain attribute” (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, 96). The beliefs that shape behavioral attitudes 
do not need to be accurate or rational to be influential. However, attitudes are more rational 
than the related but more emotional concept of affect, which a person often experiences more 
generally rather than with respect to a specific object or behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). 
The attitudes most relevant to a particular behavior being studied should be 
compatible with the target, action, time, and context of the behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 
2010). In the case of doctoral students’ career intentions, the relevant behavioral attitudes 
include the qualities doctoral students prefer in their future careers and their beliefs about 
whether faculty research positions have those qualities.  
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Qualities identified as influential by prior work include the norms and lifestyle that 
attract scientists to academic careers. Scientists have expressed preferences for work 
consistent with the Mertonian norms: universalism, communitarianism, organized 
skepticism, and objectivity (Anderson et al. 2010; Merton 1973). Challenge, freedom, 
autonomy, and a role in social change have been found to motivate people to pursue 
academic careers (Lindholm 2004). Preferences for challenge, freedom, and the ability to 
participate in the scientific community are associated with the concept of taste for science, 
which implies that a scientist will accept lower compensation to work in an environment 
consistent with scientific norms (Roach and Sauermann 2010; Stern 2004). Freedom and 
autonomy, ability to do science for its own sake, free dissemination of knowledge, and 
interaction with broader scientific community are norms doctoral students associate with 
academic careers (Mendoza 2007).2  
In addition to scientific norms, general features of job quality, such as job security 
and compensation, are lifestyle factors that often attract people to academic careers (Jencks, 
Perman, and Rainwater 1988; Finkelstein 1984). The importance students place on these 
aspects of job quality and their beliefs about the quality of faculty research positions are also 
relevant to behavioral attitudes.  
The following proposition summarizes the role behavioral attitudes are thought to 
play in doctoral students’ career intentions. 
Proposition 1: Doctoral students who perceive that the characteristics of faculty 
research positions match their own career preferences will express a stronger 
intention to pursue faculty research careers. 
 
                                                            
2 Although academic scientists also engage in commercial activities with their corresponding 
norms, the graduate students studied by Mendoza (2007) put greater emphasis on the 
traditional norms. 
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Social norms. Ajzen (1991) describes his social norms variable as “[t]he likelihood 
that important referent individuals or groups approve or disapprove of performing a given 
behavior” (p. 195). These norms can be injunctive, expressing influential others’ approval or 
disapproval, or descriptive, expressing influential others’ actions with respect to the target 
behavior (Fishbein & Azjen 2010). Both injunctive and descriptive norms are applied 
subjectively, that is, as perceived by the person whose intentions are being studied. Injunctive 
norms are believed to influence intentions directly. Descriptive norms are believed to 
influence intentions directly and indirectly through both injunctive norms and perceived 
behavioral control. 
From a rational choice perspective, social norms can be seen as a check on self-
interest potentially enforced by sanctions (Boudon 2003). Information, reward, coercion, 
legitimacy, expertise, and referent power are six bases of power thought to motivate 
compliance with social norms (Raven 2008). Social norms’ influence on intention has 
generally been assumed to depend on the subject’s motivation to comply. However, the role 
of motivation to comply does not receive strong support from empirical evidence. In practice, 
range restriction may result from subjects inherently choosing people who motivate them to 
comply with social norms when identifying influential others as referents (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010). 
Doctoral students are believed to acquire social norms through two forms of 
socialization. First, they are socialized into their role as graduate students within an academic 
department. Socialization into the graduate student role includes the tasks of intellectual 
mastery, developing a realistic sense of departmental activities, and integration into the 
department (Golde 1998). Second, students begin a stage of anticipatory socialization into 
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their profession, usually conceived as an academic career (Mendoza 2007). Anticipatory 
socialization into the academic career gains momentum once the student has achieved 
doctoral candidacy and is focused on completion of dissertation research (Tierney and 
Rhoads 1994). At the dissertation stage, students become more aware of the academic 
department’s core functions of publishing and basic research (Mendoza 2007). Awareness of 
social norms does not necessarily lead to their adoption (Antony 2002), which may depend 
on motivation to comply. Referent others promoting the socialization of doctoral students 
into academic norms and careers include influential professors (Finkelstein 1984), graduate 
advisors and faculty (Lindholm 2004), and faculty and other students (Weidman and Stein 
2003).  
Some of the social norms observed during this socialization process relate to 
differences between industry careers and academic careers (Mendoza 2007). A qualitative 
study of science and engineering doctoral students and postdocs at three universities on the 
West Coast of the US described students’ socialization as a combination of three cultures: 
strongly noncommercial, overlapping commercial and noncommercial, and strongly 
commercial (Szelenyi 2007). Noncommercial culture is associated with the Mertonian norms 
presented earlier (Merton 1973). Noncommercial norms can be contrasted with counternorms 
of emotional commitment, particularism, secrecy, self-interest, and organized dogmatism 
(Mitroff 1974) and with commercial norms of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Rhoades 
2004) and academic entrepreneurship (Shane 2004).  
Social norms and the extent to which doctoral students are motivated to comply with 
them are expected to influence career intentions. The socializing influences surrounding 
doctoral students lead to the following proposition: 
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Proposition 2: Doctoral students who perceive that social norms in their lab favor 
faculty research careers will express a stronger intention to pursue such careers. 
 
Perceived behavioral control. Perceived behavioral control refers to “… the extent to 
which people believe that they are capable of performing a given behavior” (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010, 154). Perceived behavioral control helps explain planned behavior because 
people rarely form intentions to do something if they believe it to be impossible. Perceived 
behavioral control consists of two factors, capacity and autonomy.3 Capacity refers to 
capability or power to perform a behavior and autonomy refers to the extent to which the 
behavior is under the subject’s control (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). Again, capacity and 
autonomy are applied subjectively based on the subject’s perceptions. With the addition of 
perceived behavioral control to the earlier theory of reasoned action based on attitudes and 
norms, the theory of planned behavior more effectively models behavior not fully under the 
subject’s control (Ajzen 1991). Intention to engage in a behavior completely under the 
subject’s control could potentially be explained by attitudes and norms alone. When a subject 
does not have complete control over a behavior, perceived behavioral control is more 
important for prediction of the subject’s behavioral intention.  
Control’s influence on behavior has been described using a wide variety of terms. 
Two of the most widely known terms are locus of control (Rotter 1990) and self-efficacy 
(Bandura 1997, 1977). Locus of control has its conceptual origins in social learning theory 
and refers to an individual’s generalized expectation that events are under his own control 
(internal locus of control) or determined by influences beyond his control (external locus of 
control) (Rotter 1990). Locus of control is stable within individuals and across contexts. Self-
                                                            
3 This use of the word autonomy should not be confused with its use earlier to refer to a 
desirable characteristic of a scientific career. 
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efficacy, or “beliefs in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action 
required to produce given attainments” (Bandura 1997, 3), was originally considered to be a 
similarly generalized concept (Bandura 1977). However, more recent work has considered 
self-efficacy to be specific to a given context (Bandura 1997). Thus, self-efficacy and 
perceived behavioral control are conceptually similar, although they are often operationalized 
differently (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). 
Perceived behavioral control also differs from actual control. Perceptions of capacity 
and autonomy are often influenced by actual levels of ability, resources, and opportunity, but 
intentions are believed to be formed based on perceptions—accurate or not—rather than 
actual conditions (Ajzen 1991). When the theory of planned behavior is applied in studies 
where both behavioral intentions and behavioral outcomes are measured, perceived 
behavioral control affects behavior indirectly through intentions and directly, to the extent 
that perceptions reflect reality. 
To apply the concept of perceived behavioral control to doctoral students’ career 
plans, it makes sense to consider students’ perceptions of their capacity to obtain a faculty 
research position and the extent to which they perceive that obtaining one is under their 
control. It is at this point in the model where structural concerns, such as labor market 
conditions, enter the model, albeit mediated by the student’s perceptions. Perceptions about 
the scientific labor market seem to matter even when they only partially reflect reality (Fox 
and Stephan 2001). The model predicts that students who perceive more opportunities to 
obtain a faculty research position will be more likely to pursue such a position. 
Applicants are generally understood to exert lower levels of control over obtaining 
faculty positions than over obtaining postdoc appointments (Fox and Stephan 2001; Zubieta 
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2009). Faculty positions are generally scarce, highly competitive, and filled through a 
complex formal selection process, resulting in a low level of control (Vick and Furlong 
2008). Postdoc positions are more widely available and often filled informally (Wei, Levin, 
and Sabik 2009). Because obtaining a postdoc appointment is assumed to be within most 
students’ control, perceived behavioral control is expected to be less relevant to 
understanding pursuit of postdoc appointments than it is to faculty appointments. Career 
intentions are therefore thought to depend on perceived behavioral control in the following 
way: 
Proposition 3: Doctoral students’ perceived control will be positively associated with 
intention to pursue a faculty research career. 
 
 Postdoc appointments are often described as prerequisites for faculty research careers. 
When asked their reasons for taking postdoc appointments, scientists have long reported that 
they saw the appointment as expected for their intended career (Foley 2008). While postdoc 
appointments are also available in industry, government, and non-profit organizations, most 
take place at universities (National Science Board 2010). Postdoc appointments as 
prerequisites for faculty research careers can be understood through human capital 
development, human capital signaling, and labor market surplus perspectives (Bozeman, 
Dietz, and Gaughan 2001; Dasgupta and David 1994; Mishagina 2009). 
From a human capital development perspective, individuals invest in training because 
of the potential for future returns (Becker 1975). The concept of human capital is often 
applied to scientists as S&T human capital, incorporating tacit knowledge and social capital 
in addition to the more concrete aspects of skill development (Bozeman, Dietz, and Gaughan 
2001). Returns to the investment in human capital can be either monetary or non-monetary, 
such as an agreeable work environment (Breneman, Jamison, and Radner 1976). The S&T 
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human capital development explanation gains support from scientists who report that they 
have benefitted from their postdoc appointments through gains in field-specific skills (Foley 
2008) and from survey data where postdocs describe the value they place on opportunities to 
develop generalizable skills such as proposal writing and project management (Davis 2009). 
Doctorate recipients seek postdoc appointments because they do not yet have the skills or 
social capital to compete for, or possibly even to perform, their desired career position. Such 
a skill deficit is sometimes seen as a deficiency in the doctoral program (Laudel and Gläser 
2008). In any case, the human capital development theory holds that postdoc appointments 
are prerequisites because they serve a legitimate developmental purpose. 
 Postdoc appointments may also be an opportunity to signal existing human capital to 
potential employers. The publication of research results that is a central feature of academic 
science provides an opportunity for postdocs to establish a publicly available track record of 
achievement (Dasgupta and David 1994). Dasgupta and David speculate that this human 
capital signaling is valuable even if the scientist eventually wants to work in industry, where 
publication of research findings is less common. Postdocs’ high publication productivity 
supports the human capital signaling perspective (Corley and Sabharwal 2007; Vogel 1999). 
Human capital signaling theory considers the postdoc appointment to be an opportunity to 
resolve an information asymmetry; the postdoc knows the extent of her talent and uses this 
time to demonstrate it (Zubieta 2009). 
 Postdoc positions are treated as queues or holding patterns from a labor market 
surplus perspective (Mishagina 2009). This perspective, in which scientists in postdoc 
appointments await career positions, is supported by evidence from special situations, such as 
the periods following the Vietnam War, the Cold War (Regets 1998), and the doubling of 
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NIH funding between 1998 and 2003 (Freeman and Van Reenen 2008). Labor market surplus 
is not generally considered a complete explanation for the increasing prevalence of postdoc 
appointments (Regets 1998), although it has been identified as a contributing factor (Stephan 
and Ma 2005). 
 Human capital development, human capital signaling, and labor market surplus are 
not mutually exclusive. Each perspective may play a part in explaining the role of postdoc 
appointments as career prerequisites. Each perspective provides a potential explanation for 
the empirical evidence that postdoc appointments are considered prerequisites by many 
scientists. Thus, the intention to pursue a postdoc appointment is expected to depend on both 
intention to pursue a faculty research career and on the belief that a postdoc is a prerequisite 
for that career. 
Proposition 4: Plans to pursue a postdoc appointment will be positively associated 
with intention to pursue a faculty research career and the belief that postdoc 
experience is required. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The theory of planned behavior provides a useful model of doctoral students’ 
intentions to pursue faculty research careers. Models based on the theory of planned behavior 
often suggest targets for policy intervention. If the theory of planned behavior explains 
doctoral students’ decisionmaking regarding faculty research careers, it would suggest a 
number of policy interventions. 
Science policymakers are often stymied by the seemingly contradictory problems of 
industry’s cry of a scientific talent shortage and scientists’ cries of a labor surplus (National 
Academy of Sciences 2007, 2010; Teitelbaum 2008). While some policy interventions aim to 
change the behavior of organizations through regulation and funding, policy interventions 
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aimed at individual scientists-in-training may also address these concerns. Interventions to 
change behavior arise from four characteristics of the theory of planned behavior (Fishbein 
and Ajzen 2010). The theory clearly focuses on the target behavior’s determinants. It is also 
parsimonious, explaining behavior using relatively few variables. By focusing on beliefs, it 
has a logical connection to changing behavior by providing information. Finally, its 
measurement methods adapt readily to monitoring policy effectiveness. 
Policy interventions suggested by this model include identifying avenues to inform 
early-career scientists’ choices, given the scarcity of faculty positions and the increasing 
prevalence of postdoc appointments. To the extent that students may hold erroneous, 
favorable beliefs about academic research positions, better information can improve their 
career decisions by changing behavioral attitudes.  
Further investigation of the role of specific behavioral attitudes could also be useful 
for the development of new models of scientific employment. While behavioral attitudes are 
formed by comparing preferences with beliefs about the attributes of faculty research careers, 
it is possible that some of those attributes either exist or could be incorporated into other 
employment opportunities.  
The influence of social norms could also improve career decisions. Departments, labs, 
and advisors transmit social norms to doctoral students. They may not always provide 
support for a broad range of scientific activity. For example, some labs may support activities 
narrowly focused on the advisor’s academic career. Most students would benefit from 
support for a broader range of activities that correspond to the career opportunities currently 
available. Because opportunities currently available in the labor market respond to market 
demand, society also stands to benefit from scientists improved knowledge of career options.  
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For social norms to be influential, the student needs to adopt those norms. Some 
advisors and labs may be supportive of industry research, but not engage students in such a 
way that they adopt norms consistent with industry employment. Norms related to working 
with industry will be less appealing to students if they feel exploited as a source of “cheap 
labor,” encounter barriers or perceive unfairness related to intellectual property issues, or fail 
to see a benefit to society from industry work (Mendoza 2007). 
The effects of perceived behavioral control also suggest some potential interventions. 
A recent study of entrepreneurship education found that it was possible to improve sorting on 
intention to start a company by increasing students’ knowledge of skill and resource 
requirements for entrepreneurs (von Graevenitz, Harhoff, and Weber 2010). Doctoral 
students might also modify their career plans based on additional information about the skill 
and resource requirements for faculty research positions.  
Specifically with respect to the capacity aspect of control, students can make better 
career decisions if they have accurate information early on about their own ability levels. 
Initiatives such as the NPA’s core competencies program and the promotion of individual 
development plans for doctoral students are both helpful for these decisions (Davis 2009). 
This study’s findings support expansion of initiatives that help doctoral students better 
understand their abilities and limitations. 
With respect to autonomy, students may also benefit from complete information 
about the labor market for doctoral scientists and the limited availability of faculty research 
positions. Students may overestimate the availability of these opportunities while remaining 
unaware of other career paths. Programs offering professional degrees in law and business 
conduct alumni surveys and use information about career outcomes to compete for students. 
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Academic departments offering degrees in science and engineering could adopt a similar 
practice. Government agencies and professional associations could also expand their role in 
providing labor market information. 
While one obvious place to convey information about the labor market for doctoral 
scientists is in doctoral degree programs, other options should also be considered. For 
example, labor market information could be incorporated into the doctoral student 
recruitment process. Making the information available even earlier, such as during master’s 
or even bachelor’s degree programs, could help students make decisions about and prepare 
for scientific careers before making a commitment to doctoral study. 
A final policy issue related to postdocs is the considerable debate about whether they 
are students or employees, a determination with significant policy and legal implications 
(Haak 2002). This model could be seen as providing support for treating postdocs as 
students, since it implies that postdoctoral appointments are undertaken in preparation for a 
future career. 
The theory of planned behavior provides a useful model of how doctoral students in 
the sciences and engineering form intentions related to their career paths and the decision to 
pursue postdoc appointments after graduation. The model suggests several directions for 
future research on the role of postdoctoral appointments in the scientific workforce. The 
theory of planned behavior may also be useful for investigation of other behaviors relevant to 
science and technology policy. 
A longitudinal study could establish a causal relationship between intention to pursue 
an appointment and actually seeking or obtaining one. Such a longitudinal study should 
include the moderating effects of labor market conditions and job search activity. If 
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interventions are conducted to improve career decisions, program evaluation studies should 
evaluate their effectiveness. It would also be useful to determine whether graduates from 
some programs are more likely to become postdocs because of student or program 
characteristics. 
The theory of planned behavior could also be used to study other examples of 
intentional behavior in scientific careers and technology commercialization. For example, it 
would be a useful framework for examining determinants of invention disclosure by 
university faculty. Other intentional behaviors of potential interest include migration, 
publication, patenting, and participation in university-industry partnerships.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Postdocs and Production of University Research 
The production of knowledge is one of universities’ main contributions to economic 
development (Drucker and Goldstein 2007). With federal assessment initiatives such as the 
Government Performance and Results Act, the President’s Management Agenda, and the 
Performance Assessment Rating Tool, universities are increasingly pressed to maximize this 
knowledge production under resource constraints (Michelson 2006). In How Economics 
Shapes Science (Stephan 2012), research is portrayed as a production process where 
knowledge results from labor and capital inputs. With respect to the labor inputs to 
knowledge production, Stephan poses the questions “Are certain inputs complements while 
others are substitutes for each other? Does a change in the cost of one input, such as the cost 
of employing a graduate research assistant, lead principal investigators (PIs) to hire more 
postdocs and cut the number of doctoral students they support?” (p. 63). As both postdocs 
and PhD students are employed in producing research, their relative prices may determine the 
precise mix. This chapter addresses the research question of postdocs’ role in the production 
of academic research, examining whether they serve as substitutes or complements for 
faculty and doctoral research assistants. 
 This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews select literature on 
substitution and complementarity in relevant production contexts. The second section 
presents an analytical model of the production function. The third section describes the 
sample and data used in this study. The fourth section presents results.  
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Input Substitution and Complementarity in Production 
 Since the early twentieth century, the US has been in a period of technological change 
where new technologies have complemented skilled labor, rather than substituting for it as 
was the case in the nineteenth century (Acemoglu 2000). This complementarity has two 
implications for the role of postdocs in research production. First, technological advances in 
the sciences have increased demand for the skilled labor they complement. Postdocs, 
especially immigrants, and graduate students are relatively easy ways to increase a supply of 
skilled labor that would otherwise be rather inelastic. Second, postdoc appointments 
themselves can be thought of as a “technology,” broadly defined (Rosenberg and Birdzell 
1986). Postdocs may be a skill-biased technology that increases the productivity of faculty 
and graduate students. Alternatively, postdocs may be substitutes that crowd out faculty or 
graduate students, as foreign graduate students were found to crowd out native-born males 
(Borjas 2004). Literature examining substitution in four related contexts is reviewed below: 
research production, skill level, contingent employment, and immigration.  
 First, because this study is concerned with the production of research, the literature on 
the substitutability of other inputs, such as funding sources, in research productivity is 
reviewed. Table 3 summarizes selected studies of the substitutability of inputs in research 
production. Numerous studies have examined the phenomenon of government R&D funding 
potentially crowding out private funding, when it functions as a substitute, and leading to 
increased private funding, when it functions as a complement. David, Hall, and Toole (1999) 
reviewed studies of this type and found substitution in about one third of the studies, with 
substitution more common in US studies and in studies at the line of business or lab level. In 
a recent study of life sciences R&D, federal and non-federal funding were found to be 
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complementary (Blume-Kohout, Kumar, and Sood 2009). Caloghirou, Kastelli, and 
Tsakanikas (2004) found that internal knowledge creation and external knowledge seeking 
contributed to innovation in a potentially complementary way. The substitutability of 
invention disclosures, licenses, patents, and materials transfer agreements did not appear to 
reduce commercialization activity (Mowery and Ziedonis 2007). The literature on R&D 
inputs provides evidence that both substitution and complementary relationships are possible 
and that context, such as national innovation system and level of analysis, may shape this 
phenomenon.  
Second, because doctoral students, postdocs, and faculty possess different levels of 
skill in research, consideration is given to the literature on the substitution of workers with 
different skill levels. The research questions of whether low skilled workers substitute for or 
complement higher-skilled workers has long interested labor economists and has been 
summarized by Hamermesh (1987) and Hamermesh and Grant (1979). They identify four 
studies that examine substitution by level of education, with a focus on college graduates, 
high school graduates, and workers with less than a high school degree (Grant 1979; Welch 
1970; Johnson 1970; Dougherty 1972). All find that the various categories of labor are 
substitutes, with less expensive unskilled labor taking the place of more expensive skilled 
labor. The implication of these studies for the research production context is that the less 
educated research assistants and postdocs would substitute for faculty, and research assistants 
would substitute for postdocs. 
 Third, the literature on substitution of contingent employees for core employees is 
reviewed. Although for some purposes postdocs and doctoral students are not considered to 
be employees, they are performing work on a time-limited basis similar to contingent 
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employment. Table 4 summarizes selected studies of the substitution of contingent 
employees for core employees. These studies examine two contexts, on-shore and off-shore 
employment and temporary and regular employment. In a review of empirical studies of the 
effects of offshoring on developed country labor markets, domestic and offshore labor were 
found to be weak substitutes (Crinò 2009). The relationship may depend on the location of 
the offshore workers. In a study of US multinationals hiring offshore within their own firm, 
offshore workers in high-income countries were found to be complements to US workers 
while offshore workers in low-income countries were found to be substitutes (Harrison, 
McMillan, and Null 2007). Agency temporaries have been found to function as substitutes 
for regular employees (Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2003). However, internal 
contingent employment systems were found to be complementary to regular employment 
(Ko 2003). Ko found this complementary relationship was strongest in organizations with 
strong internal labor markets. University faculty have one of the strongest internal labor 
markets in the US, characterized by high job stability, a role in governance, and generous 
benefits (Schuster 2006). If the most important feature of postdocs is their role as a system of 
contingent employment within universities’ strong internal employment system, they would 
be expected to serve as complements to faculty and perhaps, due to their shorter terms of 
appointment, even to doctoral students. 
 Fourth, immigration is one of the most widely studied labor substitution contexts. It is 
also directly relevant to the postdoc and doctoral student populations, as over half of all 
postdocs, and over half of doctoral students in some fields, are foreign-born temporary visa 
holders (National Science Board 2010). Table 5 summarizes selected studies of the labor 
market effects of immigration. In a widely cited early study, Grossman (1982) finds that 
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native workers, first generation immigrants, and new immigrants all function as substitutes. 
A recent review of this literature finds mixed results, with effects on native workers generally 
small (Okkerse 2008). Borjas (2003) finds the largest wage effects on workers with the 
highest and lowest levels of education, high school dropouts and college graduates. While 
much attention has been paid to the potential for immigrants to displace native workers at the 
lowest skill levels in the US, less is known about immigrants’ displacement of high-skill 
workers. This study of academic scientists contributes insights about a particularly high-skill 
context. The Grossman and Borjas studies suggest that postdocs are likely to function as 
substitutes.  
Two additional studies related to immigrants and natives also provide potentially 
relevant information. Borjas (2004) finds that immigrants crowd out native male graduate 
students, especially in elite programs. In their study of universities’ patent productivity, on 
the other hand, Gurmu, Stephan, and Black (2010) find evidence that suggests immigrant and 
native graduate students are complements rather than substitutes. These studies have 
contradictory implications for the role of postdocs, who are even more likely than graduate 
students to be from outside the US, in the production of research.  
 Studies of substitution and complementarity in similar contexts reveal that both 
substitution and complementary relationships are both common. Whether a given pair of 
inputs exhibits substitution or complementarity appears to depend on context. A contextual 
factor important to this study is the difference between public and private universities. The 
subsidies public universities receive for education of in-state students may be the most 
relevant difference. These subsidies apply to many students at public universities because it 
is often possible for US citizen students to establish in-state status during the doctoral 
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program. Because of these subsidies, the cost structure for doctoral student labor is different 
between public and private universities. Other differences between public and private 
universities are that faculty salaries at public universities are lower and public universities 
receive more budgetary scrutiny. Therefore, whether a university is public or private may 
moderate the substitutability of doctoral students for other inputs.   
MODEL  
It is possible to determine whether different types of labor are substitutes or 
complements using either production functions or cost functions, with production functions 
more suitable when exogenous shocks or policy interventions are expected to affect quantity 
rather than price, as is the case with immigration quotas and training programs (Hamermesh 
and Grant 1979). Grossman (1982) provides a production function model well-suited to the 
data available on the academic workforce. Borjas (2003) and Okkerse (2008) have endorsed 
this approach for estimating whether different types of labor—in their papers, immigrants 
and natives—are substitutes or complements in production. 
Academic output is estimated using a translog production function (see equation 1). 
The translog functional form is suitable for modeling a system with more than two inputs, as 
it relaxes the assumptions of additivity and homogeneity (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau 
1973). 
(1)    lnQ = lnα0+ΣαilnXi+(ΣiΣjγijlnXilnXj)/2 
 for i=doctoral, postdoc, faculty and capital and Xi=the quantity of DOCTORAL, POSTDOC, 
FACULTY, and CAPITAL. 
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Based on this functional form, factor shares are calculated based on the quantity of 
each input employed in the production of research. Equation 2 illustrates the factor share 
calculation. 
(2)     Si= wi * Xi/Q 
In this equation, wi represents the cost to employ an input, Xi is the quantity of that input 
employed, and Q represents the value of research produced. For example, equation 3 
represents the labor share for doctoral research assistants. 
(3) SDOCTORAL= DOCTORAL share=w DOCTORAL * DOCTORAL /Q 
Here, wDOCTORAL represents the wage paid to employ a doctoral research assistant, 
DOCTORAL represents the number of research assistants employed, and Q represents the 
quantity of research produced. 
Factor share equations are then estimated based on the translog production functions 
for doctoral research assistants, postdocs, faculty, and capital as shown in equation 4 
(Grossman 1982; Okkerse 2008).  
(4) Si = αi + γi,doctoral ln DOCTORAL + γi,postdoc ln POSTDOC + γi,faculty lnFACULTY + 
 γi,capital ln CAPITAL+e, where i= doctoral, postdoc, faculty, capital. 
 Factor shares were scaled so that the sum of the four shares totaled one, 
(Si(scaled)=Si/ΣSi).  
DATA 
Reliance on postdocs is most prevalent in the life sciences and this study focuses on 
145 university life sciences doctoral programs in the US. The life sciences were defined to 
include agricultural sciences, biological sciences, medical sciences, and other life sciences. 
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The analysis is based on data for 2006 because the NRC Assessment of Research 
Doctoral Programs provides an especially rich source of information for that year. The NSF 
Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates for 2006 lists 193 institutions in the 
Carnegie classifications high research activity and very high research activity with life 
sciences programs. These research-intensive universities, identified as those with a high level 
of aggregate or per capita research activity relative to all institutions granting research 
doctorates in 20 or more programs (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 
n.d.), are most likely to have a sizable population of postdocs and form the base population 
for this analysis. 169 of these institutions were also included in the NRC Assessment. Those 
that were not included in the NRC Assessment were primarily schools whose graduate 
programs in the life sciences emphasized masters rather than doctoral programs (e.g., College 
of William and Mary).  
In some cases, multiple institutions were consolidated into one reporting unit when 
some variables were only reported in aggregated form. For example, the NSF Survey 
reported the number of postdocs separately for the University of Wisconsin’s Madison and 
Milwaukee campuses. However, the publication count was available for the University of 
Wisconsin as an aggregate. Therefore data are aggregated and analyzed at the University of 
Wisconsin level. This type of aggregation reduced the number of universities by an 
additional 13, to 156. One or more missing data elements removed an additional 11 units 
from the analysis, leaving N=145. 
In addition to the NRC Assessment and the NSF Survey of Graduate Students and 
Postdoctorates, several other publicly available data sources are used as described in table 6..  
 
 
57 
 
Full-time equivalents were measured for each of the three categories of researcher. 
The number of doctoral student research assistants was taken from the NRC assessment. The 
percentage of students with teaching assistantships was subtracted from the percentage of 
first-year students receiving full support.4 This percentage was multiplied by the number of 
enrolled students. Because a doctoral student’s research assistantship is usually a part-time 
job, with the remaining time devoted to classes, exams, and the student’s dissertation 
research, the number of doctoral research assistants was divided by two to calculate the full-
time equivalents (FTE).  
The number of postdocs came from the Survey of Graduate Students and 
Postdoctorates and total faculty from the NRC assessment.5 Postdocs and faculty were 
assumed to work full-time. 
Neither master’s-level and undergraduate research assistants nor non-faculty research 
staff were included in the production function.  
Capital was measured as net assignable square feet for life sciences laboratory space 
as reported for 2005 in the biennial NSF Survey of Science and Engineering Research 
Facilities.  
Wage was measured in the following ways. For doctoral students and postdocs, the 
NIH Kirschstein National Research Scholars Assistantships were used as a baseline stipend 
amount. These stipend levels serve as a national benchmark for postdoc compensation 
                                                            
4 The NRC Assessment includes a measure of the percentage of students with research 
assistantships. However, due to the complex grid-based data collection used for this variable, 
the summary data included in the publicly-available dataset appear to dramatically understate 
the number for several schools. For example, most programs at Yale list 0% because 
institutional fellowships are counted separately. For that reason, the NRC measure of 
students with research assistantships is not used in the calculation.  
 
5 The total faculty count was used for consistency with the 1996 NRC assessment. 
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(COSEPUP 2000). For doctoral student research assistants, wage was calculated as the sum 
of the NIH pre-doctoral stipend ($20,772 in 2006)6 plus the university’s tuition—in-state for 
US citizens and out-of-state for foreign students. This calculation was based on the 
assumption that US doctoral students typically apply for in-state tuition, but foreign students 
are rarely eligible for it. Further, it assumes that the student receives a tuition waiver, with 
the academic department reimbursing the university. This approach probably understates the 
cost of US students because some may not be eligible for in-state tuition, especially in their 
first year. The lower in-state tuition can be interpreted as a subsidy from the state government 
for the training of in-state doctoral students. This subsidy is unavailable at private 
universities. For postdocs, wage was calculated as the level 1 NIH postdoc stipend ($38,976 
in 2006).  
Each of these stipend amounts was multiplied by 1.25 to account for payroll taxes and 
employee benefits. These wage estimates do not take into account graduate students or 
postdocs with outside funding— approximately 12% of first-time postdocs in biochemistry, 
for example (Nerad and Cerny 1999).  
For faculty, wage was measured as the average salary and benefits as reported for the 
institution in the Almanac of Higher Education (2006). Although faculty salaries vary 
considerably by field, the average salary for all fields appears to be a reasonable estimate for 
the life sciences. For example, of 26 fields ranked in order of 2001-2002 salaries for 
professors at doctoral institutions, biological sciences was ranked in 12th place (American 
Association of University Professors 2004). These salaries exclude faculty in medical 
                                                            
6 A survey conducted by the Chronicle of Higher Education (June 2008) found that the 
average stipend paid to research assistants at 111 doctoral research universities was $18,200.  
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schools, although some of the research doctoral programs in the NRC Assessment are housed 
in medical schools. 
The rental rate of lab space was estimated based on median construction costs for 
college laboratory space ($203 per square foot) and geographic cost adjustment factors from 
the R.S. Means directory of Facilities Construction Cost Data (R.S. Means Co. 2006). Based 
on a published account of the 2006 rental rate for Boston (Botelho 2008), the location with 
the most postdocs, the rental rate was assumed to be 24% of the construction cost.  
Quantity was measured as the estimated number of citations of life sciences journal 
articles published by the institution in 2008, to allow a two-year lag time from the 
researchers’ employment in 2006 (Stephan and Levin 1992).7 The number of articles 
published in 2008 was multiplied by the average number of citations per article calculated 
from the NRC Assesssment. Such bibliometric measures have long been used to quantify 
research production (Thelwall 2008).  
The factor share Si for each type of labor was calculated based on the wage, full-time 
equivalent workers of each type, and value of output. The factor share of capital was 
calculated using square feet of lab space multiplied by an estimate of the local rental rate. 
The independent variables in the factor share regression equations were the natural 
logs of FTE of DOCTORAL, POSTDOCS, and FACULTY and natural log of square feet of 
CAPITAL. To maintain the sample size, one was added to the values of doctoral and postdocs 
before taking the natural log to adjust for values of zero. 
                                                            
7 An alternative specification used publications as the measure of quantity. With this 
measure, fewer effects reached the level of statistical significance. 
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Descriptive statistics for the variables used to calculate factor shares are provided in 
table 7. Correlations for the variables used in the regression are provided in table 8. As is 
common in production functions (Kennedy 2008), the quantities of input factors are highly 
correlated, with the highest correlation coefficient corresponding to the faculty and doctoral 
research assistants (r=0.893, p<0.001). Issues related to multicollinearity will be discussed 
along with the regression results. 
Factor shares equations for doctoral research assistants, postdocs, faculty, and capital 
were estimated using seemingly unrelated regression using the four regression equations 
represented by equation 4 (see table 9). Consistent with demand theory, effects are assumed 
to be symmetrical. That is, the effect of postdocs on faculty’s factor share is assumed to be 
the same as the effect of faculty on postdocs’ factor share. The sum of the constant terms αi 
for the system of equations is assumed to equal one. 
 The coefficients from the regressions were used to calculate coefficients of 
complementarity, Cij=(γij+SiSj)/(SiSj) (Grossman 1982). A positive value for Cij indicates that 
the factors are complements and a negative value for Cij indicates that the factors are 
substitutes. More specifically, the factors are substitutes if the regression coefficient γij is 
negative and of greater absolute value than the product of the factor shares of factors i and j. 
RESULTS 
 Model 1 reveals that doctoral research assistants, faculty, and capital are all 
negatively associated with the size of postdocs’ factor share (γdoctoral = -0.006, p = 0.012; 
γfaculty = -0.018, p<0.001; and γcapital = -0.029, p<0.001). For example, the share of production 
attributed to faculty would increase by 1.8% (ln100=4.605; ln271=5.605) if the number of 
postdocs employed increased from 100 to 271. The statistically significant relationships 
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between the labor inputs and capital indicate that capital and labor are not separable in the 
context of this study; it would be inappropriate to estimate the substitutability of labor factors 
without including a measure of capital (Berndt and Christensen 1973). Models 2 and 3 show 
similar relationships among factors and factor shares in the sample’s 100 public institutions 
and 45 private institutions, respectively.  
 Because of the strong correlations among the quantities of input factors, potential 
issues related to multicollinearity should be considered (Kennedy 2008). One potential 
consequence of multicollinearity is a lack of statistically significant coefficients, but that is 
not the case here. The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for model 1 is 5.68 and all VIFs 
are less than 10, cited by Kennedy as a customary level above which multicollinearity is 
considered problematic. 
Calculating the coefficients of complementarity, Cij = (γij-SiSj)/(SiSj) (Grossman, 
1982), at the mean of the raw factor shares (DOCTORAL = 0.102, POSTDOCS = 0.064, 
FACULTY = 0.376, and CAPITAL = 0.304) reveals that the coefficients of all cross-
elasticities for postdocs with other labor inputs are positive (see table 10). The coefficient of 
complementarity between postdocs and capital is -0.015, indicating that these factors 
function as substitutes. Thus, all types of workers appear to be complements to one another, 
with the possible exception of doctoral research assistants and faculty at private institutions. 
In any case, this analysis provides no evidence of postdocs substituting for other categories 
of labor. Postdocs did appear to be substitutes for capital at private institutions (C = -0.065, 
p<0.001). 
Alternative specifications of the model, including the use of raw factor shares and 
Grossman’s (1982) approach which scaled XCAPITAL to equal 1-ΣLi did not improve the model 
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fit. The use of raw coefficients resulted in negative pseudo-r2 values, indicating 
misspecification. Scaling capital to equal 1- ΣLi yielded similar evidence of 
complementarity, but lower pseudo-r2 values and fewer statistically significant effects.  
DISCUSSION 
 This study’s findings indicate that postdocs function as complements to other 
categories of labor in the production of research. This finding is contrary to the expectation 
that workers at different skill levels function as substitutes (Hamermesh and Grant 1979). 
However, finding a complementary relationship is more consistent with the idea that regular 
and contingent employment systems function as complements, especially in organizations 
where the regular employees participate in a strong internal labor market (Ko 2003). 
Academia has been likened to a pyramid scheme in which faculty produce PhDs who 
go on to train yet more PhDs (Holden 1995; Sharom 2008; Stephan 2012). The problem is 
compounded as the doctoral students being trained also contribute to research and teaching, 
which provides an incentive to train them even when no career positions are available 
(Freeman and Van Reenen 2008). The increase in postdoctoral appointments is often 
attributed to this pyramidal structure (Stephan and Ma 2005). Most new doctorate recipients 
in the life sciences, especially those interested in academic careers, will take a postdoc 
appointment immediately after graduation (NSF, 2008). Yet the career academic positions 
they seek have become increasingly scarce, with tenure-track faculty positions increasing at a 
much slower rate than new doctorates (Fox and Stephan 2001). As with any pyramid scheme, 
disaster ensues when demand is quickly saturated by exponential growth.  
A 2003 New York Times piece by author Daniel Duane, “Eggheads Unite,” gives 
particularly incisive expression to this perspective:  
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University fund-raising depends primarily on high-profile faculty publishing, so the 
smart money cuts the total number of professors in order to spend big on a few stars 
and give them enough free time to stay famous. Graduate students, serving as T.A.'s 
and even as lecturers, pick up the teaching slack. This makes for a great fiscal model -
- tenure produces high fixed costs, while disposable T.A.'s work for peanuts. But it 
also creates an ever-greater oversupply of Ph.D.'s competing for ever-fewer tenured 
jobs. Back when graduate students could reasonably see themselves as apprentices 
bound for glorious lecture halls, the low pay was tolerable, but when T.A.-ships look 
like the university's way of balancing the budget at the expense of their graduate 
students' futures, it feels like an outrage (54). 
 
While the passage above refers to teaching, a similar argument can be made about the 
laboratory grunt work of animal care, sample preparation, and routine data collection done by 
research assistants and postdocs. By delegating both lab work and undergraduate teaching to 
assistants and postdocs, faculty have more time to devote to publishing, training graduate 
students, designing research, and preparing grant applications (Lan 2009). 
As more new PhDs find no career position available, many find themselves in a 
holding pattern of extended postdoc appointments (Stephan and Ma 2005; Mishagina 2008). 
If postdocs were substitutes for doctoral students in support of faculty-led research, this could 
potentially counteract the incentive to train a surplus of PhD students. However, if postdocs 
are complements to doctoral students, as indicated by the preceding analysis, the rise of the 
postdoc may perpetuate the training of scientists in excess of demand.  
 These findings also suggest a number of directions for further research. For example, 
it would be useful to understand whether these complementary relationships have changed 
over time, perhaps in response to changing funding levels or immigration policies. The 
model might also be extended to consider whether US and international research assistants 
and postdocs have similar or different roles in the production of research. Non-faculty 
research staff should perhaps be added to the model. It might also be beneficial to model the 
process as one of joint production of teaching and research outputs (Hanushek 1979; Johnson 
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and Turner 2009). Finally, there may be factors that moderate this complementary 
relationship. For example, this analysis has been confined to the life sciences. Production 
functions in the life sciences may differ from those in engineering or the physical sciences 
where there are more career opportunities in industry. 
One of the main concerns of the science of science and innovation policy is the 
application of theoretical models, often from economics, to improve understanding of the 
relevant policy issues (Marburger 2007). This study, which attempts to use publicly available 
data to answer a seemingly straightforward question based on economic theory, sheds light 
on the adequacy of existing data sources for such an effort. On the positive side, the data 
made available through the NRC assessment make it possible to at least estimate each 
variable that enters into the production function. On the other hand, in some cases these 
estimates involved significant assumptions. This was true especially with respect to 
understanding the contributions and costs associated with graduate student research 
assistants. Further, many of the data available through the NRC Assessment are not available 
on a more regular reporting schedule. For example, there appears to be no regular reporting 
of the number of faculty at a university by discipline. To apply economic and other social 
science theories to practical problems of science policy, data collection aligned with the 
constructs of prevailing theoretical models should be a priority.
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Dissatisfaction with the Postdoc Experience: Insights from a Survey 
 
 Science policymakers at the national level, institutional administrators, and individual 
scientists have all expressed concern about the nature of the postdoc experience. At the 
national level, policymakers are concerned because postdocs make significant contributions 
to scientific research (Vogel 1999; Black and Stephan 2010; Corley and Sabharwal 2007). 
Some argue that the postdoc career stage has deterred many of the most talented students, 
especially US-born men, from pursuing careers in science and technology (Stephan and Ma 
2005; Butz et al. 2003). Lack of autonomy and stability during early careers—often a time of 
peak creativity—may reduce scientific productivity (Stephan and Ma 2005; Zubieta 2009). 
The NSF has identified the nature of the postdoc experience as one of the key remaining 
research questions about postdocs (Oliver and Rivers 2006). 
 The effective management and inclusion of postdocs presents a challenge to the 
institutions where they are appointed. Although not readily classified as either students or 
employees, some postdocs have organized through labor unions (Gerwin 2010). Universities 
have responded by creating offices of postdoc affairs, perhaps as a form of nonunion 
employee representation, a common union avoidance strategy (Taras and Kaufman 2006). 
Postdocs have also engaged the political process, lobbying through the NPA and the 
American Association of Universities (AAU) (Scaffidi and Berman 2011). Collective action 
by postdocs in political and institutional contexts has often focused on increasing satisfaction 
by improving the quality of their developmental experiences. 
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 The stresses facing postdocs are a frequent topic in the popular scientific press, with 
headlines like “Career Transitions: Panel Throws Lifeline to Struggling Postdocs,” “Postdoc 
Trail: Long and Filled With Pitfalls,” “The Postdoc’s Plight,” and “A Pressure Cooker for 
Postdocs?” (Survey Sciences Group 2008). In extreme cases, postdocs have been involved in 
workplace-related violence as victims (The Associated Press 2010) or alleged perpetrators 
(Postdoc Allegedly Attempts to Poison Lab Colleague 2008) or have succumbed to 
psychological stress, even to the point of suicide (Smaglik 2006; Krupnick 2011). Workplace 
violence, sometimes attributable to dissatisfied workers, is a widespread and costly problem 
in all sectors of the economy and has received particular attention in the healthcare and 
educational settings where postdocs are found (Flannery 1996). In the scientific community, 
a single incident can result in the loss of several talented scientists and their potential 
contributions to society (Obituaries, Huntsville Times, February 14 and 15, 2010).   
Individual scientists, of course, also stand to benefit from a better understanding of 
how to avoid unsatisfactory postdoc appointments. New PhDs often obtain these positions in 
an ad hoc labor market with limited access to information (Wei, Levin, and Sabik 2009). A 
successful postdoc appointment with a prominent advisor at a prestigious institution can have 
a high payoff in the cumulative advantage that characterizes scientific careers (Su 2011; 
Merton 1968). The postdoc career stage has also been identified as a juncture where many 
women exit or reduce their commitment to the scientific workforce after significant personal 
and public investment in their training (Martinez et al. 2007). 
These social, institutional, and individual concerns motivate this investigation of 
factors influencing postdocs’ dissatisfaction with their appointments. The analysis of these 
factors proceeds in four sections. First, findings from prior research about the postdoc 
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experience are presented in support of propositions about dissatisfaction among postdocs. 
Second, the probability that a postdoc will be dissatisfied is modeled as a function of types of 
research, career goals, postdoc-advisor interaction, program quality, and demographics. 
Third, the study’s data are described. Fourth, the ordered probit regression analysis is 
explained. Fifth, results of the ordered probit regression are presented and the mediating roles 
of autonomy, advisor interaction, and advisor activities in the relationship between program 
quality and dissatisfaction are tested. Sixth, the chapter then concludes with a discussion of 
results, policy implications, and directions for future research. 
Dissatisfaction among Postdocs 
 A seminal work on the measurement of job satisfaction (Seashore and Taber 1975) 
describes it as “a result of fit between need and need fulfillment” (p. 339), emphasizing the 
importance of both individual and environmental factors in determining satisfaction. In 
summarizing the results of the Sigma Xi survey of postdocs, Davis (2005) paraphrased 
Tolstoy, observing that satisfactory postdoc experiences were uniformly good, but each 
unsatisfactory one was unhappy in its own way. However, the current study finds common 
threads in the experiences of the minority of postdocs (11% of sample) who express 
dissatisfaction with their appointments. The mean rating of postdoc satisfaction in this 
study’s sample, 5.464 on a 7-point scale, is almost exactly equal to the 5.48 reported as the 
norm for an extensively validated global measure of job satisfaction, the Michigan 
Organizational Assessment Questionnaire Job Satisfaction Measure, indicating that this 
sample of postdocs has a similar level of satisfaction to that typically found in employee 
surveys (Bowling and Hammond 2008).  
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This is about half of the rate of dissatisfaction found in the Sigma Xi survey, possibly 
indicating improvements in conditions for postdocs since 2003 when those data were 
gathered. Table 11 summarizes survey findings about postdoc satisfaction from various 
sources. While comparisons are limited by differences in measurement approaches across 
these surveys, levels of satisfaction appear to have varied significantly over time. Reported 
levels of satisfaction range from nearly universal satisfaction (Curtis and National Research 
Council 1969) to widespread dissatisfaction (National Research Council 1981) to a more 
moderate 22% dissatisfaction in the Sigma Xi survey. Global satisfaction measures such as 
the one used by Sigma Xi and in this chapter tend to understate the level of dissatisfaction 
(Oshagbemi 1999). 
University offices of postdoctoral affairs and postdoc-run associations have become 
more common and can address some potential sources of dissatisfaction by offering training, 
orientation, networking, and integration into the local community (Felfly 2011). Universities 
may have responded to the findings that nonmonetary aspects of the postdoc appointment—
such as the postdoc and advisor jointly developing a research plan at the outset— increased 
postdoc satisfaction (Davis 2009). Also, the Sigma Xi sample included postdocs in a broader 
range of fields, including social sciences and humanities, and a broad range of settings. 
Postdocs in the major research universities included in this study may be less likely to be 
dissatisfied.  
To identify potential causes of dissatisfaction, the job satisfaction literature has long 
emphasized the need to examine individual and environmental factors. “Prevailing 
conceptions view job satisfaction as a joint product of characteristics of job and job 
environment on the one hand, and the characteristics of the person on the other, with the 
 
 
69 
 
effective set of relevant job characteristics and personal characteristics depending upon 
unspecified combinations and interactions between them” (Seashore and Taber 1975, p. 340). 
At the individual level, Seashore and Taber model the correlates of job satisfaction as 
demographics, stable personality traits, abilities, and situational aspects of personality, such 
as motivations and preferences. At the environmental level, they include characteristics of the 
job and job environment, the organizational environment, and the macroeconomic and 
political context.  
Postdocs’ motivations for taking the appointment often center on pursuit of an 
academic research career and a desire to further develop or signal their level of human 
capital, while being constrained by personal, institutional, and labor market circumstances 
(Miller 2011). Prior research on postdocs suggests that factors related to the research they are 
conducting, career goals, postdoc-advisor interaction, program quality, and demographics are 
likely to be associated with postdocs’ dissatisfaction. The roles of these factors in the postdoc 
experience are described below. 
Research. Because research is central to the postdoc experience, the influence of the 
type of research conducted on postdoc satisfaction is considered first. Scientists are thought 
to be motivated by an intrinsic interest in extending the boundaries of knowledge (Anderson 
et al. 2010; Merton 1973). One important difference between the careers of faculty at 
research universities and those of researchers in other settings is their greater opportunity to 
engage in basic research (Agarwal and Ohyama 2010; Sauermann and Stephan 2010). 
Postdocs are typically pursuing faculty research careers and, especially in academic settings, 
postdoc appointments often offer opportunities to engage in basic research. Postdocs engaged 
in interesting, basic research are expected to be less likely to experience dissatisfaction. Of 
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course, scientists’ levels of interest in basic and other types of research vary (Roach and 
Sauermann 2010). A mismatch between a postdoc’s interest in basic research, applied 
research, and development and the current research project’s emphasis on these activities 
may indicate poor fit, a potential source of dissatisfaction (Edwards 1991; Kristof-Brown, 
Zimmerman, and Johnson 2005). 
 Career goals. Postdocs’ dissatisfaction may also be influenced by the extent to which 
their appointments support their career goals. In fact, 85% of the postdocs in the sample 
reported that increasing the likelihood of getting their desired job was an important factor in 
taking their current appointment. However, 20% of the sample reported taking the 
appointment because no other job was available (reasons were not mutually exclusive).  
Postdoc appointments are most closely aligned with career goals in academic 
research, since they are practically required in many fields for a faculty appointment at a 
research university (Rudd et al. 2010; Nolan et al. 2004). Postdocs who intend to pursue 
faculty research careers and those with a strong interest in basic research may therefore be 
expected to be more satisfied with their appointments compared to postdocs with other career 
goals.  
 Postdoc-advisor interaction. Another factor believed to influence satisfaction with 
postdoc appointments is the structured oversight provided (Davis 2009; Scaffidi and Berman 
2011). Davis’s analysis of the Sigma Xi survey found structured oversight, defined as the 
postdoc’s relationships with a lab and faculty advisor, to be more influential than 
compensation and benefits in determining postdoc satisfaction. Postdocs who are dissatisfied 
might be expected to be lacking in structured oversight, since not all postdoc advisors 
embrace the role of mentor (Fetzer 2008), or perhaps to be micromanaged in a way that does 
 
 
71 
 
not facilitate the transition to an independent research career (Laudel and Gläser 2008). The 
NSF recognized the importance of this relationship by introducing a mandate in 2009 that 
required principal investigators to include a mentoring plan for postdocs funded through their 
grants (NSF, 2009). While prior research on postdocs has found benefits from structured 
oversight, the “paradox of autonomy” implies that such oversight should consist of a balance 
of direction and involvement (Trevelyan 2001). 
 Postdoc-advisor interaction should also be considered with regard to the postdoc’s 
and advisor’s levels of ability. Cumulative advantage, in which those who have an early 
advantage tend to accumulate future advantages, has long been identified as a characteristic 
of scientific careers (Merton 1968). Thus, postdocs with the highest research ability are 
expected to work with the advisors with the highest research ability and gain the most from 
those associations. Good mentoring relationships with highly regarded researchers are 
expected to be inversely related to dissatisfaction in postdocs. 
Program quality. Program quality is also expected to influence postdocs’ level of 
satisfaction. Quality can confer benefits in terms of reputation or access to specific resources. 
The prestige of a postdoc program has been found to be associated with the prestige of 
subsequent faculty appointments (Rudd et al. 2010; McGinnis, Allison, and Long 1981; Su 
2011; Burris 2004). High quality departments are likely to provide more resources and 
affiliation with a prestigious program may send a stronger signal of the scientist’s ability, 
supporting future career goals (Dasgupta and David 1994). Although these benefits might be 
countered by stress and pressure to perform, postdocs are believed to seek out the 
appointments that they believe will maximize their utility, constrained by their ability to 
signal their level of human capital (Zubieta 2009). Presumably those postdocs who were able 
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to obtain appointments in high-quality departments would also have been able to get 
appointments in lower-quality departments (Spence 1973), so postdocs’ presence in high 
quality departments is interpreted as a revealed preference for quality. For reasons of both 
reputation and resources, postdocs in high-quality departments are expected to be more 
satisfied. 
  Demographics. Earlier studies had found that several demographic characteristics 
were related to satisfaction as a postdoc. There is concern that native-born males may be 
leaving the scientific workforce, “crowded out” by immigrants or lured away by higher 
earnings in finance, law, and other careers (Black and Stephan 2010). If native-born males 
tend to leave science for better opportunities, perhaps they are more likely be dissatisfied as 
postdocs. However, another study found that noncitizen postdocs were less satisfied (Corley 
and Sabharwal 2007). Thus, the direction of the expected relationship between citizenship 
and satisfaction is ambiguous, especially keeping in mind the potential for higher attrition 
among the dissatisfied. 
 Prior studies have found that older doctorate recipients were less likely to take 
postdoc appointments, possibly due to financial obligations (Zumeta 1985; McGinnis, 
Allison, and Long 1981; Recotillet 2007). Financial concerns may also be greater for married 
postdocs or those with children, and the effects of family obligations have been found to be 
different for men and women (Helbing, Verhoef, and Wellington 1998; National Research 
Council 1981; Martinez et al. 2007). Prior research also indicates that satisfaction will 
decline as scientists spend more years as postdocs or take multiple appointments (Akerlind 
2005). This effect may be independent of age, as postdocs feel less valued the longer they 
remain in an appointment (Helbing, Verhoef, and Wellington 1998). Although decreasing 
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satisfaction over time as a postdoc has been a consistent finding, it may potentially be 
countered by attrition of postdocs who are especially dissatisfied. 
Prior work has demonstrated that parenthood plays a different role in the academic 
careers of men and women (Mason and Goulden 2004). Qualitative and survey research on 
postdocs has previously found family to be a greater barrier to women’s careers (Martinez et 
al. 2007). While prior research has identified no clear direct relationship between gender and 
satisfaction as a postdoc, gender may have an effect mediated by parental or marital status. 
Gender and discipline were found to be related to job satisfaction in science and social 
science faculty (Sabharwal and Corley 2009). 
Returning to the Seashore and Taber (1975) model, the independent variables above 
include demographic characteristics, stable personality traits such as research interests, a self-
assessment of ability, and situational variables such as motivations. They also include job 
characteristics such as interesting research, the type of research involved, and freedom to 
shape a research project and factors related to the organizational environment, including 
interaction with the advisor and program quality. In a sense occupation is held constant, since 
all subjects are postdocs, and as a cross-sectional study the political and economic context 
does not vary. To the extent occupational and economic conditions vary by scientific field, 
these are controlled for by fixed effects.  
MODEL 
Dissatisfaction among postdocs may be explained by examining the influence of the 
type of research they are conducting, career goals, postdoc-advisor interaction, program 
quality, and demographics. These factors are incorporated into an ordered probit model of 
postdoc dissatisfaction.  
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The following equation (5) represents the ordered probit model: 
(5)  Pr(dissatisfaction) = y = β0 + β1[research] + β2[career goals] + β3[postdoc-advisor 
interaction] + β4[program quality] + β5[demographics] + e 
The error term e is clustered by university to account for shared variance among postdocs at 
the same institution.  
DATA 
Survey Sample 
This analysis is based on data from 764 postdocs at major research universities in the 
US. Web surveys were sent to approximately 30,000 graduate students and postdocs whose 
names and email addresses were gathered from the websites of biological and health 
sciences, engineering, and physical and mathematical sciences departments at 39 large US 
research universities.8 The overall response rate for the survey was 30%.  
1,137 respondents identified themselves as current postdocs in doctorate granting 
departments at major US research universities in the biological sciences, health sciences, or 
physical and mathematical sciences. The biological sciences category includes biochemistry, 
biophysics, and structural biology; cell and developmental biology; ecology and evolutionary 
biology; genetics and genomics; and neuroscience/neurobiology. Health sciences includes 
biology/integrated biology/integrated biomedical sciences; immunology and infectious 
disease; microbiology; and pharmacology, toxicology and environmental health. Physical 
                                                            
8 Further details of the survey and sample are available in Sauermann, Henry and Roach, 
Michael, Not All Scientists Pay to Be Scientists: Heterogeneous Preferences for Publishing 
in Industrial Research (August 15, 2011). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696783. The 20 universities with the most survey responses were 
Columbia University, Cornell, Duke University, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Michigan State 
University, MIT, Ohio State University, UC Berkeley, UC Davis, UC Los Angeles, UC San 
Diego, UNC Chapel Hill, University of Chicago, University of Florida, University of 
Michigan, University of Washington, University of Wisconsin, Washington University St. 
Louis, and Yale. 
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and mathematical sciences includes astrophysics and astronomy, chemistry, computer 
science, and physics. This total includes doctoral students identified in the original sampling 
frame who had become postdocs (either at the same institution or a different one), postdocs 
identified in the original sampling frame who remained in their appointments, and postdocs 
who had moved into another postdoc appointment. 281 postdoc respondents indicated they 
were currently at the university where they earned their doctorates.  
The proportions of men and US citizens were comparable to those found in other 
surveys, such as the 2009 NSF Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates. The current 
sample had slightly more male (58% vs. 56%) and fewer US citizen (47% vs. 49%) 
respondents in the biological and health sciences and approximately the same percentage of 
male (79%) and slightly fewer US citizen (38% vs. 40%) respondents in the physical and 
mathematical sciences.  
The demographic makeup of the sample can also be compared to the population of 
those earning doctorates in the US, as measured by the 2009 Survey of Earned Doctorates. 
Overall, 57% of these graduates are male and 70% are US citizens. The current survey 
sample contains more men and more noncitizens. This difference can be attributed to 
postdocs coming to the US after earning doctorates abroad. 
Analyses are conducted on the 764 complete responses from postdocs at major US 
research universities in the biological sciences, health sciences, and physical and 
mathematical sciences. Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for the sample and its three 
subgroups: biological sciences, health sciences, and physical and mathematical sciences. 
Table 13 presents a correlation matrix for the full sample.  
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Dependent variable 
 Dissatisfaction. Postdocs were asked to respond to the question “Overall, how 
satisfied are you with your current PostDoc experience?” on a seven-point Likert scale 
ranging from “Very dissatisfied” to “Very satisfied.” The ordinal variable dissatisfaction was 
coded as 1 if the response was very dissatisfied, dissatisfied, or somewhat dissatisfied, 0 if 
the response was “Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” and -1 if the response indicated some 
degree of satisfaction. 
Binary variables were created for alternative specifications. The binary variable 
dissatisfied was coded as 1 if the response was very dissatisfied, dissatisfied, or somewhat 
dissatisfied and zero if the response was neutral or indicated some degree of satisfaction.  
Independent variables 
 Type of research. Three types of variables were used to represent the type of research. 
The binary variable research interesting was coded as 1 if the response to the question “How 
interesting do you find your current research?” was “Somewhat interesting” or “Extremely 
interesting” on a five-point Likert scale.  
 The variable mismatch average was created by averaging difference scores based on 
responses to six questions. First, postdocs responded to the question “To what extent do you 
agree or disagree with the following phrases regarding the nature of your current research[?]” 
on five-point Likert scales ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree” with respect 
to three types of research: basic, applied, and development. Because the use of these terms 
varies in different contexts (Calvert 2006), the following phrases were used to define the 
types of research: “My research contributes fundamental insights or theories (basic 
research),” “My research creates knowledge to solve practical problems (applied research),” 
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and “My research uses knowledge to develop materials, devices, or software (development).” 
Second, postdocs were asked to respond to the question “When thinking about the future, 
how interesting would you find the following kinds of work?” on five-point Likert scales 
ranging from “Uninteresting” to “Interesting.” They were presented with the same three 
types of research defined previously. Difference scores were calculated as the absolute value 
of the difference between the current research project rating and the future research interest 
rating and the difference scores were averaged such that a higher score indicates a greater 
discrepancy between the postdoc’s current research and future research interests. Responses 
to each of the six questions about the current research project and future research interests 
and the relevant interactions were also entered individually into the equation.  
Career goals. Three types of variables represented the extent to which the postdoc 
appointment was consistent with future career goals. The first of these variables recorded 
whether the respondent took their first postdoc appointment because of difficulty finding 
another job. Postdocs were asked “Thinking back to when you began your first PostDoc in 
[year], how important were the following factors in influencing your decision to do a 
PostDoc?” They were asked to rate four factors on a five-point Likert scale from “Extremely 
unimportant” to “Extremely important”: “I wanted to deepen my skills in a particular 
research area,” “I experienced difficulty finding another job,” “A PostDoc increases the 
chance to get my desired job,” and “I wanted to have more time before deciding on my long-
term career.” Noncitizen postdocs were also asked about the influence of coming to or 
staying in the US. This reason was described as at least moderately important by 17% of 
noncitizens. A binary variable was coded as 1 if the response was “Extremely important” or 
“Moderately important” and 0 if the response was neutral or unimportant. 
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 The second career goal measure was faculty career goal, whether the postdocs were 
most likely to pursue a faculty career focused on research compared to other options. 
Subjects were asked to rank the following careers from most likely to pursue to least likely to 
pursue: “University faculty with an emphasis on research or development,” “University 
faculty with an emphasis on teaching,” “Government job with an emphasis on research or 
development,” “Job in an established firm with an emphasis on research or development,” 
“Job in a startup firm with an emphasis on research or development,” and “Other career.” To 
create a set of ordered rankings, the web survey was constructed so that a respondent could 
not give two careers equal rank. A binary variable was coded 1 if the responded ranked a 
faculty research career as the most likely future career and coded 0 if any other career was 
ranked as most likely. 
Responses to the questions described previously about interest in types of research 
were also coded as a binary variables interest in basic, interest in applied, and interest in 
development with 1 corresponding to “Extremely interesting” and “Interesting” and 0 
corresponding to neutral responses and lack of interest. 
Postdoc-advisor relationship. Five variables were used to measure this relationship. 
Advisor ability was measured as the response to “How would you rate the overall research 
accomplishments of your advisor relative to his/her peers in their field?” on a continuous 
scale from 0 to 10 anchored with the following descriptions: “Among Least Accomplished,” 
“Below Average,” “Average,” “Above Average,” and “Among Most Accomplished.” Self-
rated ability was measured as the response to “How would you rate your research ability 
relative to other PostDocs in your specific field of study?” on a continuous scale from 0 to 10 
anchored with the following descriptions: “Among the least skilled,” “Below Average,” 
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“Average,” “Above Average,” and “Among the most skilled.” 22.27% of the postdoc 
respondents gave a response of exactly 5. This may indicate an anchoring bias, with 
mechanical and psychological factors making respondents unlikely to move the web survey’s 
slider bar from the default value.  
Advisor often was a binary variable based on the question “On average, how often do 
you directly interact with your advisor?” It was coded as 1 if the response indicated direct 
interaction at least once per week and 0 if interaction was less frequent. Shape current 
research was a binary variable based on the question “How much freedom do you have in 
influencing the direction of your research project(s)?” It was coded 1 if the response 
indicated complete or great freedom and 0 if the response indicated some, little, or no 
freedom. Lab size represented the response to the question “Including yourself, 
approximately how many members are in your primary research lab?” Responses ranged 
from 1 to 25 or more (8%). Only 944 postdocs reported a lab size. Where lab size was 
included in regressions, records with missing data were not included. 
 Program quality. Institutional quality was operationalized with a binary variable 
coded as 1 for approximately 25% of postdocs who were in appointments at top tier of 
programs based on the NRC assessment. This assessment reported a 90% confidence interval 
around each doctoral program’s ranking based on various criteria (National Research Council 
2011). Z-scores were calculated based on each program’s 5th percentile score for the 
regression-based ranking to allow comparison across fields. In some cases, rankings were 
imputed at the broad field or institution level if the survey response was not complete enough 
to identify a specific program. Approximately 25% of respondents were in the highest-ranked 
tier of programs with rankings 1.3 standard deviations better than the mean. Because the 
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sample already focused on leading research universities, defining the top tier as broadly as 
the top 25% was appropriate to avoid leverage from large individual programs.  
 Many universities expressed concerns about the NRC assessment and rankings. While 
these concerns may be very relevant to assessing the quality of individual programs, there is 
not a particular concern that the subtleties of these rankings would be correlated with the 
satisfaction of postdocs. A limitation that is perhaps more relevant to the context of this study 
is that the quality of a postdoc experience may not depend on the same factors as the quality 
of a research doctorate program. For example, the practice of assigning office space to 
doctoral students could represent either a resource-rich environment favoring both students 
and postdocs or competition between students and postdocs for resources. 
 Demographics. Six demographic variables were used. Binary variables measured 
female gender, whether the postdoc had any children, and whether the postdoc was married. 
Start year represented the year the respondent started the first postdoc appointment. 
Responses ranged from 2002 to 2010, the year the study was conducted. Nationality was 
analyzed by creating two binary variables for non-US citizens. Non-US high income was 
coded 1 for noncitizen postdocs whose nationality was from a country in the World Bank’s 
high income category. Using 2010 definitions, the World Bank classified countries as high income 
if their gross national income per capita was above $12,276. Further explanation of the definitions can 
be found on the World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications. The 
binary variable Non-US other was coded as 1 for noncitizen postdocs from countries with 
lower incomes. US citizens were the reference category for the analysis of nationality.  
Equation 5 was estimated using ordered probit regression analysis with postdocs’ 
dissatisfaction as the dependent variable. Alternative specifications treating the dependent 
variable as multinomial with three unordered categories and as 5-point and 7-point Likert 
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scales are shown in appendix C. These alternative specifications did not appear to fit the data 
as well as the 3-category ordered probit model. 
RESULTS 
Table 14 summarizes the results of the ordered probit regression. Results for factors 
related to research, career goals, postdoc-advisor interaction, program quality, and 
demographics are presented below. 
 Research. Engaging in interesting research seemed to be the most influential factor in 
avoiding postdoc dissatisfaction (b = -1.557, p<0.001). Being involved in interesting research 
had an average marginal effect of -0.194 on the probability that a postdoc would be 
dissatisfied. There was a statistically significant effect on dissatisfaction from being involved 
in basic research for those postdocs with an interest in basic research (b = -0.877, p = 0.040). 
Satisfaction also did not appear to be related to the extent to which current research did not 
match future research interests (b= 0.048, p=0.672). The effect of this mismatch may have 
been captured by the variable measuring interest in the current research project. 
 Career goals. As expected, those postdocs who took their appointment out of 
necessity were more likely to be dissatisfied (b = 0.415, p=0.068). There was a statistically 
significant interaction between the effect of taking a postdoc appointment because there was 
no other job available and currently being involved in applied research (b = -0.729, p=0.021). 
Being involved in applied research seemed to offset somewhat the dissatisfaction associated 
with taking a postdoc out of necessity. Alternatively, this finding could be interpreted as the 
reduced likelihood of dissatisfaction associated with applied research being stronger for those 
who took their postdoc out of necessity. Perhaps these postdocs believed that more 
experience with applied research would improve their future employment prospects. 
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With respect to career interests, postdocs who intended to pursue faculty careers 
focused on research were somewhat less likely to be dissatisfied (b = -0.447, p=0.005).  
With respect to research interests, an interest in basic research was associated with a 
higher probability of dissatisfaction (b=-1.042, p=0.015) that, as seen above, was partially 
offset if the postdoc’s current research project involved basic research, which was the case 
for almost 90% of the postdocs. Interest in basic research was found to reduce the probability 
of dissatisfaction, but only among female postdocs (b = -1.058, p=0.001). The apparent 
absence of this relationship for male postdocs is puzzling, but may relate to more male 
postdocs in the sample doing basic research when basic research did not interest them. 71% 
of 72 male postdocs who were not interested in basic research reported that their current 
project involved basic research. This was true for only 61% of 36 similar female postdocs. 
An interest in applied research or development was not found to be related to dissatisfaction, 
regardless of the type of research involved in the current project. 
Postdoc-advisor relationship. Consistent with the findings of Scaffidi and Berman 
(2011) and Davis (2009), measures associated with advisors providing effective mentoring 
and oversight were associated with a lower probability of dissatisfaction. For example, 
postdocs who interacted with their advisors at least once per week were less likely to be 
dissatisfied, an effect that was strongest and statistically significant in the biological sciences 
(b = -0.406, p = 0.045). The association between infrequent postdoc-advisor interaction and 
dissatisfaction could be interpreted as psychological contract breach if this level of 
interaction does not match the postdoc’s expectation for the advising relationship (Lambert, 
Edwards, and Cable 2003). 
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There was a positive correlation between the postdoc’s rating of own research ability 
and advisor research ability (b = 0.263, p<0.001). The regression coefficients for advisor 
ability (b = 0.173, p=0.087), self-perceived ability (b = 0.333, p = 0.008), and their 
interaction (b = -0.041, p = 0.004) were jointly significant. Perceptions of the advisor’s and 
one’s own research ability were associated with a higher probability of dissatisfaction. 
However, this probability of dissatisfaction diminished when the postdoc rated both self and 
advisor as high ability. Inspection of the marginal effects (see figure 7) indicated that the 
effects of increases of perceived research ability in either party on dissatisfaction were 
negative and increasing in magnitude over both types of perceived research ability. That is, 
the most accomplished advisors were associated with reduced probability of dissatisfaction 
for the most skilled postdocs. These results were robust to an alternative specification that 
treated self-ratings of ability equal to 5 as nonresponse. 
Program quality. Surprisingly, being appointed in a high quality academic 
department was associated with a higher probability of dissatisfaction after controlling for the 
other variables in the model (b = 0.383, p=0.040).  
 Program quality was found to be associated with reduced dissatisfaction through its 
relationship with autonomy (b = -0.809, p = <0.001). A postdoc appointment in a high-
quality academic department only appeared to be associated with reduced dissatisfaction if 
the postdoc felt free to shape a research project.9 While being in a high-quality academic 
department had a positive correlation of 0.063 (p=0.050) with having freedom to shape a 
                                                            
9 In an alternative specification, shape current research was coded as 1 for all respondents 
who reported at least “Some freedom.” In this model, the interaction between the ability to 
shape current research and high program quality was positive and approached statistical 
significance (β = 0.872, p=0.050). This suggests that the reduced probability of 
dissatisfaction depended on a high, not just moderate, level of freedom to shape the project. 
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project, 30% of 286 postdocs in high-quality departments reported not having the freedom to 
shape their research project.  
Lab size was used as a control variable because the lab often provides the context for 
the postdoc-advisor relationship, but no significant effect was found for lab size (p=0.422). 
 While there was no overall relationship between citizenship and satisfaction, postdocs 
from outside the US who were not from high income countries were less likely to be 
dissatisfied with their appointments in the biological sciences (b = -0.448, p=0.055). 10  
 Postdocs reported greater satisfaction the more recently they had begun their first 
postdoc appointment (b = -0.058, p=0.075). Estimates of this effect may be conservative due 
to attrition of the most dissatisfied postdocs. 
The effect of family on women scientists’ careers is represented in the model. The 
interaction between female gender and parenthood reveals that children were associated with 
an increased probability of dissatisfaction for female postdocs (b = 0.498, p = 0.090).  
Dummy variables for life sciences and health sciences were used to control for field 
fixed effects. The physical and mathematical sciences field was the reference category. Field 
fixed effects dummies were interacted with all variables to test whether effects were 
consistent across fields. Two effects specific to the biological sciences have been described 
previously: postdocs from outside the US but not from high income countries were less likely 
to be dissatisfied and interacting at least once per week with the advisor was associated with 
a lower probability of dissatisfaction. In biological sciences, female postdocs were more 
likely to be dissatisfied (b = 0.672, p = 0.099). On the other hand, in health sciences, female 
                                                            
10 Using 2010 World Bank definitions. The World Bank defined countries as high income if 
their gross national income per capita was above $12,276. Further explanation of the 
definitions can be found on the World Bank website: 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications 
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postdocs were less likely to be dissatisfied (b = -1.034, p=0.012). For all other variables 
included in the model, the effects did not differ significantly among fields. In their analysis 
of job satisfaction in science faculty, Sabharwal and Corley (2009) found that correlates of 
satisfaction were similar for science and health professions faculty, while correlates were 
different for engineering and social science faculty.  
A surprising aspect of the preceding analysis was the absence of any significant 
beneficial effect from the quality of the academic department on postdoc satisfaction after 
controlling for the other variables in the model. In fact, the relationship between quality and 
satisfaction was in the opposite direction from that expected, with quality increasing the 
probability of dissatisfaction. The analysis of interaction effects revealed that being in a high-
quality program did have a beneficial effect on satisfaction if the postdoc had the freedom to 
shape a research project.  
Frequent advisor interaction was also associated with satisfaction. However, it is 
possible that faculty in high-quality doctoral research programs have so many competing 
priorities that they interact less frequently with their postdocs. Seemingly unrelated 
regression was used to estimate a multiple mediation model (UCLA Academic Technology 
Services n.d.) that illustrates how freedom to shape a project and less frequent advisor 
interaction may explain the relationship between quality and satisfaction (see figure 8). High 
program quality was associated with less frequent advisor interaction (b = -0.128, p<0.001) 
and greater freedom to shape the current research project (b = 0.061, p=0.064). Further, both 
frequent advisor interaction (b = -0.200, p<0.001) and freedom to shape the current research 
project (b = -0.312, p<0.001) were negatively associated with dissatisfaction. The indirect 
effect of high program quality through advisor interaction was 0.025 (p = 0.002) and the 
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effect through shaping the research project was -0.019 (p = 0.073). The total indirect effect 
was estimated to be 0.007, which was not statistically significant (p = 0.620) as expected, 
because the indirect effects were of opposite sign and similar magnitude. Consistent with the 
paradox of autonomy (Trevelyan 2001), postdocs in high quality programs appeared to 
appreciate the increased freedom to shape research projects, but this was offset by less access 
to advisors, resulting in no net gain from program quality. This finding is also consistent with 
the dependence of job satisfaction on both autonomy and feedback, especially for workers 
concerned about career growth, identified in a meta-analytic review of the relationship 
between job characteristics and job satisfaction (Loher et al. 1985). 
While freedom to shape a project could theoretically result from minimal advisor 
interaction or cause the advisor to allocate less time to supervision, these data do not seem to 
show a relationship, causal or otherwise, between these variables. The correlation between 
freedom to shape a project and interacting with the advisor at least once per week was 0.017 
(p = 0.583). 
 Chang et al. (2005) identify grantwriting, publishing, teaching, and keeping up with 
the rapid pace of scientific advancement as demands that compete with postdocs for 
advisors’ time in the interdisciplinary field they study, cancer prevention. Additional 
responsibilities may mediate the relationship between program quality and less frequent 
advisor interaction. An index of advisor activity was created based on postdocs’ reports of 
their advisors’ involvement in consulting, patenting, advisory board service, and founding or 
serving as an executive of an entrepreneurial venture. Advisors in high-quality programs 
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participated in a mean of 1.898 activities (CI= 1.516-2.279) and in low quality programs a 
mean of 0.956 activities (CI= 0.807-1.106).11  
Modeling this relationship using seemingly unrelated regression (see figure 9), 
reveals that high program quality is positively associated with the number of advisor 
activities (b = 0.318, p=0.001). Similar results were obtained by estimating the relationship 
between program quality and number of activities using zero-inflated Poisson regression, an 
approach suitable for a dependent variable that is a count measure without overdispersion 
(StataCorp 2009). There was also a significant negative association between the number of 
advisor activities and frequent advisor interaction with the postdoc (b = -0.139, p=0.046). 
While there may be benefits to postdocs from working with advisors with broad experiences 
and an extensive network of contacts, there did appear to be less frequent interaction. Less 
frequent interaction was in turn associated with lower levels of satisfaction. Advisor activity 
measures partially mediated the relationship between program quality and frequency of 
advisor interaction with the postdoc (c′=0.142, p=002). These findings appear consistent with 
those of Chang et al. (2005) in that activities such as teaching and grantwriting may also 
mediate the relationship between quality and advisor interaction.  
One limitation of this analysis is the availability of only a binary measure of the 
advisor’s involvement in an activity. It is unknown, for example, how much consulting 
activity the advisor did or on how many boards the advisor served. There is also no measure 
available of the advisor’s involvement in teaching and mentoring graduate students. It stands 
to reason that this involvement would be high in high-quality doctoral programs. Further, the 
                                                            
11 These calculations include only those records where any advisor activities were reported. If 
records with no advisor activities reported are coded as zero rather than missing data, average 
number of activities in high quality programs is 0.584 activities (CI= 0.429-0.738) and in low 
quality programs a mean of 0.360 activities (CI=0.295-0.424). 
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activities were reported by postdocs, not the advisors themselves. However, it seems likely 
that postdocs who interacted more frequently with advisors would be more likely to be aware 
of their advisors’ activities, which implies that this estimate of the effect of activities on 
interaction may be conservative. It is also possible that work-life issues on behalf of either 
the postdoc or advisor reduce the frequency of interaction. However, postdocs in high quality 
programs tend to be younger (mean age= 31.876 compared to 32.417, p=0.023), with perhaps 
fewer work-life conflicts. A final possibility is that reduced interaction with the advisor is a 
symptom rather than the cause of dissatisfaction. This cannot be dismissed, and the 
possibility of a negative feedback loop between dissatisfaction and advisor interaction should 
also be considered.  
The postdoc’s funding source may also influence the frequency of interaction with the 
advisor and freedom to shape the research project. There are two potential mechanisms for 
this influence, which unfortunately cannot be distinguished in these data. First, the postdoc 
may secure independent funding through a competitive portable fellowship, which would 
provide the postdoc a great deal of influence over the research project while potentially 
minimizing the need to interact with an advisor. The advisor may also be less invested in 
interacting with an independently funded postdoc than with one being paid from grant 
funding to contribute to the advisor’s research. Alternatively, postdocs and advisors could 
collaborate in securing grant funding. In this case the postdoc and advisor are likely to 
interact more frequently, particularly during the grantwriting process, and the postdoc may 
also have more input into the direction of the overall research project or the ability to shape 
one project within a larger program of research.  
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DISCUSSION 
 The probability that the postdoc will be dissatisfied with the appointment is 
influenced by the type of research being conducted, its relationship to the postdoc’s future 
career goals, postdoc-advisor interaction, and demographic factors. Dissatisfaction is less 
likely when the postdoc finds the current research project interesting, when the postdoc 
appointment is consistent with future career interests—especially as a faculty researcher—
rather than employment of last resort. Satisfaction is also more likely when the research has 
an applied element, especially if the postdoc took the appointment for lack of an available 
job.  
Working in a high-quality program does not appear to prevent dissatisfaction and in 
some cases may even be a contributing factor. If the advisor and postdoc do not interact at 
least once per week and the postdoc does not have freedom to shape the research projects, the 
potential benefits of a top program can become liabilities. The postdoc may avoid a 
potentially unsatisfactory experience by seeking out an appointment that allows greater 
autonomy and more frequent advisor interaction in a less prestigious department. It also 
appears that only the most capable, or at least the most confident, are less likely to be 
dissatisfied when working with advisors they consider among the most accomplished. 
These findings should be considered in terms of their implications for national policy, 
institutions, and individual scientists. One policy approach often advocated to improve the 
postdoc experience is to fund more postdocs through portable fellowships (Armbruster 2008; 
COSEPUP 2000). Portable fellowships have the advantage of increasing the postdoc’s 
autonomy. However, they may be associated with less advisor interaction and less integration 
with labs and university communities. These findings about the influence of program quality 
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on postdoc dissatisfaction suggest that there may be no net benefit if an increase in autonomy 
is accompanied by a decrease in advisor interaction.  
Universities and other research organizations may be able to avoid postdocs’ 
dissatisfaction by providing structure to integrate postdocs into their work environments, 
even if the postdocs enjoy considerable autonomy in their research direction. Professional 
development offerings for faculty and postdocs can be designed to facilitate regular 
interaction as well as promoting the postdocs’ empowerment and transition to independent 
research. 
These findings also have implications for new doctorate recipients who are 
considering taking a postdoc appointment. For those who have the opportunity to take a 
postdoc appointment that immerses them in interesting research and who plan to pursue 
faculty research careers, these findings indicate that postdocs are likely to find at least their 
first appointment satisfactory. However, a faculty research career will be unattainable for 
many. Actively researching the job market and critically assessing one’s own research 
abilities may bring some scientists to that conclusion sooner rather than later. Those scientists 
faced with a choice between a postdoc or no job at all may be more satisfied if they secure an 
appointment involving applied research. 
Future research on postdoc satisfaction would be advanced by the use of longitudinal 
studies that allow for the analysis antecedents and consequences of satisfaction. For example, 
longitudinal data could be used to investigate the causal relationship between satisfaction and 
frequency of advisor interaction. It would also be beneficial to incorporate validated global 
and facet-based measures of satisfaction to facilitate connections to the existing body of 
satisfaction research in education and employment settings.
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the chapters that make up this dissertation advance research on 
postdocs’ motivations, role in research production, and experiences. Much prior research on 
postdocs has been phenomenological and descriptive in nature. The dissertation approaches 
the fragmented body of prior research on postdocs with theoretical frameworks that connect 
the postdoctoral experience with research in psychology, sociology, and economics. The 
dissertation also takes a multilevel approach to the study of postdoc appointments, 
considering both individual and organizational factors as well as cross-level relationships. 
This chapter summarizes findings from the dissertation, describes the current postdoc policy 
agenda, and suggests directions for further research. 
SUMMARY 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on postdocs and suggests potentially testable 
propositions related to scientists’ motivations to pursue postdoc appointments. The annotated 
bibliography provided in appendix A is comprehensive in its coverage of a wide range of 
literature discussing postdocs and establishes a valuable starting point for further scholarship 
on the topic. 
The conceptual and empirical chapters of this dissertation suggest a number of 
implications for policy and directions for further research. 
The conceptual model based on the theory of planned behavior, developed in Chapter 
3, could potentially suggest several potential policy interventions once it has been 
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empirically validated. First, students in the sciences could be provided with information 
about academic research careers and other career paths, including government, industry, 
entrepreneurship, and education. Students should be encouraged to reflect realistically on 
their own career preferences. Further, it suggests that an understanding of students’ beliefs 
about academic careers and career preferences could be used to develop innovative 
employment models.  
The theory of planned behavior also suggests that lab colleagues, including advisors, 
can play an important role in socializing doctoral students about the nature and value of 
various career paths. Increasing the sphere of influential others beyond career academics 
could help in this regard. Lab relationships that are collegial rather than exploitative are 
likely to lead students to place more weight on the influence of lab colleagues. 
The model suggests that students should also be given opportunities to assess their 
likely prospects in the scientific labor market. These prospects depend on their level of 
ability and their success in signaling that ability. Students may also benefit from more 
information about the level of competition they will face in the labor market, where success 
depends not just on absolute ability but on relative ability. Their prospects may also be 
affected by characteristics and choices that constrain their participation in the labor market, 
such as willingness to relocate or access to capital for entrepreneurial ventures. There may 
also be opportunities for policy to address these constraints directly through more flexible 
access to capital and relocation assistance. 
Results from Chapter 4 suggest that policies that increase the availability of postdocs, 
such as relaxed immigration constraints, will support the employment of more faculty since 
postdocs appear to be complements to faculty. However, such policies may also support the 
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training of more doctoral research assistants, who are likely to also enter the postdoc 
workforce, perpetuating the cycle. 
Chapter 5 implies that advocacy for mentoring is appropriately aligned with the goal 
of preventing postdoc satisfaction. It also indicates that women scientists may not yet face a 
level playing field at the postdoctoral stage. These findings also suggest that the autonomy 
benefits of portable fellowships may be offset if fellowship recipients are not frequently 
interacting with an advisor. 
POSTDOC POLICY AGENDA 
 The current policy agenda for postdocs in the US is grounded in the 2000 COSEPUP 
report, Enhancing the Postdoctoral Experience for Scientists and Engineers: A Guide for 
Postdoctoral Scholars, Advisers, Institutions, Funding Organizations, and Disciplinary 
Societies. This report laid out an agenda of ten action points related to the postdoc 
experience: 
1. Award institutional recognition, status, and compensation commensurate with 
the contributions of postdocs to the research enterprise. 
2. Develop distinct policies and standards for postdocs, modeled on those 
available for graduate students and faculty. 
3. Develop mechanisms for frequent and regular communication between 
postdocs and their advisers, institutions, funding organizations, and 
disciplinary societies. 
4. Monitor and provide formal evaluations (at least annually) of the performance 
of postdocs. 
5. Ensure that all postdocs have access to health insurance, regardless of funding 
source, and to institutional services. 
6. Set limits for total time of a postdoc appointment (of approximately five 
years, summing time at all institutions), with clearly described exceptions as 
appropriate. 
7. Invite the participation of postdocs when creating standards, definitions, and 
conditions for appointments. 
8. Provide substantive career guidance to improve postdocs' ability to prepare for 
regular employment. 
9. Improve the quality of data both for postdoctoral working conditions and for 
the population of postdocs in relation to employment prospects in research. 
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10. Take steps to improve the transition of postdocs to regular career positions (p. 
99). 
 
In the intervening years, institutions have taken steps to address many of these points. 
Consistent with these recommendations, the NSF added a requirement that postdocs funded 
out of its grant funds have a mentoring plan included at the proposal stage and documented in 
annual reports, section 7008 of the 2007 America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully 
Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science (COMPETES) Act. An 
evaluation based on data from the Sigma Xi survey documented benefits to postdocs from 
professional development and structured oversight, but little change in satisfaction associated 
with improvement to compensation (Davis 2009). 
Steps have also been taken to improve data collection about postdocs and establish a 
new agenda for policy and research. The NPA, the NSF, and the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) COSEPUP are key stakeholder groups in these initiatives.  
The NPA, founded in 2002, has hosted annual meetings since 2003. A review of 
annual meeting agendas from 2003-2012 reveals that policy and collective action have been 
some of the most consistent priorities at these meetings (National Postdoctoral Association 
2012). Other consistent themes at the meetings have been mentoring, diversity, careers, 
funding, and immigration. Topics that have appeared for the first time on these meeting 
agendas since 2010, potentially indicating emerging areas of interest, include unionization, 
industry careers, entrepreneurship, and teaching. 
The NSF has initiated a project to improve collection of data on postdocs (Oliver and 
Rivers 2006; Survey Sciences Group 2008). This project has proceeded through two phases. 
In the first phase, Survey Sciences Group focused on developing sampling strategies to 
capture postdocs believed to be missing from current data collection efforts: those on 
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temporary visas who earned their PhD outside the US, those with doctorates other than the 
PhD, and those outside of academia. In the second phase, Survey Sciences Group tested the 
feasibility of their proposed sampling strategy, including the use of FastLane data on funding 
sources for postdocs. While many feasibility challenges were identified, the project has now 
progressed to development of survey items that can be used in a survey of postdocs and 
potentially integrated into existing surveys such as the SDR. 
The NAS COSEPUP has established a committee to undertake a project on “The 
State of the Postdoctoral Experience for Scientists and Engineers Revisited.” As described on 
the NAS Current Projects System website (accessed April 3, 2012) the committee has been 
charged with addressing the following questions: 
1) General characteristics of postdoctoral fellows and positions in the U.S. 
How many postdoctoral fellows are there in the U.S.? Where are they 
working, in what fields, and for how many years?  
2) Current conditions for postdocs  
Are expectations of principal investigators made clear? Do postdocs receive 
adequate professional status and privileges as well as salary and benefits? Are the 
rules clear about credit they receive for their discoveries in the lab, and are they 
receiving adequate career guidance and development? 
3) Institutional provisions. 
Do postdocs serve as investigators on grants? Are questions of intellectual 
property identified and provided for? At universities, is teaching required; if not, is it 
encouraged or discouraged? 
4) Career paths 
Where do postdocs come from? What do we know and what can we learn 
about what postdocs do after they complete their programs. How well are the postdoc 
programs matched with the career opportunities that are open to them?  
5) Recent trends and changes 
Have previous recommendations been implemented and to what effect? Are 
there other developments in the research enterprise that have had a significant effect 
on postdocs? 
6) Participation in the research enterprise 
Are postdocs being invited to review journal articles and to write grant 
proposals, either formally by journals and agencies or informally by PIs, and is this 
experience useful? What are the impressions of postdocs about peer review today? 
Are postdocs being used effectively in research? Are postdocs acquiring the skills 
they need to become productive independent researchers in the future? 
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This dissertation provides information that could potentially inform points 2, 4, and 6 of the 
committee’s charge. With respect to point 2, current conditions for postdocs, Chapter 5 on 
postdoc dissatisfaction sheds light on the nature of the postdoc experience. With respect to 
point 4, career paths, Chapter 3 provides a conceptual framework for understanding the 
relationship of postdoc appointments to career plans. With respect to point 6, participation in 
the research enterprise, Chapter 4 provides an economic perspective on the effective use of 
postdocs in research. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are three potential extensions of this dissertation research. First, the theory of 
planned behavior offers a framework for the empirical study of decision making in scientific 
careers more broadly, encompassing the choice between industry and academia and, within 
industry careers, the choice between startups and established firms. By integrating findings 
from behavioral economics, it may be possible to create a more thorough understanding of 
seemingly irrational decisions to pursue graduate study in the face of highly uncertain career 
opportunities.  
Second, it would be useful to examine the role of postdocs as a labor input in the 
production of university research over time. Just as technology can be a substitute for labor in 
some contexts and a complement in others, postdocs’ role in the production of research may 
be different under different circumstances.  
Third, research on satisfaction and dissatisfaction can make use of existing validated 
facet-based measures of satisfaction to connect this research with the extensive literature on 
satisfaction in work and educational settings. Longitudinal research on satisfaction will make 
it possible to study causal effects and potentially evaluate the results of policy interventions. 
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Table 1 
Postdoctoral Scholars in the US: Large-scale Surveys 
 
Survey name Description 
  
Postdoctoral Work in American 
Universities 
16 campus visits conducted in 1960 by Bernard Berelson 
and David Sills for the Association of American 
Universities. Surveys were also mailed to presidents of 
AAU member schools and the researchers met with 
representatives of major funders of postdoctoral 
research. 
  
The Invisible University: 
Postdoctoral Education in the 
US 
Conducted by Richard Curtis for the National Research 
Council. A census of postdocs was taken in spring 1967 
and qualitative data were gathered from interviews in 
agencies, non-profits, and industry and 20 campus visits. 
  
Postdoctoral Appointments and 
Disappointments  
A two stage study directed by Porter Coggeshall for the 
National Research Council. In the first stage, survey 
responses from 150 university administrators and 40 
R&D managers in government and industry as well as 
information from site visits to 50 departments at 15 
universities were used to craft a proposal for the study’s 
second stage, which included surveys of chairmen of 
science and engineering departments, US citizens with 
science and engineering doctorates, and foreign citizens 
holding postdoctoral appointments. 
  
Extending the Educational 
Ladder: The Changing Quality 
and Value of Postdoctoral 
Study 
Compiled by William Zumeta for the National Science 
Foundation, Spencer Foundation, Lilly Endowment, 
Mellon Foundation, and Higher Education Research 
Institute. Data are from a variety of sources including the 
Survey of Earned Doctorates, Survey of Doctorate 
Recipients, other National Research Council Surveys, 
and the Higher Education Research Institute Survey of 
Mobility and Nontraditional Careers in Science and 
Engineering.  
  
PhDs 10 Years Later Conducted by Maresi Nerad and Joseph Cerny in 
approximately 1996 and funded by the Mellon 
Foundation and National Science Foundation. The 
survey involved almost 6000 PhDs from biochemistry, 
computer science, electrical ,engineering, English, 
mathematics, and political science from 61 institutions.  
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Table 1 (continued) 
  
Survey name Description 
  
Enhancing the postdoctoral 
experience for scientists and 
engineers 
Directed by Deborah Stine for the Committee on 
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy from 1999-
2000. Includes analysis of secondary data as well as 
survey responses from 40 organizations with 
postdoctoral appointees, 39 focus groups, and a day-long 
workshop with over 100 participants. 
  
Sigma Xi Led by Geoff Davis for Sigma Xi in partnership with the 
National Postdoctoral Association, Science NextWave 
Postdoc Network between December 2003 and April 
2005. Includes 22,400 postdocs at 47 institutions. 
  
American Association of 
Universities 
Conducted by the Graduate and Postdoctoral Education 
Committee of the AAU in March 2005. Included 
responses from 25 public and 14 private AAU 
universities. 
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Table 2 
 
National Science Foundation Surveys with Data about Postdoctoral Scholars 
 
Survey Name Description 
  
Survey of Earned Doctorates 
(annual) 
Provides information about new doctorate recipients 
with post-graduation commitments for employment or 
study. Postdoctoral appointments are counted as “study” 
for this purpose. Summary data tables are publicly 
available. 
  
Survey of Doctorate Recipients 
(biennial) 
1993 and 1997 surveys asked if current job is a 
postdoctoral appointment. 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2008 
ask if job was a postdoc and reasons for taking the 
postdoc. 1995 and 2006 asked respondents if current job 
is a postdoctoral appointment, number of postdocs held, 
and details about up to 3 postdocs. In 1993 an indicator 
of whether the position is a postdoc is available for 
public use. Other data about postdocs available only in 
restricted use dataset. 
  
Survey of Graduate Students 
and Postdoctorates in Science 
and Engineering (annual) 
This survey of US academic institutions provides 
aggregate data on the number and characteristics of 
postdoctoral scholars. 
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Table 3 
 
Substitution and Complementarity: Selected Studies of Research Production 
 
Study Factors Key findings Methods Data 
David et al. 
1999 
Public R&D 
(grants and 
contracts) and 
private R&D 
Ambiguous Review 30 studies 
conducted over 
35 years at the 
line of business/ 
lab, firm, 
industry, and 
aggregate 
levels. 
Caloghirou et 
al. 2004 
Internal 
knowledge 
creation and 
external 
knowledge 
seeking 
Both contribute to 
innovation in a 
potentially 
complementary 
way. 
OLS 558 firms from 
Greece, 
Italy, Denmark, 
UK, France, 
Germany and 
the Netherlands 
surveyed in 
2000. 
Mowery and 
Ziedonis 2007 
Invention 
disclosures, 
licenses, patents 
and materials 
transfer 
agreements 
(MTAs) 
MTAs do not 
reduce 
commercializ-
ation 
Comparison 
of means. 
83 invention 
disclosures 
linked to MTAs 
at U. of MI 
     
Blume-Kouhout 
et al. 2009 
Federal funding 
and non-federal 
funding for life 
sciences 
university R&D 
Complementarity Multivariate 
linear 
regression, 
fixed effects, 
and 
instrumental 
variables 
NSF Survey of 
Research and 
Development 
Expenditures at 
Universities and 
Colleges and 
NIH 
administrative 
records. 
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Table 4 
 
Substitution and Complementarity: Selected Studies of Contingent Employment 
     
Study Factors Key findings Methods Data 
     
Houseman et al. 
2003 
Agency 
temporary 
workers and 
regular 
employees in 
tight labor 
market 
Substitutes Case studies, 
interviews 
Interview data 
from 6 hospitals 
and 5 auto parts 
manufacturing 
firms, 1999 and 
2000 
     
Ko 2003 Contingent and 
internal 
employment. 
Complements Tobit regression 727 employers 
from the 
National 
Organizations 
Study, 1991 
     
Harrison 2007 US 
multinationals' 
employees in 
US and in other 
countries 
(offshoring) 
Complements in 
high-income 
countries, 
substitution in 
low-income 
countries. 
Regression 
plots 
1,746 parent 
firms and their 
foreign 
affiliates from 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis, 1977 
to 1999. 
     
Crino 2009 Developed 
country and 
offshore 
workers 
Weak 
substitutability 
Review 42 empirical 
studies of 
offshoring 
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Table 5 
 
Substitution and Complementarity: Selected Studies of Immigration 
 
Study Factors Key findings Methods Data 
     
Grossman 1982 Immigrants, 1st 
generation, 
natives 
All labor groups 
are substitutes, 
small wage 
effects on 
native workers 
Cross-sectional 
factor share 
calculations, 
seemingly 
unrelated 
regression 
19 Standard 
Metropolitan 
Statistical 
Areas. National 
Origin and 
Language 
Subject Report, 
County and 
City Data Book, 
Census of 
Manufacturing, 
and Annual 
Survey of 
Manufacturing, 
1969-1970. 
     
Borjas 2003 Immigrants and 
native workers 
across range of 
education and 
experience 
College 
graduates and 
high school 
dropouts 
experience 
largest wage 
decrease from 
immigration  
Regression 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990 
Decennial 
Census Public 
Use Microdata 
Samples and 
1999, 2000, 
2001 Annual 
Demographic 
Supplement of 
the Current 
Population 
Surveys 
     
Mendola 2008 Migration and 
adoption of 
technology 
Complementary IV, 
simultaneous 
equations. 
3,404 
households 
Bangladesh. 
     
Okkerse 2008 Immigrants and 
native workers 
Mixed results, 
effects on 
native workers 
generally small 
if any 
Review Simulation and 
econometric 
analyses 
immigration 
labor market 
effects. 
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Table 6 
 
Data Sources Used in Production Equation for University Research 
Data element Variable Source 
 
Unit  
Life sciences articles 
published 
Q Web of Science Program 
    
Life sciences citations Q Web of Science, National 
Research Council (NRC) 
Assessment 
Program 
    
NIH Stipend wPOSTDOC Ruth L. Kirschstein National 
Research Service Award 
(NRSA) 
Nation 
    
Faculty salaries wFACULTY National Education Association 
faculty salary report, Almanac of 
Higher Education 
University 
    
Construction cost of lab 
space 
wCAPITAL RSMeans Construction Cost 
Data 
City 
    
Rental rate of lab space wCAPITAL Published accounts City 
    
WebCaspar interface       
    
Graduate tuition and fees, 
out-of-state 
wDOCTORAL Integrated Postsecondary 
Educational Data System 
(IPEDS) Institutional 
Characteristics Survey Tuition 
Data 
University  
    
Graduate tuition and fees, 
in-state 
wDOCTORAL IPEDS Institutional 
Characteristics Survey Tuition 
Data 
University  
    
Number of postdocs XPOSTDOC National Science Foundation 
(NSF) Graduates and 
Postdoctorates 
Program 
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Table 6 (continued)    
    
Data element Variable Source Unit 
 
Net assignable square 
footage 
 
XCAPITAL 
 
NSF Survey of Science and 
Engineering Research Facilities 
 
Program 
    
NRC Assessment of 
Research Doctoral 
Programs 
      
    
Number of PhD students XDOCTORAL NRC Assessment Program 
    
Research assistantships XDOCTORAL NRC Assessment Program 
    
International wPHD NRC Assessment Program 
    
Total faculty XFACULTY NRC Assessment Program 
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Table 7 
 
 Descriptive Statistics for Research Production Function 
Variable Mean s.d. 
Doctoral     259.235     22.658 
Percent international        0.314       0.011 
Graduate tuition, in-state   12,518.740     931.631 
Graduate tuition, out-of-state   19,043.530     652.055 
Postdocs      185.455      31.774 
Total doctoral faculty      358.862      30.992 
Average salary       79.467       1.320 
Average benefits       20.807       0.423 
Lab space (sq. ft.) 535,262.700 46,075.590 
Lab rent       50.457       0.585 
Publications    1,064.690      98.351 
Citations    4,037.335     539.323 
Doctoral students      327.476      27.241 
Public        0.690       0.039 
Share doctoral        0.102       0.005 
Share postdocs        0.064       0.004 
Share faculty        0.376       0.017 
Share capital        0.304       0.023 
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Table 10 
 
Elasticities of Factor Complementarities at the Mean of the Factor Shares. 
  Elasticities of factor complementarities 
with respect to the quantity of 
Doctoral   Postdocs   Faculty   Capital   
Doctoral -0.122 *** 0.422 * 0.097 *** 0.107 *** 
Postdocs -0.288 *** 0.534 *** -0.015 ** 
Faculty       -0.066 *** 0.029 *** 
Public 
Doctoral -0.245 *** 0.213 *** 0.209 *** 0.163 *** 
Postdocs -0.293 *** 0.457 *** 0.086 ** 
Faculty       -0.227 *** -0.004 *** 
Private 
Doctoral -0.074 *** 0.178 *** -0.002 ** 0.254 *** 
Postdocs -0.311 *** 0.698 * -0.065 *** 
Faculty       -0.105 *** 0.087 *** 
 
Elasticities of factor complementarity are defined as d ln(pi/pj)/d ln(qi/qj), or Cij=(γij+SiSj) and 
Cii=( γii + Si2 - Si)/Si, where γij is the translog production function coefficient and Si is the 
share of factor i in output. The estimates above are evaluated at the means of the Si's. Factors 
are substitutes if Cij <0 ) and complements if Cij>0. 
 
†p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 11 
Selected Published Surveys Measuring Postdoc Satisfaction in the US 
Survey 
 
Data 
year Sample Measure Findings 
     
Sigma Xi 
Postdoc Survey 
(Davis 2005) 
2003 Postdocs in 
academic and non-
academic 
organizations in 
science, 
engineering, social 
science, and 
humanities fields. 
5-point 
Likert scale 
22% of postdocs 
expressed 
dissatisfaction. 
     
Survey of 
Doctorate 
Recipients 
(Corley and 
Sabharwal 
2007) 
2001 Postdocs who 
earned PhDs in the 
US 
Rated 9 
aspects of 
postdoc 
experience 
on  5-point 
Likert scale, 
very 
dissatisfied 
to very 
satisfied. 
Foreign-born 
scientists less 
satisfied on 5 criteria. 
Postdocs satisfied 
with intrinsic 
motivation, 
somewhat 
dissatisfied with 
extrinsic motivation.  
     
Survey of 
Scientists and 
Engineers 
(National 
Research 
Council 1981) 
1979 Postdocs in the 
biosciences who 
had received their 
PhDs in 1972 and 
1978.  
Qualitative 
comments 
75% of 1972 
graduates described 
postdoc 
appointments as 
highly rewarding. 
Approximately 75% 
of 1978 graduates 
were dissatisfied.  
     
Postdoctoral 
Experience 
Questionnaire 
(Curtis and 
National 
Research 
Council 1969) 
1967 Academic scientists Rated 8 
aspects of 
postdoc 
experience 
on 3-point 
scale 
unsatisfac-
tory to  
highly 
satisfactory. 
Only opportunity to 
teach was rated less 
than satisfactory. 
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Figure 1. Primary reasons for becoming a postdoc.  
Source: Survey of Doctorate Recipients data from SESTAT Metadata Explorer. 
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Figure 2. Benefits of postdoc appointments. 
Source: Survey of Doctorate Recipients data from SESTAT Metadata Explorer. 
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Figure 3. Stay rates for 2002 temporary resident science and engineering doctorate recipients 
from Asian nations. 
Source: Adapted from Finn, M. G. (2010). Stay rates of foreign doctorate recipients from US 
universities, 2007 (pp. 33). Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and 
Education. 
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Figure 4. Stay rates for 2002 temporary resident science and engineering doctorate recipients 
from Anglo-Saxon and European nations.  
Source: Adapted from Finn, M. G. (2010). Stay rates of foreign doctorate recipients from US 
universities, 2007 (pp. 33). Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and 
Education. 
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Figure 5. Stay rates for 2002 temporary resident science and engineering doctorate recipients 
from Anglo-Saxon and continental European nations. 
Source: Adapted from Finn, M. G. (2010). Stay rates of foreign doctorate recipients from US 
universities, 2007 (pp. 33). Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and 
Education. 
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Figure 6. Stay rates for 2002 temporary resident science and engineering doctorate recipients 
from Latin American nations 
Source: Adapted from Finn, M. G. (2010). Stay rates of foreign doctorate recipients from US 
universities, 2007 (pp. 33). Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and 
Education. 
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Figure 7. Theory of planned behavior model of doctoral students’ plans to pursue a 
postdoctoral appointment 
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Figure 8. Marginal effects of postdoc’s own and advisor’s perceived research ability on 
probability of dissatisfaction. 
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Figure 9. Frequency of advisor interaction and freedom to shape current research mediate 
relationship between program quality and postdoc dissatisfaction 
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Figure 10. Advisor activities mediate relationship between program quality and frequency of 
advisor interaction. 
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si
st
en
t w
ith
 it
s m
is
si
on
. 
Th
e 
us
e 
of
 c
at
eg
or
ic
al
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
nd
 
G
er
m
an
 su
bs
am
pl
e 
m
ay
 h
av
e 
co
m
pr
om
is
ed
 p
ow
er
 a
nd
 b
ia
se
d 
th
e 
st
ud
y.
 
O
nl
y 
an
al
yz
ed
 th
e 
30
%
 o
f d
oc
to
ra
l 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 b
ot
h 
co
m
in
g 
fr
om
 a
nd
 
go
in
g 
to
 a
 G
er
m
an
 
un
iv
er
si
ty
. O
nl
y 
an
al
yz
ed
 p
os
td
oc
 
da
ta
 th
ro
ug
h 
19
95
. 
U
se
 o
f c
at
eg
or
ic
al
 
m
ea
su
re
s f
or
 
co
nt
in
uo
us
 
va
ria
bl
es
. F
ie
ld
-
ba
se
d 
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
te
rp
re
te
d 
as
 b
ia
s 
m
or
e 
th
an
 m
is
si
on
. 
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K
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m
ita
tio
ns
 
B
ry
so
n,
 1
99
8 
 
O
ve
r 4
00
 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
re
se
ar
ch
 st
af
f 
at
 1
0 
U
K
 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s. 
C
R
S 
at
 o
ne
 
U
K
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
. 
D
ire
ct
or
s o
f 
Pe
rs
on
ne
l i
n 
al
l 
U
K
 H
EI
s. 
Su
rv
ey
 d
at
a 
of
 
C
R
S 
at
 1
0 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s. 
A
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
da
ta
 fr
om
 1
 
un
iv
er
si
ty
. 
N
at
io
na
l 
st
at
is
tic
s, 
jo
b 
ad
s f
or
 C
R
S 
in
 
19
96
, 
pr
el
im
in
ar
y 
re
su
lts
 fr
om
 
su
rv
ey
 o
f 
D
ire
ct
or
s o
f 
Pe
rs
on
ne
l. 
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 
su
rv
ey
 re
su
lts
. 
D
es
cr
ib
es
 fe
at
ur
es
 o
f C
R
S 
sy
st
em
 in
 
th
e 
U
K
. T
he
 a
ut
ho
r b
el
ie
ve
s t
he
 m
ai
n 
ro
ot
 c
au
se
s o
f p
ro
bl
em
 a
re
 w
ea
k 
ac
ad
em
ic
 u
ni
on
 in
vo
lv
em
en
t a
nd
 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l i
ne
rti
a.
 
D
at
a 
co
lle
ct
ed
 in
 
th
e 
U
K
 1
99
4-
19
98
. 
A
rti
cl
e 
ha
s a
 st
ro
ng
 
ad
vo
ca
cy
 to
ne
. 
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nd
 
da
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Su
bj
ec
ts
 
D
at
a 
M
et
ho
ds
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
Li
m
ita
tio
ns
 
B
ur
ris
, 2
00
4 
 
Fu
ll-
tim
e 
fa
cu
lty
 
m
em
be
rs
 li
st
ed
 
in
 A
m
er
ic
an
 
So
ci
ol
og
ic
al
 
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n’
s 
G
ui
de
 to
 
G
ra
du
at
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
 o
f 
So
ci
ol
og
y 
(1
99
5)
  
Fo
r e
ac
h 
fa
cu
lty
 
m
em
be
r, 
sc
ho
ol
 w
he
re
 
Ph
D
 w
as
 
re
ce
iv
ed
. 
C
ro
ss
ta
bu
la
tio
ns
 
an
d 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s i
n 
m
at
rix
. 
Pr
es
tig
e 
is
 v
er
y 
st
ab
le
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
se
lf-
re
pl
ic
at
in
g 
na
tu
re
 o
f s
oc
ia
l c
ap
ita
l. 
Th
e 
se
lf-
re
pl
ic
at
in
g 
be
ha
vi
or
 u
su
al
ly
 
ha
pp
en
s u
nd
er
 th
e 
gu
is
e 
of
 
un
iv
er
sa
lis
m
 a
nd
 m
er
ito
cr
ac
y.
 "
Th
e 
m
or
e 
co
m
m
on
 p
at
te
rn
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
lu
ck
y 
fe
w
 w
ho
 h
av
e 
be
en
 a
bl
e 
to
 p
ar
la
y 
a 
Ph
D
 fr
om
 a
 n
on
-to
p 
20
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t i
nt
o 
a 
jo
b 
at
 a
 to
p 
20
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t i
s t
ha
t t
he
y 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 th
is
 a
t t
he
 ti
m
e 
of
 th
ei
r f
irs
t 
jo
b—
of
te
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
ai
d 
of
 a
 
po
st
do
ct
or
al
 fe
llo
w
sh
ip
 fr
om
 a
 
pr
es
tig
io
us
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
r a
n 
ac
co
m
pa
ny
in
g 
ba
ch
el
or
’s
 o
r m
as
te
r’
s 
de
gr
ee
 fr
om
 a
n 
el
ite
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
" 
(p
. 
25
1)
. [
Th
is
 se
em
s t
o 
be
 th
e 
on
ly
 d
ire
ct
 
re
le
va
nc
e 
to
 p
os
td
oc
s.]
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f 
so
ci
ol
og
is
ts
. 
Po
st
do
cs
 a
re
 n
ot
 th
e 
fo
cu
s o
f t
he
 st
ud
y.
 
D
at
a 
ga
th
er
ed
 fr
om
 
fa
cu
lty
 in
 1
99
5,
 so
 
th
ey
 re
fle
ct
 e
ar
lie
r 
la
bo
r m
ar
ke
t 
co
nd
iti
on
s. 
  
 
C
ha
ng
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
05
  
C
an
ce
r 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
Fe
llo
w
sh
ip
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 a
t t
he
 
N
at
io
na
l 
C
an
ce
r 
In
st
itu
te
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 
al
um
ni
 
pl
ac
em
en
t 
re
co
rd
s, 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
re
co
rd
s 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y.
 
C
om
pe
tin
g 
de
m
an
ds
 o
n 
m
en
to
rs
, w
or
ki
ng
 
co
nd
iti
on
s, 
tra
in
in
g 
fo
r 
in
te
rd
is
ci
pl
in
ar
ity
, 
an
d 
ca
re
er
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
su
pp
or
t. 
Th
e 
pr
og
ra
m
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
us
ed
 a
s a
 m
od
el
 
fo
r o
th
er
 in
te
rd
is
ci
pl
in
ar
y 
fie
ld
s, 
si
nc
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 d
is
ci
pl
in
ar
y 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
 
do
n'
t p
ro
vi
de
 th
is
 ty
pe
 o
f p
os
td
oc
 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
. S
lig
ht
ly
 o
ve
r h
al
f o
f 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s (
55
%
) g
o 
on
 to
 ta
ke
 
po
si
tio
ns
 in
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t. 
Si
ng
le
 c
as
e 
st
ud
y.
 
M
ay
 n
ot
 g
en
er
al
iz
e 
to
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 
po
st
do
cs
. A
ut
ho
rs
 
af
fil
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
N
at
io
na
l C
an
ce
r 
In
st
itu
te
 m
ay
 n
ot
 
pr
ov
id
e 
un
bi
as
ed
 
ev
al
ua
tio
n.
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K
ey
 fi
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m
ita
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ns
 
C
or
le
y 
an
d 
Sa
bh
ar
w
al
, 
20
07
 
79
80
 sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
en
gi
ne
er
in
g 
ac
ad
em
ic
s w
ho
 
w
or
ke
d 
fu
ll-
tim
e 
at
 fo
ur
 
ye
ar
 c
ol
le
ge
s 
or
 u
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
, 
m
ed
ic
al
 
sc
ho
ol
s o
r 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 
re
se
ar
ch
 
in
st
itu
te
s. 
20
01
 S
D
R
 
C
hi
 sq
ua
re
, t
-
te
st
s, 
O
LS
 
Fo
re
ig
n 
bo
rn
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
in
 
po
st
do
c 
po
si
tio
ns
, a
nd
 to
 h
av
e 
ta
ke
n 
th
at
 p
os
iti
on
 d
ue
 to
 la
ck
 o
f o
th
er
 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s. 
Fo
re
ig
n 
bo
rn
 p
os
td
oc
s 
m
uc
h 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 h
av
e 
ta
ke
n 
a 
po
st
do
c 
to
 w
or
k 
w
ith
 a
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
pe
rs
on
. 
Fo
re
ig
n-
bo
rn
 p
os
td
oc
s l
es
s s
at
is
fie
d 
an
d 
m
or
e 
pr
od
uc
tiv
e,
 e
xc
ep
t f
or
 
pa
te
nt
s. 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
na
l. 
D
id
 
no
t d
is
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
fo
re
ig
n-
bo
rn
 b
y 
co
un
try
 o
f o
rig
in
. 
SD
R
 d
at
a 
on
ly
 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
os
e 
w
ith
 
Ph
D
s e
ar
ne
d 
in
 U
S 
C
ur
tis
, 1
96
9 
 
10
,7
40
 
po
st
do
cs
. 
4,
04
0 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
 a
t 
35
7 
sc
ho
ol
s. 
2,
19
5 
fa
cu
lty
 
w
ho
 m
en
to
r 
po
st
do
cs
 a
nd
 
56
4 
w
ho
 d
on
't.
 
12
5 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s. 
20
 
ca
m
pu
se
s. 
Fe
llo
w
sh
ip
 
sp
on
so
rs
. 
Su
rv
ey
s, 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s, 
ca
m
pu
s v
is
its
. 
Pr
im
ar
ily
 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
C
en
su
s a
nd
 d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 U
S 
po
st
do
cs
.
O
ld
er
 d
at
a 
of
 
pr
im
ar
ily
 h
is
to
ric
al
 
in
te
re
st
. 
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00
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In
cl
ud
es
 
22
,4
00
 
po
st
do
cs
 a
t 4
7 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Su
rv
ey
 
C
or
re
la
tio
ns
, 
ro
bu
st
 re
gr
es
si
on
 
w
ith
 a
n 
M
-
es
tim
at
or
, l
og
is
tic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
, 
Po
is
so
n 
re
gr
es
si
on
. 
Po
st
do
cs
 b
en
ef
ite
d 
fr
om
 st
ru
ct
ur
ed
 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
nd
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
Fe
w
 b
en
ef
its
 ti
ed
 to
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n.
 W
rit
in
g 
re
se
ar
ch
/ c
ar
ee
r 
pl
an
s a
t b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
f a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 2
5%
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
in
cr
ea
se
. O
th
er
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
: 
te
ac
hi
ng
, l
ea
rn
in
g 
ab
ou
t n
on
-a
ca
de
m
ic
 
ca
re
er
s, 
an
d 
tra
in
in
g 
in
 p
ro
po
sa
l 
w
rit
in
g 
an
d 
pr
oj
ec
t m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
na
l. 
Li
m
ite
d 
ca
us
al
 
in
fe
re
nc
e.
 
U
nd
er
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 A
fr
ic
an
-
A
m
er
ic
an
s a
nd
 
no
nc
iti
ze
ns
 a
m
on
g 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s. 
Fo
x 
an
d 
St
ep
ha
n,
 2
00
1 
23
48
 d
oc
to
ra
l 
st
ud
en
ts
 in
 8
0 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
 o
f 
ch
em
is
try
, 
co
m
pu
te
r 
sc
ie
nc
e,
 
el
ec
tri
ca
l 
en
gi
ne
er
in
g,
 
m
ic
ro
bi
ol
og
y,
 
an
d 
ph
ys
ic
s, 
19
93
-1
99
4.
 
M
ai
l s
ur
ve
y 
by
 
Fo
x,
 S
D
R
. 
C
hi
-s
qu
ar
e 
te
st
s, 
cr
os
st
ab
ul
at
io
ns
 
Th
e 
w
id
e 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
of
 p
os
td
oc
to
ra
l 
po
si
tio
ns
 in
 m
ic
ro
bi
ol
og
y 
m
ay
 le
ad
 
ne
w
 P
hD
s i
n 
th
at
 d
is
ci
pl
in
e 
to
 v
ie
w
 
th
ei
r c
ar
ee
r p
ro
sp
ec
ts
 m
or
e 
fa
vo
ra
bl
y 
th
an
 fi
el
ds
 w
ith
ou
t t
ho
se
 o
pt
io
ns
, 
re
ga
rd
le
ss
 o
f a
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
of
 te
nu
re
-
tra
ck
 p
os
iti
on
s. 
D
at
a 
co
lle
ct
ed
 fr
om
 
do
ct
or
al
 st
ud
en
ts
 in
 
19
93
-1
99
4 
an
d 
19
93
 S
D
R
 d
at
a 
fr
om
 P
hD
s 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 in
 1
98
7-
19
92
. L
ac
k 
of
 d
at
a 
on
 n
um
be
r o
f j
ob
 
ca
nd
id
at
es
 a
nd
 
op
en
in
gs
. 
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40
0 
Fr
en
ch
 li
fe
 
sc
ie
nc
e 
Ph
D
s 
an
d 
40
7 
U
S 
lif
e 
an
d 
ph
ys
ic
al
 
sc
ie
nt
is
ts
 a
t 
U
R
C
s. 
Fr
en
ch
 
re
c'd
 P
hD
 
19
84
-1
99
4 
an
d 
U
S 
19
84
-1
99
7.
  
Fr
en
ch
 d
at
a 
w
er
e 
fr
om
 a
 
su
rv
ey
 a
nd
 U
S 
da
ta
 w
er
e 
co
de
d 
fr
om
 
C
V
s (
pe
r D
ie
tz
 
et
 a
l. 
20
00
). 
D
is
cr
et
e 
tim
e 
pr
op
or
tio
na
l 
ha
za
rd
s m
od
el
. 
Po
st
do
cs
 d
el
ay
ed
 e
nt
ry
 in
to
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
Fr
an
ce
, b
ut
 
no
t i
n 
th
e 
U
S,
 p
ro
ba
bl
y 
du
e 
to
 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
ea
rly
 c
ar
ee
r m
ob
ili
ty
 in
 
th
e 
U
S.
 A
bo
ut
 1
/3
 o
f e
ac
h 
gr
ou
p 
to
ok
 a
 
po
st
do
c.
 N
ot
e:
 F
re
nc
h 
po
st
do
cs
 a
re
 
al
m
os
t b
y 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
ut
si
de
 o
f F
ra
nc
e.
 
C
V
s d
o 
no
t p
ro
vi
de
 
da
ta
 o
n 
no
n-
ac
ad
em
ic
 c
ar
ee
r 
pa
th
s. 
Se
le
ct
io
n 
on
 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e.
 
D
at
a 
re
fle
ct
 
do
ct
or
at
es
 e
ar
ne
d 
19
84
-1
99
7.
 
H
el
bi
ng
 e
t a
l.,
 
19
98
a 
 1
,3
22
 
Po
st
do
ct
or
al
 
fe
llo
w
s i
n 
lif
e,
 
ph
ys
ic
al
, a
nd
 
so
ci
al
 sc
ie
nc
es
.  
43
 L
ik
er
t-t
yp
e 
ite
m
s f
ro
m
 a
 
m
ai
l s
ur
ve
y.
  
Fa
ct
or
 a
na
ly
si
s 
an
d 
on
e-
w
ay
 
A
N
O
V
A
. 
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
an
d 
st
re
ss
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
th
e 
lo
ng
er
 so
m
eo
ne
 w
as
 a
 
po
st
do
c.
 6
0-
70
%
 re
po
rte
d 
be
in
g 
ac
tiv
el
y 
en
ga
ge
d 
in
 th
e 
se
ar
ch
 fo
r a
 
ne
w
 jo
b.
 P
os
td
oc
s i
n 
C
an
ad
a 
ar
e 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 n
ot
 tr
ea
te
d 
as
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s. 
C
an
ad
ia
ns
, m
os
tly
 
in
 C
an
ad
a 
an
d 
so
m
e 
in
 th
e 
U
S 
C
ro
ss
-
se
ct
io
na
l. 
D
at
a 
co
lle
ct
ed
 in
 1
99
6.
 
H
el
bi
ng
 e
t a
l.,
 
19
98
b 
 
Sa
m
e 
as
 
H
el
bi
ng
 e
t a
l. 
19
98
a.
 
Sa
m
e 
as
 
H
el
bi
ng
 e
t a
l. 
19
98
a.
 
Fa
ct
or
 a
na
ly
si
s 
an
d 
on
e-
w
ay
 
A
N
O
V
A
. 
W
om
en
 a
nd
 m
en
 w
er
e 
si
m
ila
r i
n 
m
an
y 
w
ay
s. 
W
om
en
 w
er
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 le
ct
ur
er
/ r
es
ea
rc
h 
as
so
ci
at
e 
ro
le
s o
r t
o 
na
m
e 
th
os
e 
as
 c
ar
ee
r 
go
al
s.W
om
en
 w
ith
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
st
re
ss
 p
rim
ar
ily
 re
la
te
d 
to
 is
ol
at
io
n 
an
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
 M
en
 w
ith
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
st
re
ss
 p
rim
ar
ily
 in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 fi
na
nc
es
. 
C
an
ad
ia
ns
, m
os
tly
 
in
 C
an
ad
a 
an
d 
so
m
e 
in
 th
e 
U
S 
C
ro
ss
-
se
ct
io
na
l. 
D
at
a 
co
lle
ct
ed
 in
 1
99
6.
 
Em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
ad
vo
ca
cy
 m
ay
 
co
m
pr
om
is
e 
ne
ut
ra
lit
y.
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H
or
nb
os
te
l e
t 
al
., 
20
09
 
69
5 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
 
fo
r E
m
m
y 
N
oe
th
er
 
fe
llo
w
sh
ip
s. 
Pa
rti
cu
la
r 
fo
cu
s o
n 
29
4 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
 in
 
ph
ys
ic
s a
nd
 
m
ed
ic
in
e,
 o
f 
w
ho
m
 5
0 
w
er
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 fo
r 
re
vi
ew
. 
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
 
fr
om
 W
eb
 o
f 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
da
ta
ba
se
 a
nd
 
in
te
rn
et
 se
ar
ch
 
vi
a 
G
oo
gl
e 
an
d 
M
SN
. 
O
nl
in
e 
su
rv
ey
. 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s. 
A
pp
lic
an
t 
fil
es
. 
C
on
te
nt
 a
na
ly
si
s, 
bi
bl
io
m
et
ric
s, 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
st
at
is
tic
s. 
R
ev
ie
w
er
s w
er
e 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 in
 se
le
ct
in
g 
pr
od
uc
tiv
e 
re
se
ar
ch
er
s. 
In
 m
ed
ic
in
e,
 
th
er
e 
w
as
 li
ttl
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 in
 o
ut
co
m
es
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 a
nd
 re
je
ct
ed
 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
. I
n 
ph
ys
ic
s, 
th
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
 h
ad
 b
et
te
r p
la
ce
m
en
t a
nd
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 o
ut
co
m
es
. 
A
pp
lie
s t
o 
a 
si
ng
le
 
pr
es
tig
io
us
 
fe
llo
w
sh
ip
 in
 
G
er
m
an
y.
 F
oc
us
 o
n 
di
sc
ip
lin
es
 o
f 
ph
ys
ic
s a
nd
 
m
ed
ic
in
e.
 P
re
st
ig
e 
of
 c
oa
ut
ho
rs
 m
ay
 
bi
as
 m
ea
su
re
s o
f 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
. 
H
or
ta
, 2
00
9 
49
2 
do
ct
or
at
e-
ho
ld
in
g 
fa
cu
lty
 
m
em
be
rs
 a
t 
hi
gh
er
 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 in
 
M
ex
ic
o 
D
at
a 
fr
om
 
19
99
-2
00
2 
ga
th
er
ed
 in
 th
e 
su
rv
ey
 b
y 
C
O
N
A
C
Y
T 
an
d 
U
N
A
M
. 
W
rit
te
n 
su
rv
ey
. 
O
rd
er
ed
 p
ro
bi
t 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
bi
no
m
ia
l 
re
gr
es
si
on
. 
Po
st
do
c 
w
as
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
le
ve
ls
 o
f a
ll 
ty
pe
s o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
. 
St
ud
y 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 w
er
e 
fa
cu
lty
 m
em
be
rs
 in
 
M
ex
ic
o 
19
99
-2
00
2.
 
D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
yo
un
ge
r 
an
d 
ol
de
r f
ac
ul
ty
 
in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
of
 p
os
td
oc
 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 h
av
e 
ch
an
ge
d 
ov
er
 ti
m
e 
an
d 
m
ay
 n
ot
 
ge
ne
ra
liz
e 
to
 th
e 
pr
es
en
t. 
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 2
00
9 
C
hi
ne
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nd
 
In
di
an
 st
ud
en
ts
 
ea
rn
in
g 
S&
E 
Ph
D
s 1
99
4-
20
00
, a
ge
s 2
7-
36
, w
ith
 4
-7
 
ye
ar
s d
oc
to
ra
l 
st
ud
y.
 
SE
D
 d
at
a.
  
U
se
s e
lig
ib
ili
ty
 
fo
r t
he
 1
99
0 
C
hi
ne
se
 S
tu
de
nt
 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
A
ct
 
(E
O
12
71
1)
 a
s a
n 
in
st
ru
m
en
t f
or
 
pe
rm
an
en
t v
is
a.
 
Li
ne
ar
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
m
od
el
, O
LS
 a
nd
 
2S
LS
. P
ro
bi
t 
m
od
el
 to
 e
st
im
at
e 
m
ar
gi
na
l e
ff
ec
ts
. 
Lo
ca
l A
ve
ra
ge
 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t E
ff
ec
ts
 
(L
A
TE
). 
N
ew
 P
hD
s f
ro
m
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tri
es
 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 ta
ke
 p
os
td
oc
s i
f t
he
y 
ha
ve
 te
m
po
ra
ry
 v
is
as
 th
an
 if
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
pe
rm
an
en
t o
ne
s. 
Th
is
 e
ff
ec
t i
s n
ot
 
fo
un
d 
fo
r P
hD
s f
ro
m
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 
co
un
tri
es
. T
he
 ro
le
 o
f v
is
a 
st
at
us
 is
 
is
ol
at
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 C
SP
A
 a
s a
n 
in
st
ru
m
en
t. 
Th
is
 e
ff
ec
t i
s m
os
t 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
 fi
el
ds
 w
he
re
 p
os
td
oc
s a
re
 
no
t e
xp
ec
te
d 
of
 m
os
t P
hD
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
ch
em
is
try
 a
nd
 p
hy
si
cs
. 
La
n 
no
te
s t
ha
t i
t 
w
as
 n
ot
 p
os
si
bl
e 
to
 
di
ff
er
en
tia
te
 
be
tw
ee
n 
di
ff
er
en
t 
ty
pe
s o
f p
er
m
an
en
t 
vi
sa
s, 
w
hi
ch
 m
ay
 
bi
as
 e
st
im
at
es
. 
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La
ud
el
 a
nd
 
G
la
se
r, 
20
08
 
16
 A
us
tra
lia
n 
re
se
ar
ch
er
s, 
9 
of
 w
ho
m
 a
re
 in
 
th
e 
sc
ie
nc
es
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 
tra
ns
cr
ip
ts
, 
bi
bl
io
gr
ap
hi
c 
re
co
rd
s, 
IS
I, 
SC
I 
Se
co
nd
ar
y 
an
al
ys
is
. C
re
at
io
n 
of
 c
hr
on
ol
og
ic
al
 
ca
re
er
 p
ro
fil
e 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
, 
ci
ta
tio
ns
, r
es
ea
rc
h 
to
pi
cs
, j
ob
 
po
si
tio
ns
 a
nd
 
th
ei
r 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s i
n 
te
rm
s o
f r
es
ou
rc
es
 
an
d 
au
to
no
m
y.
 
A
pp
re
nt
ic
es
 fa
de
 fr
om
 c
om
m
un
ity
 
ca
re
er
 b
y 
ab
an
do
ni
ng
 re
se
ar
ch
 o
r 
ta
ki
ng
 a
 ro
le
 w
he
re
 th
ey
 su
pp
or
t 
re
se
ar
ch
 b
y 
ot
he
rs
. A
ll 
EC
R
s b
ec
am
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t r
es
ea
rc
he
rs
 h
ad
 b
ui
lt 
on
 
th
e 
Ph
D
 to
pi
c.
  
In
 A
us
tra
lia
. 
U
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
 w
er
e 
hi
rin
g 
th
os
e 
w
ith
ou
t 
re
se
ar
ch
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
fo
r f
ac
ul
ty
 
po
si
tio
ns
, u
nl
ik
el
y 
in
 th
e 
U
S.
 C
ar
ee
r 
pr
of
ile
s w
er
e 
a 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
l 
in
no
va
tio
n.
 S
om
e 
de
si
ra
bl
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
no
t 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
in
 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
da
ta
.  
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in
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nd
 
Fi
nk
el
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ei
n,
 
20
01
 
 2
8 
Fe
llo
w
s 
(P
hD
 
sc
ie
nt
is
ts
) a
nd
 
11
 m
en
to
rs
 in
 
th
e 
3 
co
ho
rts
 
of
 P
os
td
oc
to
ra
l 
Fe
llo
w
sh
ip
s i
n 
Sc
ie
nc
e,
 
M
at
he
m
at
ic
s, 
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(P
FS
M
ET
E)
, 
19
97
-1
99
9.
 
O
pe
n-
en
de
d 
su
rv
ey
 
qu
es
tio
ns
 fr
om
 
N
SF
 (f
el
lo
w
s 
on
ly
), 
Li
ke
rt-
sc
al
e 
pr
og
ra
m
 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
qu
es
tio
ns
 
(F
el
lo
w
s a
nd
 
m
en
to
rs
), 
an
d 
op
en
-e
nd
ed
 
to
pi
ca
l 
qu
es
tio
ns
 
(F
el
lo
w
s a
nd
 
m
en
to
rs
). 
Th
em
at
ic
 a
nd
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
co
nt
en
t a
na
ly
se
s 
M
os
t r
es
po
nd
en
ts
 w
er
e 
hi
gh
ly
 sa
tis
fie
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
og
ra
m
. C
on
si
de
r 
im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 o
f p
ro
vi
di
ng
 fu
nd
in
g 
th
at
 
is
 n
ot
 th
ro
ug
h 
ho
st
 in
st
itu
tio
n 
(b
en
ef
its
, 
st
at
us
, i
so
la
tio
n)
 a
nd
 c
ha
lle
ng
es
 o
f 
pa
rti
ci
pa
tin
g 
in
 m
ul
tip
le
 d
is
ci
pl
in
es
. 
Ev
al
ua
te
s a
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
N
SF
-f
un
de
d 
fe
llo
w
sh
ip
 p
ro
gr
am
 
fo
r s
ci
en
tis
ts
 
in
te
re
st
ed
 in
 sc
ie
nc
e 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
re
se
ar
ch
. 
Ev
al
ua
to
rs
 h
ad
 a
ls
o 
be
en
 p
ro
gr
am
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
N
ot
 
en
ou
gh
 ti
m
e 
ha
d 
pa
ss
ed
 to
 m
ea
su
re
 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 
ou
tc
om
es
. 
M
ar
tin
ez
 e
t 
al
., 
20
07
 
1,
32
2 
po
st
do
ct
or
al
 
fe
llo
w
s a
t N
IH
. 
42
.6
%
 w
om
en
. 
A
 4
8-
qu
es
tio
n 
w
eb
 su
rv
ey
 
th
at
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
s, 
in
fo
 o
n 
qu
al
ity
 
of
 p
os
td
oc
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
(n
ot
 p
re
se
nt
ed
) 
an
d 
on
 c
ar
ee
r 
tra
ns
iti
on
 
de
ci
si
on
s. 
C
hi
-s
qu
ar
e 
te
st
s 
W
om
en
 a
re
 le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 se
ek
 a
 P
I 
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 p
er
si
st
 in
 
se
ek
in
g 
a 
PI
 p
os
iti
on
 if
 th
ey
 d
on
't 
fin
d 
on
e 
rig
ht
 a
w
ay
. T
he
re
fo
re
, P
Is
 a
re
 
se
le
ct
ed
 fr
om
 a
 p
oo
l w
ith
 fe
w
er
 
w
om
en
. W
om
en
 e
xp
re
ss
 a
 lo
t m
or
e 
co
nc
er
n 
ab
ou
t c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
d 
fa
m
ily
 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 c
ar
ee
r p
la
nn
in
g.
 T
he
y 
al
so
 
ex
pr
es
s l
es
s c
on
fid
en
ce
 in
 a
bi
lit
ie
s a
nd
 
ha
ve
 fe
w
 fe
m
al
e 
ro
le
 m
od
el
s. 
 
C
ro
ss
 se
ct
io
na
l. 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 w
er
e 
in
tra
m
ur
al
 p
os
td
oc
s 
at
 N
IH
 a
nd
 m
ay
 
di
ff
er
 fr
om
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 p
os
td
oc
s. 
141 
 
 
 
 Ta
bl
e 
A
1 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
ut
ho
r a
nd
 
da
te
 
Su
bj
ec
ts
 
D
at
a 
M
et
ho
ds
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
Li
m
ita
tio
ns
 
M
cG
in
ni
s e
t 
al
. 1
98
1 
55
7 
bi
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ts
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d 
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D
s i
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50
s e
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ly
 6
0s
 
A
rc
hi
va
l, 
bi
bl
io
m
et
ric
 
O
LS
, l
og
it,
 
m
ul
tin
om
ia
l l
og
it 
Pr
ed
oc
to
ra
l r
es
ea
rc
h 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 d
oe
s 
no
t i
nf
lu
en
ce
 w
ho
 d
oe
s a
 p
os
td
oc
 o
r 
th
e 
po
st
do
c's
 p
re
st
ig
e.
 A
 p
os
td
oc
 d
oe
s 
no
t s
ee
m
 to
 a
ff
ec
t o
ne
's 
ch
an
ce
s o
f 
ge
tti
ng
 a
 p
re
st
ig
io
us
 jo
b,
 b
ut
 th
e 
pr
es
tig
e 
of
 th
e 
po
st
do
c 
ha
s a
 m
aj
or
 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
pr
es
tig
e 
of
 su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 
jo
bs
. P
os
td
oc
to
ra
l t
ra
in
in
g 
se
em
s t
o 
re
su
lt 
in
 su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l i
nc
re
as
es
 in
 la
te
r 
ci
ta
tio
n 
ra
te
s, 
bu
t w
he
re
 th
e 
tra
in
in
g 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 m
ak
es
 li
ttl
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 in
 
ci
ta
tio
n 
ra
te
s. 
Th
e 
m
od
es
t e
ff
ec
t o
f 
po
st
do
ct
or
al
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 o
n 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
ra
te
s d
is
ap
pe
ar
s w
he
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
se
ct
or
 is
 h
el
d 
co
ns
ta
nt
. 
Sa
m
pl
e 
re
st
ric
te
d 
to
 
bi
oc
he
m
is
ts
 w
ho
 
ea
rn
ed
 d
oc
to
ra
te
s i
n 
19
57
, 5
8,
 6
2,
 a
nd
 
63
. T
hi
s s
tu
dy
 
ex
am
in
ed
 a
 p
er
io
d 
of
 p
le
nt
ifu
l 
ac
ad
em
ic
 jo
bs
. 
 
M
el
in
 2
00
4 
 
28
4 
Sw
ed
is
h 
Ph
D
s w
ho
 h
ad
 
a 
st
ay
 a
br
oa
d 
as
 a
 ju
ni
or
 
gu
es
t 
re
se
ar
ch
er
 
M
ai
l s
ur
ve
y 
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e,
 G
in
i-
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s 
Sw
ed
es
 te
nd
ed
 to
 d
o 
po
st
do
cs
 in
 
co
un
tri
es
 th
at
 h
av
e 
be
en
 h
is
to
ric
al
ly
 
do
m
in
an
t i
n 
sc
ie
nc
e 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 
em
er
gi
ng
. A
bo
ut
 h
al
f d
id
 p
os
td
oc
s i
n 
U
S.
 N
et
w
or
ks
 p
la
ye
d 
a 
ro
le
 in
 fi
nd
in
g 
po
st
do
c,
 b
ut
 su
pe
rv
is
or
 w
as
 u
su
al
ly
 n
ot
 
di
re
ct
ly
 in
vo
lv
ed
. C
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
ns
 o
fte
n 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
af
te
r t
he
 p
os
td
oc
. 
Sw
ed
is
h 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s h
ad
 
re
ce
iv
ed
 g
ra
nt
s 
19
84
-1
99
9.
 T
ha
t i
s, 
al
l h
ad
 S
w
ed
is
h 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
fu
nd
in
g.
 T
ho
se
 w
ho
 
ha
d 
le
ft 
Sw
ed
en
 
w
er
e 
no
t i
n 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e.
 
R
et
ro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
se
lf-
re
po
rt 
da
ta
. 
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M
el
in
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pl
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 1
5 
te
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in
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rv
ie
w
s. 
Sa
m
e 
da
ta
 a
s 
M
el
in
 (2
00
4)
 
pl
us
 1
5 
te
le
ph
on
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s. 
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
an
d 
qu
al
ita
tiv
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n.
 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 o
f p
os
td
oc
s 
w
er
e 
m
ai
nl
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 re
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
ba
ck
 a
t t
he
 h
om
e 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
an
d 
w
er
e 
so
m
ew
ha
t g
re
at
er
 fo
r w
om
en
 th
an
 fo
r 
m
en
. T
hi
s h
as
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l a
s 
w
el
l a
s p
er
so
na
l e
ff
ec
ts
. 
Si
m
ila
r t
o 
M
el
in
 
20
04
. T
he
 fa
ct
 th
at
 
Sw
ed
is
h 
po
st
do
cs
 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 h
ad
 a
 
ho
m
e 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
to
 
re
tu
rn
 to
 is
 v
er
y 
di
ff
er
en
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
U
S 
m
od
el
. 
M
en
g 
an
d 
Su
, 
20
09
  
38
8 
sc
ie
nt
is
ts
 
at
 R
1 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s 
C
V
s a
nd
 
su
rv
ey
 
re
sp
on
se
s 
fr
om
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
va
lu
e 
m
ap
pi
ng
 
pr
oj
ec
t. 
Pr
es
tig
e 
ra
nk
in
gs
.  
N
eg
at
iv
e 
bi
on
om
ia
l 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
Po
st
do
cs
 in
cr
ea
se
 re
se
ar
ch
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
ov
er
 fi
rs
t 3
 y
ea
rs
 in
 P
hD
. T
hi
s e
ff
ec
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 v
ar
y 
by
 g
en
de
r. 
W
om
en
's 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
re
m
ai
ns
 lo
w
er
 w
he
th
er
 o
r 
no
t t
he
re
 is
 a
 p
os
td
oc
s. 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 w
er
e 
fa
cu
lty
 m
em
be
rs
 a
t 
R
1 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s, 
so
 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 
on
 a
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ria
bl
e.
 S
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
tru
nc
at
io
n 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 C
V
s 
m
ay
 b
ia
s s
am
pl
e.
 
M
is
ha
gi
na
, 
20
09
a 
 
15
,0
00
 w
hi
te
 
m
en
 w
ith
 P
hD
s 
in
 n
at
ur
al
 
sc
ie
nc
es
 a
nd
 
en
gi
ne
er
in
g 
SD
R
 1
97
3-
20
01
 
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
m
od
el
 
w
ith
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
co
m
pe
tin
g 
ris
ks
. 
Th
os
e 
w
ho
 d
id
 m
an
y 
po
st
do
cs
 w
er
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 le
av
e 
S&
E 
fo
r g
oo
d,
 b
ut
 
w
er
e 
no
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 sw
itc
h 
be
tw
ee
n 
R
&
D
 a
nd
 a
pp
lie
d 
w
or
k.
 T
he
 m
or
e 
tim
e 
pa
ss
es
 w
ith
ou
t g
et
tin
g 
an
 R
&
D
 
po
si
tio
n,
 th
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 is
 
to
 le
av
e 
sc
ie
nc
e.
 
W
hi
le
 th
is
 is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
lly
 
st
ro
ng
er
 st
ud
ie
s, 
th
e 
da
ta
 g
en
er
al
ly
 
re
fle
ct
 a
 m
uc
h 
ea
rli
er
 ti
m
e 
pe
rio
d.
 
In
 so
m
e 
an
al
ys
es
, 
on
ly
 m
al
e 
sc
ie
nt
is
ts
 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
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nd
 
da
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ts
 
D
at
a 
M
et
ho
ds
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
Li
m
ita
tio
ns
 
M
is
ha
gi
na
, 
20
09
b 
M
en
 a
nd
 
w
om
en
 in
 th
e 
lif
e 
sc
ie
nc
es
. 
C
om
pa
ris
on
 o
f 
tre
nd
s i
n 
ex
it 
ra
te
s a
cr
os
s 
di
sc
ip
lin
es
. 
SD
R
 1
97
3-
20
01
 
D
yn
am
ic
 
oc
cu
pa
tio
na
l 
ch
oi
ce
 m
od
el
. 
M
et
ho
d 
of
 
si
m
ul
at
ed
 
m
om
en
ts
. 
D
at
a 
se
em
 m
os
t c
on
si
st
en
t w
ith
 
sc
ie
nt
is
ts
 se
ek
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
th
ei
r l
ev
el
 o
f r
es
ea
rc
h 
ab
ili
ty
. R
es
ul
ts
 
ar
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 so
rti
ng
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
co
m
pa
ra
tiv
e,
 n
ot
 a
bs
ol
ut
e,
 a
dv
an
ta
ge
. 
N
ot
 sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
 a
bo
ut
 p
os
td
oc
s. 
 
W
hi
le
 th
is
 is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
lly
 
st
ro
ng
er
 st
ud
ie
s, 
th
e 
da
ta
 g
en
er
al
ly
 
re
fle
ct
 a
 m
uc
h 
ea
rli
er
 ti
m
e 
pe
rio
d.
 
M
is
ha
gi
na
, 
20
09
c 
D
oc
to
ra
te
 
re
ci
pi
en
ts
 
19
57
-2
00
5,
 n
ot
 
ju
st
 sc
ie
nt
is
ts
. 
SE
D
 
N
es
te
d 
lo
gi
t 
m
od
el
, p
ro
bi
t 
m
od
el
 fo
r E
U
-1
5.
 
U
S 
do
ct
or
at
es
 b
ec
am
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
ta
ke
 a
 fi
rs
t p
os
iti
on
 in
 C
an
ad
a 
ov
er
 
tim
e.
 U
S 
ci
tiz
en
s w
er
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
m
ov
e 
to
 C
an
ad
a 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
V
ie
tn
am
 
w
ar
 a
nd
 M
id
dl
e 
Ea
st
er
n 
gr
ad
ua
te
s w
er
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 m
ov
e 
to
 C
an
ad
a 
af
te
r 
9/
11
. H
ig
h 
U
S 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t m
ad
e 
U
S 
an
d 
3C
N
s m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 g
o 
to
 
C
an
ad
a,
 b
ut
 d
id
 n
ot
 a
ff
ec
t C
an
ad
ia
ns
. 
(T
hi
s e
ss
ay
 w
as
 n
ot
 re
al
ly
 a
bo
ut
 
po
st
do
cs
, b
ut
 w
as
 a
bo
ut
 fi
rs
t p
os
iti
on
 
af
te
r t
he
 d
oc
to
ra
te
). 
W
hi
le
 th
is
 is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
lly
 
st
ro
ng
er
 st
ud
ie
s, 
th
e 
da
ta
 g
en
er
al
ly
 
re
fle
ct
 a
 m
uc
h 
ea
rli
er
 ti
m
e 
pe
rio
d.
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K
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M
us
se
lin
, 
20
04
 
18
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
 
of
 h
is
to
ry
 a
nd
 
m
at
he
m
at
ic
s i
n 
Fr
an
ce
 a
nd
 
G
er
m
an
y 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
Fi
el
d 
re
se
ar
ch
 
A
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
ac
ad
em
ic
 la
bo
r m
ar
ke
t i
s 
im
pe
de
d 
by
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s a
m
on
g 
na
tio
na
l 
la
bo
r m
ar
ke
ts
. I
nd
iv
id
ua
l a
ct
or
s a
ls
o 
m
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 a
ca
de
m
ic
 m
ob
ili
ty
 in
 a
 
w
ay
 th
at
 d
oe
s n
ot
 le
ad
 to
 c
ar
ee
rs
 
ou
ts
id
e 
of
 th
e 
ho
m
e 
co
un
try
. 
Fo
cu
s i
s o
n 
Fr
an
ce
 
an
d 
G
er
m
an
y 
an
d 
di
sc
ip
lin
es
 o
f m
at
h 
an
d 
hi
st
or
y.
 F
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
G
er
m
an
y 
m
ay
 
be
 so
m
ew
ha
t 
un
iq
ue
 in
 e
xp
ec
tin
g 
in
st
ru
ct
io
n 
to
 ta
ke
 
pl
ac
e 
in
 th
e 
lo
ca
l 
la
ng
ua
ge
. T
hi
s 
pa
pe
r s
um
m
ar
iz
es
 
fin
di
ng
s f
ro
m
 
re
po
rts
 o
f r
es
ea
rc
h 
fo
r t
he
 F
re
nc
h 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
nd
 
do
es
 n
ot
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. T
he
 
re
po
rts
 w
er
e 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 in
 1
99
7 
an
d 
20
02
. 
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D
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a 
M
et
ho
ds
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
Li
m
ita
tio
ns
 
N
er
ad
 a
nd
 
C
er
ny
, 1
99
9 
 
5,
85
4 
Ph
D
 
gr
ad
ua
te
s f
ro
m
 
61
 u
ni
ve
si
tie
s 
in
 
bi
oc
he
m
is
try
, 
co
m
pu
te
r 
sc
ie
nc
e,
 
el
ec
tri
ca
l 
en
gi
ne
er
in
g,
 
En
gl
is
h,
 
m
at
he
m
at
ic
s, 
po
lit
ic
al
 
sc
ie
nc
e,
 1
98
2-
85
. 
Ph
.D
.s-
-T
en
 
Y
ea
rs
 L
at
er
 
Su
rv
ey
 
C
ro
ss
ta
bu
la
tio
ns
 
an
d 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
st
at
is
tic
s. 
B
io
ch
em
 st
ay
ed
 lo
ng
er
 in
 p
os
td
oc
s a
nd
 
ha
d 
lo
w
es
t %
 te
nu
re
d 
fa
cu
lty
. W
om
en
 
w
er
e 
m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 ta
ke
 a
 
po
st
do
c 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r t
he
m
 
an
d 
th
ei
r s
po
us
e.
 P
os
td
oc
s h
ad
 a
 st
ro
ng
 
ef
fe
ct
 a
t m
ov
in
g 
m
al
e 
Ph
D
s i
nt
o 
te
nu
re
 
tra
ck
 a
nd
 te
nu
re
d 
po
si
tio
ns
. 
Su
bj
ec
ts
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
Ph
D
s i
n 
19
82
-8
5.
 
Th
is
 is
 a
 su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 a
 la
rg
er
 st
ud
y 
an
d 
pr
ov
id
es
 li
ttl
e 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
l 
de
ta
il.
 
N
ol
an
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
04
 
1,
59
5 
te
nu
re
 
tra
ck
 fa
cu
lty
 a
t 
N
R
C
 to
p-
50
 
ch
em
is
try
 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
 
20
01
 A
C
S 
D
ire
ct
or
y 
of
 
G
ra
du
at
e 
R
es
ea
rc
h,
 
W
eb
C
as
pa
r 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
an
d 
cr
os
st
ab
ul
at
io
n,
 
G
ot
ts
el
ig
 a
nd
 
O
el
tje
n 
"i
m
pa
ct
 
fa
ct
or
" 
fo
r 
su
cc
es
s o
f 
gr
ad
ua
te
 
pl
ac
em
en
t. 
O
ve
r 9
0%
 o
f n
ew
 fa
cu
lty
 h
ad
 h
el
d 
a 
po
st
do
c.
 F
el
lo
w
sh
ip
s a
t t
op
 5
 su
pp
lie
r 
sc
ho
ol
s h
ad
 st
ro
ng
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
l e
ff
ec
ts
 o
n 
pl
ac
em
en
t i
n 
to
p 
50
 p
ro
gr
am
s. 
W
om
en
 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
to
 fa
ce
 b
ar
rie
rs
 to
 h
iri
ng
 in
 
ch
em
is
try
. 
Su
bj
ec
ts
 w
er
e 
ch
em
is
try
 fa
cu
lty
 in
 
to
p 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
, 
ha
lf 
of
 w
ho
m
 h
ad
 
re
ce
iv
ed
 d
oc
to
ra
te
s 
be
fo
re
 1
97
9.
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et
ho
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K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
Li
m
ita
tio
ns
 
N
ol
an
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
08
 
45
5 
gr
ad
ua
te
s 
(1
35
 w
om
en
) 
fr
om
 1
1 
to
p 
ch
em
is
try
 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
, 
19
88
-1
99
2 
Su
rv
ey
 d
at
a 
M
A
N
O
V
A
 
W
om
en
's 
re
sp
on
se
s i
nd
ic
at
ed
 a
 lo
w
er
 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
le
ve
l o
f i
nt
er
es
t b
y 
th
ei
r 
po
st
do
c 
ad
vi
so
r i
n 
th
ei
r r
es
ea
rc
h 
fin
di
ng
s, 
re
se
ar
ch
 id
ea
s, 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s. 
N
o 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 w
as
 fo
un
d 
in
 h
ow
 m
en
 a
nd
 
w
om
en
 ra
te
d 
th
ei
r p
os
t d
oc
 a
dv
is
in
g 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 o
th
er
s i
n 
th
ei
r p
ro
gr
am
 o
r 
ho
w
 th
ey
 fo
un
d 
th
ei
r f
irs
t c
ar
ee
r 
po
si
tio
n.
 
R
el
ie
d 
on
 
re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
se
lf-
re
po
rts
 o
f 
m
en
to
rin
g 
ex
pe
rie
nc
es
. 
Su
bj
ec
ts
 re
ce
iv
ed
 
Ph
D
s i
n 
ch
em
is
try
 
fr
om
 to
p-
10
 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
 in
 
19
88
–1
99
2.
 
Pu
lja
k 
an
d 
Sh
ar
if,
 2
00
9 
30
1 
po
st
do
cs
 a
t 
th
e 
U
T 
So
ut
hw
es
te
rn
 
M
ed
ic
al
 C
en
te
r 
in
 2
00
5 
Su
rv
ey
 re
su
lts
 
H
ar
co
py
 su
rv
ey
, 
37
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 
Th
is
 is
 a
 h
ea
vi
ly
 im
m
ig
ra
nt
 p
os
td
oc
 
po
pu
la
tio
n.
 P
eo
pl
e 
st
ay
 in
 p
os
td
oc
s f
or
 
a 
lo
ng
 ti
m
e 
be
ca
us
e 
fa
cu
lty
 p
os
iti
on
s 
sc
ar
ce
. M
os
t p
os
td
oc
s w
ou
ld
 li
ke
 to
 
st
ay
 in
 sc
ie
nc
e.
 P
rio
rit
ie
s a
re
 jo
b 
pl
ac
em
en
t, 
sa
la
ry
, a
nd
 tr
ai
ni
ng
, w
hi
ch
 
sh
ou
ld
 le
ad
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 to
 fo
cu
s o
n 
jo
b 
an
d 
tra
in
in
g 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s. 
Si
ng
le
 si
te
. T
ho
se
 
w
ith
 st
ro
ng
 
op
in
io
ns
 o
r i
nt
er
es
t 
in
 jo
in
in
g 
an
 
as
so
ci
at
io
n 
m
ay
 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 re
sp
on
d.
 
Po
st
do
cs
 o
n 
lo
ng
 
as
si
gn
m
en
ts
 m
ay
 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ov
er
sa
m
pl
ed
. 
R
ec
ot
ill
et
, 
20
07
 
1,
74
4 
Fr
en
ch
 
Ph
D
s f
ro
m
 
19
96
 in
 
sc
ie
nc
e,
 
en
gi
ne
er
in
g 
an
d 
hu
m
an
iti
es
.  
Su
rv
ey
 in
 
19
99
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t e
ff
ec
t 
m
od
el
, b
iv
ar
ia
te
 
se
le
ct
io
n 
ru
le
. 
Po
st
do
cs
 fu
nc
tio
n 
as
 a
 si
gn
al
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
e 
w
ag
e 
pr
em
iu
m
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
th
em
 d
is
ap
pe
ar
s w
he
n 
se
le
ct
io
n 
bi
as
 is
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d.
 
Su
bj
ec
ts
 re
ce
iv
ed
 
do
ct
or
at
es
 in
 F
ra
nc
e 
in
 1
99
6.
 D
oe
s n
ot
 
di
st
in
gu
is
h 
am
on
g 
ty
pe
s o
f 
po
st
do
ct
or
al
 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
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D
at
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M
et
ho
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K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
Li
m
ita
tio
ns
 
R
es
ki
n,
 1
97
6 
45
0 
do
ct
or
al
 
ch
em
is
ts
 w
ho
 
ea
rn
ed
 d
eg
re
es
 
in
 U
S 
19
55
-
19
61
. 2
21
 w
er
e 
fe
m
al
e,
 2
23
 
w
er
e 
a 
sy
st
em
at
ic
 
ra
nd
om
 sa
m
pl
e 
of
 m
al
es
. 
D
ire
ct
or
y 
of
 
G
ra
du
at
e 
R
es
ea
rc
h,
 
A
m
er
ic
an
 M
en
 
an
d 
W
om
en
 in
 
Sc
ie
nc
e,
 o
th
er
 
bi
og
ra
ph
ic
al
 
sk
et
ch
es
, a
nd
 
m
ai
le
d 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
s. 
C
he
m
ic
al
 
A
bs
tra
ct
s, 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
C
ita
tio
n 
In
de
x.
 
A
na
ly
si
s o
f 
co
va
ria
nc
e 
Fo
r m
en
, p
os
td
oc
s r
ef
le
ct
ed
 
pr
ed
oc
to
ra
l a
ch
ie
ve
m
en
t a
nd
 p
re
di
ct
ed
 
fu
tu
re
 c
ar
ee
r a
dv
an
ce
m
en
t. 
Th
es
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 d
id
 n
ot
 h
ol
d 
fo
r w
om
en
, a
 
fin
di
ng
 m
os
t c
on
si
st
en
t w
ith
 a
 se
x 
di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n.
 
Su
bj
ec
ts
 e
ar
ne
d 
Ph
D
s i
n 
ch
em
is
try
 
19
55
-1
96
1.
 
Po
st
do
cs
 w
er
e 
de
fin
ed
 so
 a
s t
o 
on
ly
 in
cl
ud
e 
pr
es
tig
io
us
 
fe
llo
w
sh
ip
s. 
St
ep
ha
n 
&
 
M
a,
 2
00
5 
U
S 
Ph
D
 
re
ci
pi
en
ts
 in
 1
0 
br
oa
d 
fie
ld
s o
f 
sc
ie
nc
e 
&
 
en
gi
ne
er
in
g 
w
ho
 in
di
ca
te
d 
th
ey
 p
la
nn
ed
 to
 
st
ay
 in
 th
e 
U
S.
 
SE
D
 d
at
a,
 
19
81
-2
00
0,
 
SD
R
 d
at
a 
fo
r 
19
95
, w
hi
ch
 
co
nt
ai
ns
 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
ca
re
er
 h
is
to
ry
 
qu
es
tio
ns
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
up
 to
 
3 
po
st
do
cs
. 
Lo
gi
t a
na
ly
si
s a
nd
 
du
ra
tio
n 
m
od
el
 o
f 
lo
g 
le
ng
th
 o
f 
po
st
do
c 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e.
 
G
ra
du
at
es
 h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
ta
ke
 p
os
td
oc
s a
nd
 re
m
ai
n 
in
 p
os
td
oc
s 
fo
r l
on
ge
r p
er
io
ds
 o
f t
im
e 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
hi
gh
er
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f t
he
m
 a
re
 o
n 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 v
is
as
, a
 h
ig
he
r p
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f 
th
em
 a
re
 in
 th
e 
lif
e 
sc
ie
nc
es
, a
nd
 th
ey
 
ha
ve
 fa
ce
d 
a 
m
or
e 
di
ff
ic
ul
t j
ob
 m
ar
ke
t. 
H
um
an
 c
ap
ita
l m
ay
 b
e 
w
as
te
d 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 a
ge
 a
nd
 te
nu
re
 e
ff
ec
ts
. 
SE
D
 d
at
a 
sp
an
 fr
om
 
19
81
-2
00
0.
 L
ab
or
 
m
ar
ke
t c
on
di
tio
ns
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
su
bj
ec
tiv
el
y.
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Su
, 2
00
9a
 
Su
bs
am
pl
e 
of
 
51
4 
sc
ie
nt
is
ts
 
w
ith
 a
de
qu
at
e 
ca
re
er
 d
at
a 
fr
om
 1
64
7 
re
sp
on
se
s a
nd
 
11
06
 C
V
s f
ro
m
 
te
nu
re
d 
or
 
te
nu
re
 tr
ac
k 
fa
cu
lty
 in
 1
3 
S&
E 
di
sc
ip
lin
es
 a
t 
15
0 
re
se
ar
ch
 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s. 
 
Fr
om
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
V
al
ue
 
M
ap
pi
ng
 
pr
oj
ec
t a
t G
A
 
Te
ch
. 
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 
re
sp
on
se
s a
nd
 
co
de
d 
C
V
s. 
M
ul
tin
om
ia
l l
og
it 
re
gr
es
si
on
. 
D
id
 n
ot
 su
pp
or
t t
he
 id
ea
 th
at
 p
os
td
oc
s 
w
er
e 
le
ss
 q
ua
lif
ie
d 
th
an
 n
on
 p
os
td
oc
s. 
Po
st
do
cs
 in
 p
re
st
ig
io
us
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
 
w
er
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
 in
 
pr
es
tig
io
us
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
. P
re
st
ig
e 
of
 
Ph
D
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t a
ls
o 
ha
d 
an
 e
ff
ec
t. 
N
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 th
at
 p
re
-d
oc
to
ra
l p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
m
at
te
re
d.
 A
t a
bo
ut
 3
 y
ea
rs
, a
 p
os
td
oc
 
sh
ow
s i
ts
 p
la
ce
m
en
t b
en
ef
it 
Fo
re
ig
n 
po
st
do
cs
 a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
pl
ac
ed
 
in
 p
re
st
ig
io
us
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 
A
si
an
s. 
N
o 
ge
nd
er
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s. 
Su
bj
ec
ts
 w
er
e 
fa
cu
lty
 a
t R
1 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s. 
D
iff
ic
ul
ty
 in
 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 
po
si
tio
ns
 w
er
e 
po
st
do
cs
 fr
om
 C
V
 
da
ta
. A
bs
en
ce
 o
f 
ge
nd
er
 e
ff
ec
t m
ay
 
be
 d
ue
 to
 n
ot
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
ot
he
r 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
s l
ik
e 
m
ar
ria
ge
 a
nd
 
ch
ild
re
n.
 
Su
, 2
00
9b
 
Su
bs
am
pl
e 
of
 
86
0 
sc
ie
nt
is
ts
. 
38
8 
w
/in
 3
 
ye
ar
s o
f 
de
gr
ee
, 2
45
 
w
/in
 9
 y
ea
rs
 o
f 
de
gr
ee
, a
nd
 
22
7 
w
/in
 1
3 
ye
ar
s o
f d
eg
re
e 
Fr
om
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
V
al
ue
 
M
ap
pi
ng
 
pr
oj
ec
t a
t G
A
 
Te
ch
. 
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
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sp
on
se
s a
nd
 
co
de
d 
C
V
s. 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
bi
no
m
ia
l 
re
gr
es
si
on
. 
Po
st
do
cs
 in
cr
ea
se
 re
se
ar
ch
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
bu
t o
nl
y 
du
rin
g 
fir
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 3
 y
ea
rs
. 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
ta
l p
re
st
ig
e 
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ea
se
s 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 b
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 o
nl
y 
in
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ig
hl
y 
pr
es
tig
io
us
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
. I
n 
an
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
of
 c
um
ul
at
iv
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e,
 p
os
td
oc
s 
in
cr
ea
se
 fu
tu
re
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 b
y 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
e 
ch
an
ce
s o
f b
ei
ng
 h
ire
d 
in
 
a 
hi
gh
ly
 p
re
st
ig
io
us
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t. 
A
ve
ra
ge
 y
ea
r o
f 
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D
 re
ce
ip
t w
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19
86
. S
ub
je
ct
s w
er
e 
fa
cu
lty
 a
t R
1 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s. 
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 p
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 c
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 c
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 c
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, p
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 p
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 p
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t p
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re
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 b
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r t
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 b
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 m
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 p
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r t
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. D
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 m
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 b
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 o
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 p
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 p
os
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 p
os
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 b
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 b
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ra
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 d
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l c
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 b
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 b
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 b
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Table B2 
Multinomial Probit Model of Postdoc Satisfaction 
 
Satisfied Dissatisfied 
  b/se  b/se 
Research interesting 0.417 (0.507) -2.366 (0.536) ***
Mismatch average -0.165 (0.186) -0.169 (0.290) 
Current basic 0.389 (0.608) 1.345 (0.758) † 
Current applied 0.551 (0.275) * 0.077 (0.319) 
Current development -0.296 (0.257) -0.521 (0.397) 
Reason - No job 0.050 (0.412) 0.977 (0.424) * 
Reason - Desired job 0.111 (0.335) 0.471 (0.310) 
Reason - Skills 1.008 (0.368) ** 0.779 (0.391) * 
Reason - More time -0.386 (0.195) * -0.345 (0.239) 
Faculty career plans 0.275 (0.248) -0.49 (0.317) 
Interest in basic -0.436 (0.630) 1.409 (0.587) * 
Interest in applied 1.199 (0.532) * 1.613 (0.724) * 
Interest in development -0.462 (0.313) 0.083 (0.325) 
Advisor ability 0.308 (0.248) ** 0.797 0.272 
Advisor 1+ per week 0.258 (0.395) 0.797 (0.272) ** 
Self-rated ability 0.397 (0.330) -0.018 (0.644) 
Shape current research 0.578 (0.219) ** 1.228 (0.307) ***
Lab size 0.011 (0.019) 0.213 (0.316) 
High quality program 0.029 (0.433) 0.653 (0.433) 
Female -0.241 (0.705) 0.462 (0.908) 
Children 0.453 (0.400) -0.156 (0.309) 
Married 0.255 (0.229) -0.037 (0.294) 
Start year -0.139 (0.072) † -0.299 (0.074) ***
Non-US high income -0.490 (0.298) † -0.759 (0.349) * 
Non-US other -1.025 (0.422) * -1.379 (0.638) * 
Basic current x interest 0.588 (0.600) -0.781 (0.910) 
No job x applied 0.098 (0.527) -1.743 (0.707) * 
Self-rated ability x advisor 
ability -0.042 (0.039) -0.145 (0.041) ***
High quality x shape 0.306 (0.371) -1.173 (0.616) † 
Female x interest in basic 0.296 (0.584) -1.921 (0.820) * 
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Table B2 (continued) 
 
Satisfied Dissatisfied 
b/se b/se 
Female x children 0.058 (0.584) 0.934 (0.650) 
Female x bio sciences -0.184 (0.638) 1.969 (0.982) * 
Female x health sciences 1.007 (0.642) -0.904 (1.041) 
Non-US other x bio sciences 0.346 (0.415) -0.373 (0.610) 
Advisor 1+/wk. x bio sciences 0.225 (0.390) -0.598 (0.613) 
Biological sciences -1.660 (0.525) ** -1.532 (0.821) † 
Health sciences 0.748 (0.386) † 1.59 (0.701) * 
Constant 274.511 145.254 † 592.169 149.856
 
***
N   764         
ll -289.845
bic   991.281         
 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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